Artifacts of Thinking by Berkowitz, Roger & Storey, Ian

A r t i f a c t s  o f  T h i n k i n g
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   i 11/2/16   11:12 AM
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   ii 11/2/16   11:12 AM
Artifacts of Thinking
Reading Hannah Arendt’s 
Denktagebuch
Roger Berkowitz and Ian Storey
Editors
f o r d h a m  u n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s
New York 2017
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   iii 11/2/16   11:12 AM
Copyright © 2017 Fordham University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in 
any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, 
photocopy, recording, or any other—except for brief 
quotations in printed reviews, without the prior 
permission of the publisher.
Fordham University Press has no responsibility for the 
persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third- party 
Internet websites referred to in this publication and does 
not guarantee that any content on such websites is, 
or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Fordham University Press also publishes its books in a 
variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in 
print may not be available in electronic books.
Visit us online at www.fordhampress.com.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Berkowitz, Roger, 1968– editor. | Storey, Ian (Ian N.), editor.
Title: Artifacts of thinking : reading Hannah Arendt’s Denktagebuch / Roger 
 Berkowitz and Ian Storey, editors.
Description: First edition. | New York, NY : Fordham University Press, 2017. 
 | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifi ers: LCCN 2016014313 | ISBN 9780823272174 (cloth : alk. paper) 
 | ISBN 9780823272181 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Arendt, Hannah, 1906–1975 Denktagebuch. | Political 
 science—History—20th century.
Classifi cation: LCC JC251.A74 A825 2017 | DDC 320.01—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016014313
Printed in the United States of America
19 18 17    5 4 3 2 1
First edition
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   iv 11/2/16   11:12 AM
For Jerome Kohn and Elisabeth Young- Bruehl
for their long dedication
Das Interpretieren, das Zitieren—doch nur, 
um Zeugen zu haben, auch Freunde.
—Hannah Arendt, Denktagebuch XXVII.7
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   v 11/2/16   11:12 AM




1. Reconciling Oneself to the Impossibility of Reconciliation: 
Judgment and Worldliness in Hannah Arendt’s Politics
roger berkowitz 9
2. On the Truth- and- Politics Section in the Denktagebuch
ursula ludz 37
3. “By Relating It”: On Modes of Writing and Judgment 
in the Denktagebuch
thomas wild 51
4. Thinking in Metaphors
wout cornelissen 73
5. The Task of Knowledgeable Love: Arendt 
and Portmann in Search of Meaning
anne o’byrne 88
6. Vita Passiva: Love in Arendt’s Denktagebuch
tatjana noemi tömmel 106
7. America as Exemplar: The Denktagebuch of 1951
tracy b. strong 124
8. “Poetry or Body Politic”: Natality and the Space of Birth 
in Hannah Arendt’s Thought Diary
jeffrey champlin 143




List of Contributors 183
Index 185
contents
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   vii 11/2/16   11:12 AM
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   viii 11/2/16   11:12 AM
A r t i f a c t s  o f  T h i n k i n g
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   ix 11/2/16   11:12 AM
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   x 11/2/16   11:12 AM
1
Hannah Arendt’s intellectual diary, her Denktagebuch,1 is a unique record of 
an intellectual life and one of the most fascinating and compelling archives 
of twentieth- century literature, political thought, and philosophy. Com-
prising twenty- eight handwritten notebooks—primarily in German but 
partly in English and Greek—the Denktagebuch begins in 1950 and trails 
into sporadic notes in the early 1970s. By far the majority of entries, rang-
ing from personal refl ections to dense, argumentative engagements with 
other thinkers, are from the 1950s and 1960s. In these two decades, during 
which Arendt published The Human Condition, Between Past and Future, 
Men in Dark Times, On Revolution, and Eichmann in Jerusalem, as well as a 
number of essays, the Denktagebuch makes evident how closely Arendt read 
the works of her interlocutors, records previously hidden sources, and 
displays the dynamic, evolving nature of Arendt’s thinking.
Neither an Augustinian confessional nor an autobiography like those of 
Virginia Wolff, still less a narrative journal like the diaries of Samuel Pepys 
or Andy Warhol, the Denktagebuch is an uneasy fi t in familiar literary cat-
egories. It is far more structured than the collection of musings and quota-
tions that comprise Thomas Jefferson’s commonplace book, but less formal 
Introduction
Ian Storey
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than a collection of drafts and unfi nished essays. The majority of entries 
are thematic, and some of the most common themes (often announced in 
Arendt’s own subheadings) include “Thinking and Acting,” “Plato,” Plu-
rality,” “Means—Ends Categories in Politics,” “Metaphor and Truth,” 
“The Path of Wrong,” “Love,” “Marx,” “Hegel,” “On Labor,” “On Lone-
liness,” “On Heidegger,” and “On Philosophy and Politics.” Arendt’s 
utterly unconstrained intellectual range, combined with the unusual form 
of the record, makes it nearly impossible to align the Denktagebuch with any 
familiar genre or subject heading, as the humorously strained classifi cation 
of the work by the Library of Congress under “Political Theory. Theories 
of the State: The Modern State” attests.
Even the usual English translation of the title, Thought Diary, can be 
misleading, insofar as Arendt herself as a fi gure appears only rarely in her 
Denktagebuch and the fi rst- person voice is almost never used. There are 
pieces of poetry and aphorisms by herself and others, as well as favored 
quotations and musings that stretch for pages. Some entries are polished 
short essays. Many are intense textual readings with etymological and 
philosophical commentary. Others are the rough working out of new ideas, 
which will later appear in her published writing. The notebooks manifest 
Arendt’s thinking and writing process and betray the intensity of her read-
ing and thinking in a community of thinkers, but Arendt herself as a think-
ing subject occupying the privileged seat of I, remains elusive.
The absence of the authorial voice adds to the peculiar intimacy of read-
ing the Denktagebuch, precisely because the text bears none of the signs and 
disturbances of having any potential audience other than herself in mind. 
The fi rst notebook, written on Arendt’s return from a still war- shattered 
Europe and her fi rst postwar encounter with Martin Heidegger, opens with 
a long, troubled refl ection on responsibility for the past and reconciliation 
among its survivors. Belying the clearly personal nature of her refl ections, 
Arendt’s tone is often a conceptually rigorous distillation of thoughts. She 
may be responding to conversations with Heidegger, as detailed in her let-
ters, and readings of Nietzsche, but neither thinker is mentioned in entries. 
The opening metaphor of the weight of the past that is born on one’s shoul-
ders is taken from Friedrich Hölderlin, who again is not named and disap-
pears behind Arendt’s analytical accounts of forgiveness, revenge, and 
reconciliation. The fi rst reconciliation narrative is a personal working out 
of her thoughts, a seemingly fi nished product that Arendt nevertheless 
returns to in the Denktagebuch and amends many times over the next twenty 
years. Never do Arendt’s conceptually detailed and seemingly considered 
refl ections on reconciliation appear in her published writings.
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There is another voice in the notebooks, one evident in the opening 
entry of the last notebook, dated 1971. Arendt begins poetically as she 
struggles to come to terms with a life without her longtime partner and 
husband, Heinrich Blücher. The one- sentence entry bears the title “Ohne 
Heinrich” (Without Heinrich) and reads: “Frei—wie ein Blatt im Wind.” 
Blücher’s death, Arendt’s entry suggests, leaves her “free, like a leaf in the 
wind,” a suggestive line that Arendt then includes in a letter to her friend 
Mary McCarthy. In that letter, Arendt goes on to cite explicitly from “Reif 
Sind,” the same poetic fragment of Hölderlin about the burden of the past 
that she takes as her inspiration for the inaugural entry of the Denktagebuch 
in 1950. Not only does this opening of the fi nal notebook hearken to the 
book’s origin, but it also sets a once playful expression of freedom into a 
context of both grief and respect for the past. Arendt is profoundly aware 
of the mixed blessings of unconstrained freedom; the unbounded freedom 
of a leaf in the wind is without the tether to a past that gives life meaning.
If the Denktagebuch has a consistent voice, it is Arendt’s unique and 
unceasing interrogation of her world, a world that, as she once wrote to 
Gershom Scholem, is the world of German philosophy—“If I ‘come out 
of ’ anywhere,” Arendt writes in denying Scholem’s claim that she is part 
of the “German left” or the “German intellectuals,” “it is out of German 
philosophy.”2 But even as Arendt engages in the tradition of German 
philosophy—with numerous entries on Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, 
and Heidegger—the notebooks widen our sense of the scope of her intel-
lectual homeland. In the Denktagebuch, we see her in close and careful 
conversation with her spiritual family: Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, 
Alfred Portmann, William Faulkner, Wallace Stevens, and Friedrich 
Hölderlin. We might think of the Denktagebuch as a kind of antithesis to 
Rousseau’s Confessions: if, as Cicero said, “the face is a picture of the mind 
as the eyes are its interpreter,”3 then Rousseau has put on his best (and 
worst) face for us, but in her twenty- eight fragmentary and eloquent note-
books, we have something as close to Arendt’s literary eyes as we could 
ever hope to see.
The singular nature of the Denktagebuch as a glimpse through Arendt’s 
own way of reading and thinking raises important questions for how to 
think about its contribution to our understanding of Arendt’s monumental 
life spent in thought, and how it can be used for scholarship when it is read 
other than for sheer pleasure. There will be a temptation to read the Denk-
tagebuch as any other of Arendt’s books, but this is a seduction that must 
be resisted: The Denktagebuch is not a fi nished product, and its conceptual 
categories are rarely fi nalized. We may never know why Arendt chose not 
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to publish certain of her insights recorded in the Denktagebuch, but that 
choice cannot be ignored.
Early forays such as those of David Marshall and Sigrid Weigel have 
shown the considerable promise of looking to the Denktagebuch to help illu-
minate Arendt’s published writings, and in the process they have shed light 
an equal danger: that, presented with a treasure trove of hints and gestures, 
one might treat the Denktagebuch as a kind of defi nitive guide, a historical 
trump card when confronted with diffi cult, unavoidable trials of hermeneu-
tics that come with interpreting a writer as dense and original as Arendt.4 An 
honest perusal of the Denktagebuch itself—an unsteady terrain of shifting 
arguments, investments, architectures, and conjectures—should trouble this 
impulse. For those of us without the mental grammar of the sole mind by 
and for whom it was written, the Denktagebuch can constitute neither more 
nor less than Whitman’s “backward glance o’er travel’d roads”: entrancing, 
instructive, illuminative, but no more fi nal than the thoughts each entry 
brings us.
Finally, there will be a competing tendency by skeptics to diminish the 
importance of the Denktagebuch, arguing that its motley collection of notes, 
aphorisms, and tentative formulations may have been useful to Arendt 
herself but is unreliable as a window into her thought. Just as we must resist 
the temptations to rely too fully on the Denktagebuch, we must also resist 
the urge to write it off as a private fancy. The Denktagebuch offers insights 
into both formative and advanced stages of Arendt’s thinking, a halting and 
often incomplete yet ultimately invaluable guide through her intellectual 
and philosophical development.
This question of how to read, interpret, and employ the immense wealth 
of the Denktagebuch guides all of the essays in this volume, and each author 
has tried to approach these questions explicitly and to do so in a way that 
uses a substantive concern or theme in the book to model their approach. 
Taken together, the essays, most of which began their life during a week-
long workshop in the summer of 2012 sponsored by the Hannah Arendt 
Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College, attempt to present a 
conversation on how to begin what will be a long, slow, but infi nitely fruit-
ful process of integrating the Denktagebuch into our understanding of Han-
nah Arendt and her world.
The opening essay, Roger Berkowitz’s “Reconciling Oneself to the 
Impossibility of Reconciliation,” explores themes of responsibility and rec-
onciliation in the long fi rst entry and beyond of the Denktagebuch, and how 
those themes are repeatedly refl ected (and altered) in Arendt’s later works. 
Looking solely at Arendt’s published writings, Berkowitz argues, one could 
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be forgiven for seeing reconciliation as “meaningful, but not central to her 
larger effort to rethink the practice of politics in the modern age.” “All this 
changes” though, “when one opens Arendt’s Denktagebuch,” within which 
reconciliation is a constant, fl uid trope to which she returns often in the face 
of an enormous variety of intellectual problems. In order to emphasize the 
extraordinary fl exibility and incisive infl uence of the idea of reconciliation 
for Arendt’s thought, Berkowitz eschews putting forward a unitary account 
of Arendt’s theory of reconciliation in favor of nine interrelated but distinct 
(and sometimes in tension) understandings of reconciliation to be found in 
the Denktagebuch. The formal architecture of Berkowitz’s essay presents a 
way of thinking about the content of the Denktagebuch that emphasizes 
Arendt’s own resistance to systematicity in favor of conceptual fl exibility 
and responsiveness to the world around her.
Ursula Ludz, one of the two editors who took on the monumental task 
of compiling and annotating it, explores the unique perspective the Denk-
tagebuch provides into perhaps the most publically tumultuous period of 
Arendt’s life and work: her report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann and the 
ensuing furor. In “On the Truth- and- Politics Section in the Denktagebuch,” 
Ludz uses a detailed account of three entries as a platform to contemplate 
not only the background and motivations of Arendt’s singular decision only 
to respond to her critics collectively and at arms length, but also what the 
Denktagebuch reveals philosophically about the claim, sometimes made, that 
she understood Eichmann’s banality to be a simple factual truth. The ques-
tion of what is a factual truth becomes central Ludz’s reading of Arendt’s 
own thinking about the Eichmann controversy.
Picking up from Berkowitz the strands in the opening notebook that 
would become Arendt’s central political concerns of the 1950s, Thomas 
Wild provides a meditation on what he views as Arendt’s extraordinary 
translation of her specifi c political diagnosis of an “unprecedented break in 
history and tradition” into new modes of writing and expression that con-
front the political structure of thinking itself. Entwining Arendt’s frequent 
meditations in this period on poetics with the signs the notebook provides 
of her developing account of totalitarianism and judgment, “ ‘By Relating 
It’: On Modes of Writing and Judgment in the Denktagebuch” suggests that 
we can read the Denktagebuch as an alternative practice of writing and judg-
ment, one that recrafts historical understanding as a response to her early 
question, “Is there a way of thinking which is not tyrannical?”
Like Wild, Wout Cornelissen focuses his “Thinking in Metaphors” on 
the particular, deliberate practices of thinking recorded in Denktagebuch. 
Cornelissen constructs a dialogue between the Denktagebuch and The Human 
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Condition on thinking and the dangers of herstellen (making) as a mode of 
approaching the world. In a striking series of interconnections between 
Arendt’s texts, Cornelissen provides a reading of three different metaphors or 
literary motifs that he suggests all point to modes of thought Arendt embraces 
to resist the anticommunicative (and ultimately antipolitical) nature of a her-
stellen and its tendency to “mute violence.” Rather than read Denktagebuch 
through Arendt’s more canonical texts, the essay suggests that we need to 
learn to read those published texts more in the mode of the Denktagebuch and 
take more seriously Arendt’s commitment not just to perspectival plurality 
but also to its implications for the very thinking of theory itself.
In “The Task of Knowledgeable Love: Arendt and Portmann in Search 
of Meaning,” Anne O’Byrne explores Arendt’s long fascination and 
engagement with the natural scientist and thinker Adolf Portmann, who 
emerges as a central fi gure in Arendt’s discussion of appearance in The Life 
of the Mind. In dialogue with Portmann, O’Byrne writes, Arendt found an 
account of the natural world that resonated with her own approach to the 
political one, a “hermeneutic phenomenology, a way of looking at the 
world that engages and transforms the viewer.” Portmann’s antifunctional-
ism and focus on “intensifi ed life” shared and fed Arendt’s anti- instrumental 
revaluation of appearance in which “appearances are sensed, and that sens-
ing is the province of all sentient beings.” The unreliability of sensed 
appearance as well as its diversity supports Arendt’s turn from knowledge 
to meaning and from singularity to plurality. For both Arendt and Port-
mann, this attunement to meaning- making through knowledge was what 
made it possible to love the world as it is, thus leading Arendt to imagine 
education as the decision to “love the world enough to take responsibility 
for it.”
Expanding beyond the particular form of love of the world, Tatjana 
Noemi Tömmel argues that the Denktagebuch is a source for understanding 
love as the deepest and most systematic of Arendt’s investments which 
never the less rarely entered her published work. In “Vita Passiva: Love in 
Arendt’s Denktagebuch,” Tömmel observes that we might “distinguish 
three or even four different concepts of love in the Denktagebuch” that 
allow for “a systematic reconstruction of her . . . ambivalent, partly para-
doxical theories of love.” The key, according to the Tömmel, is to accept 
provisionally Arendt’s impulse to conceptual formalism and explore the 
ways in which she both deliberately contrasts passion, recognition, and 
amor mundi, while also cultivating their intersections. The result is a way of 
understanding the enormously important role of love in Arendt’s thinking 
that both and allows us to pick up and interweave “loose ends . . . waiting 
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to be tied up” while still keeping “the diversity of her concepts and the 
liveliness of her thinking.” Tömmel’s essay provides an elegant defense 
and demonstration that resisting the impulse to logical systematicity in 
interpreting Arendt need not entail abandoning systematic interrelation 
altogether.
Tracy Strong’s “America as Exemplar: The Denktagebuch of 1951” takes 
as its departure a starting point of Arendt’s own, her turn after the publica-
tion of The Origins of Totalitarianism toward “making sense” of her new 
adoptive country and searching in the “American revolutionary experi-
ence” for “what a human society would be that was truly political.” Tracing 
the genealogy of European thinkers to whom Arendt turns to begin to 
make sense of what might be distinctive about the American experiment as 
“an example of what an understanding of politics that did not rest upon any 
kind of absolute would look like,” Strong builds a conversation between 
Nietzsche and Arendt on contracting and promising, and the specifi cally 
political relation entailed in Arendt’s admonishment to Nietzsche that 
when we promise, we can only ever promise “to each other.” This concept 
of the political space founded in the creation of the revolutionary contract, 
for Strong, allowed Arendt to begin to explore what models of judgment 
were still open to the world after totalitarianism had left the thinking world 
with an inescapable and “legitimate distrust of all moralizing.” In this early 
section of the Denktagebuch, we discover just how important “America was, 
in Arendt’s reading” as “an exemplar of what the political could be.”
Although the concept of “natality” has become one of the central con-
cerns of recent Arendt scholarship, she used the term itself only quite 
rarely in her published corpus, and as Jeff Champlin points out in his 
“ ‘Poetry or Body Politic’: Natality and the Space of Birth in Hannah 
Arendt’s Thought Diary,” still less in the Denktagebuch, where the word 
appears only once. Nevertheless, Champlin argues, it comes at a crucial 
moment, and examining the section in which natality appears not only 
helps us understand the specifi c, novel alteration she is trying to introduce 
to the concept of politics but also highlights the ways in which “Arendt 
uses the narrative and poetic dimensions of the idea to expand the philo-
sophical concepts of novelty and change.” For Champlin, the way in which 
the Denktagebuch interweaves traditionally “poetic” and “philosophical” 
voices is a technique that puts into literary practice the conceptual demand 
of her new vision for a “poetry of the body politic,” a way of understanding 
the necessarily embodied character of all political beginnings for Arendt, 
which belies Habermas’s reduction of her thoughts on revolution to just 
another “contract theory of natural law.”
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Finally, Ian Storey’s “Facing the End: The Work of Thinking in the 
Late Denktagebuch” inverts the traditional gaze of reading archival material 
forward into the work that resulted from it. It asks what can be learned by 
looking on the Denktagebuch as a rearview mirror on Arendt’s thought as 
well. Arendt’s intertwined late meditations on the nature of “thinking, 
death, and purpose” can be read, Storey suggests, as the preparatory notes 
for Thinking that they are, but they should also trouble our established 
sense of Arendt’s concerns in her early works as well, particularly her con-
sistent concern with what she saw as the increasing instrumentalization of 
the shared human world. The twenty- seventh notebook of the Denktage-
buch, the last substantive Heft, provides a language for teasing apart the 
multiple senses in which ends and end- orientation are an integral piece of 
Arendt’s view of the human condition, and for resuscitating some of the 
essential ambiguity in Arendt’s relationship to instrumentality. It also pro-
vides, in the end, some important gestures toward a way of thinking about 
political ethics that Arendt never fi nished exploring, some fascinating 
glimpses at what might have been and, in the afterlife of the Denktagebuch, 
what might yet be.
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Hannah Arendt’s Denktagebuch begins with a refl ection on how to respond 
to wrongs: “The Wrong that one has done is the burden on the shoulders, 
what one bears, because one has laden it upon himself”1 (D I.1.3). The 
strange phrase of a “burden upon the shoulders” refers to the poetic frag-
ment “Reif Sind” by Friedrich Hölderlin. Arendt and Martin Heidegger 
had discussed Hölderlin’s poem months earlier while walking in the Black 
Forest on Arendt’s fi rst trip to Germany since fl eeing the Nazis. Upon 
returning to New York, she wrote Heidegger and requested the citation. 
Heidegger provided the citation in a letter of May 6, when he writes: “I am 
happy for you that you are surrounded by your books again. The line with 
‘the burden of the logs’ is in ‘Ripe and dipped in Fire’—around the same 
time you probably wrote it [presumably a lost letter], I had been thinking 
about the burden of logs.”2 Just weeks later, Arendt inaugurated her Denk-
tagebuch with a refl ection on the proper response to past wrongs.3
In calling upon Hölderlin’s poem, Arendt raises the problem of memory 
and of how to respond to past wrongdoings. The stanza Arendt cites 
announces her theme:
c h a p t e r  1
Reconciling Oneself to the Impossibility 
of Reconciliation: Judgment and 
Worldliness in Hannah Arendt’s Politics
Roger Berkowitz
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Und vieles
Wie auf den Schultern eine Last von Scheitern ist
Zu behalten.
And as
A load of logs upon
The shoulders, there is much
To bear in mind.4
We must remember our past wrongs and sufferings and bear them as 
our burden. At the same time, Hölderlin insists, we need to let go of the 
past and to taste the ripeness of the present. Ripe hanging fruit may have 
deep roots, but we cannot live looking backward. We need to forgo the 
temptation of nostalgia as well as the security of knowing what was. Instead, 
Hölderlin writes, we should “Let ourselves rock, as on a boat, lapped by 
the waves.” Without disavowing the past, “Reif Sind” is a clarion call to 
grasp the fruit now while it is ripe.
In Arendt’s opening entry of her Denktagebuch in 1950, she names the 
embrace of the now over and against the past “reconciliation” (Versöhnung). 
Reconciliation, she writes, “has its origin in a self- coming to terms with 
what has been given to one” (D, I.1, 4). To reconcile with the given is a 
willful act—a judgment—to love the world as it is. Reconciliation with a 
wrongful act or an evil world is “only possible on the foundation of grati-
tude for what has been given” (D I.1.4). It is a judgment that amidst pain, 
injustice, and heartbreak, we must love the world as it is. As an act of lov -
ing the world—what Arendt later in the Denktagebuch calls amor mundi—
reconciliation is at the very core of political judgment.
Arendt’s Denktagebuch begins and ends with refl ections on reconcilia-
tion. For those unfamiliar with Arendt’s Denktagebuch, her decision to 
begin with a discussion of reconciliation may seem circumstantial, a mere 
accident. Reconciliation appears sporadically in Arendt’s published writ-
ing. It does not appear in On Revolution (although the problem of revolu-
tion—the imperative of a new beginning to meet the challenge of living 
together in a world without authority—is to be understood within the 
guiding framework of reconciliation). In The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
the idea is present, but is spoken under the name “comprehension.” In The 
Human Condition, reconciliation is mentioned only once, although the 
discussion of forgiveness in the section on Action is heavily infl uenced by 
Arendt’s approach to reconciliation. Arendt’s book most indebted to the 
thinking of reconciliation is The Life of the Mind, her unfi nished fi nal book, 
which contains important passages on reconciliation, many of which origi-
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nate in the Denktagebuch. Most important, however, reconciliation fi gures 
prominently in numerous published essays such as “Understanding and 
Politics,” “The Gap Between Past and Future,” “The Crisis in Education,” 
“Truth and Politics,” “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About 
Lessing,” and “Isak Dinesen 1885–1963.”5 To look simply at Arendt’s 
published texts reveals Arendt’s account of reconciliation to be meaning-
ful, but not central to her larger effort to rethink the practice of politics in 
the modern age.
All this changes when one opens Arendt’s Denktagebuch. Beyond the 
opening entry, Arendt energetically returns to the theme of reconciliation 
over the two decades that she actively engages with her Denktagebuch. Rec-
onciliation is one of the recurrent ideas in the Denktagebuch, showing deep 
resonances with Arendt’s development of action, thinking, understanding, 
comprehension, forgiveness, politics, and the love of the world. In conver-
sation with her readings of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, Arendt 
reworks the question of reconciliation into one of the fundamental if hid-
den questions of her work. To follow the thread of reconciliation through 
the Denktagebuch, as I do in this essay, is to see that Arendt both begins and 
ends her inquiry into reconciliation in relation to her engagement with 
Heidegger.
I argue in this essay that reconciliation is a central and guiding idea that 
deepens our understanding of Arendt’s fundamental conception of politics, 
plurality, and judgment. I also show that the judgment to reconcile with 
world is inspired by Arendt’s engagement with Heidegger on the questions 
of thinking, forgiveness, and reconciliation, as well as by her own efforts to 
think through her personal and intellectual reconciliation with Heidegger. 
Arendt characterizes Heidegger’s fundamental “error” to be his refusal of 
reconciliation with the world. His wakeful standing- in- the- clearing of 
being leads him to attend to being as that which withdraws. By focusing 
on the presence of what is absent, Heidegger’s thinking retreats from the 
world of appearances in its concern with the unseeable and the unsayable. 
It is against Heidegger’s unworldly escapism—his refusal of reconciliation 
with the world as it is in a standing- in the clearing of being—that Arendt 
embraces reconciliation as one way to name politics, the worldly standing-
 in amidst the battle that is man’s struggle to make a home on earth.
I present nine theses that Arendt advances around the theme of recon-
ciliation found in her Denktagebuch. Theses 1– 4 address reconciliation—as 
distinct from forgiveness, guilt, and revenge—as a political act of judg-
ment, one that affi rms solidarity in response to the potentially disintegrat-
ing experience of evil. Thesis 5 situates Arendt’s discussion of reconciliation 
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in her critiques of Hegel and Marx. Thesis 6 considers the central role of 
reconciliation in Arendt’s book Between Past and Future and argues that the 
“gap between past and future” is Arendt’s metaphorical space for a politics 
of reconciliation understood as the practice of thinking and judging with-
out banisters, as she put it, in a world without political truths. Theses 7 and 
8 turn to Arendt’s engagement with Heidegger on the question of recon-
ciliation, arguing that her embrace of reconciliation within an evil world is 
a response to the errors of Heidegger’s worldless thinking. Finally, Thesis 
9 turns to Arendt’s fi nal judgment of Adolf Eichmann, arguing that her 
refusal to reconcile herself with Eichmann exemplifi es the limits of recon-
ciliation; Arendt’s decision not to reconcile with Eichmann and to demand 
his death is Arendt’s paramount example of political judgment. Judgments 
for reconciliation and nonreconciliation are judgments that can reenliven 
and reimagine political solidarity in the wake of great acts of evil.
Not one of these theses encompasses all the others. Reconciliation is 
not a single or controlling concept in Arendt’s work; it is, however, a mul-
tifaceted idea that touches nearly every aspect of Arendt’s work. Attention 
to the depth of Arendt’s engagement with reconciliation in the Denktage-
buch offers new insights into her fundamental ideas of politics, solidarity, 
and judgment. Read in this way, the Denktagebuch shows that Arendt places 
the question of reconciliation—and at times nonreconciliation—at the 
very center of her inquiry into the activities of thinking and judging in 
politics.
Thesis 1: Reconciliation is an act of political judgment affi rming 
solidarity in response to a wrong.
Arendt develops her understanding of reconciliation by setting recon-
ciliation against forgiveness and revenge as one of the three possible 
responses to wrongdoing. When confronted with a wrongdoer who has 
done a wrong, she writes, forgiveness and revenge both are incapable of 
political judgment. Forgiveness—at least human forgiveness as opposed to 
divine forgiveness—proceeds on the Christian assumption that what the 
wrongdoer has done is something that anyone could have done. “Forgive-
ness is perhaps possible insofar as it is only the express recognition that 
we- are- all- sinners, thus it claims that everyone could have done anything, 
and in this way it produces an equality—not of rights, but of nature” (D 
I.1.4). In order to forgive, we assume that “but for the grace of God” we 
could have committed similar wrongs. Forgiveness therefore erases the 
difference between the one who forgives and the wrongdoer; thus, forgive-
ness erases the distance necessary to judge and makes judgment impossible.
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Revenge similarly follows the Christian precept of a natural equality of 
all, but in the reverse direction. If forgiveness assumes we are all equally 
sinful and fallen and thus might have committed a wrong, revenge presumes 
we all have the right to do wrong. Revenge proceeds from out of a concept 
that “we are all born poisoned” by our vengeful lusts (D I.1.5). The avenger 
asserts his equal right as a human animal to take the law into his hands 
instinctively and without refl ection, just as the wrongdoer has done. To 
avenge a wrong is to claim the same passionate right as the wrongdoer. 
Acting on unthinking passions, revenge also negates judgment.
Both revenge and forgiveness, Arendt writes, “spring from the Christian 
solidarity between mankind, that all are equally sinners and all are capable 
of everything just as their fellow man, even the greatest evil” (D I.1.6). For 
Arendt, this Christian solidarity with all men is “grounded on the funda-
mental mistrust in the human substance” (D I.1.6). Since revenge and for-
giveness imagine all people to be the same in their sinfulness, both erase 
human plurality and difference. Christian solidarity is a “negative solidar-
ity, which springs out of the idea of original sin” (D I.1.6). In such a Chris-
tian solidarity, we are all the same by nature. If everyone is the same, no 
one can judge another. Neither forgiveness nor revenge allow for political 
judgment that could articulate a positive ideal of a common world that 
might gather a plurality of persons into a political world.
Reconciliation is different from forgiveness and revenge in two ways 
that are crucial for politics. First, the political power of reconciliation pro-
ceeds from its ability to create and affi rm solidarity in the face of a wrong 
that threatens to dissolve that common sense of belonging to a common 
world. By affi rming one’s acceptance of the world with the wrong in it, 
reconciliation accepts the wrong in its difference—for example, for Arendt 
to reconcile with Heidegger means to accept that what he did was wrong 
and yet still affi rm that the world is better with him and his wrongdoing in 
it than without them. Politically, reconciliation means to accept and affi rm 
the reality of people whose acts we consider to be fundamentally wrong; 
thus, while Arendt disagrees with anti- Semites and racists as well as com-
munists and laissez- faire capitalists, she believes that they and their opin-
ions are part of the common world. Reconciliation is thus open to radical 
plurality in a way that forgiveness and revenge are not.
Second, reconciliation has a specifi cally political judgment at its core. 
Reconciliation is an act of solidarity; unlike the presumptive solidarity of 
Christian forgiveness and vengeance, however, reconciliation is a political 
judgment that fi rst brings solidarity to be. The “solidarity of reconciliation 
is fi rstly not the foundation of reconciliation (as the solidarity of being 
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sinful is the foundation of forgiveness), but rather the product [of recon-
ciliation]” (D I.1.6). When I decide to reconcile with the world as it is, I 
affi rm my love for the world and thus my solidarity with the world and 
those who live in it. In this sense, reconciliation is the precondition for the 
being of a polis: It is the judgment that in spite of our plurality and differ-
ences, we share a common world. To reconcile with a wrong is to affi rm 
one’s solidarity with the world as it is and is, therefore, to help bring into 
being a common world. Arendt thus turns to reconciliation as a more 
properly political response to wrongdoing, one that might help to build “a 
new concept of solidarity” (D I.1.6).
The fact that solidarity is connected to political judgment means that it 
includes a judgment about the constitution of a people, a “we.”6 The “we” 
appealed to in solidarity is not a pregiven essence but is the result of a judg-
ment that fi nds something common among a plurality. Solidarity, for 
Arendt, offers a unity that emerges not out of sympathy or pity, both of 
which develop togetherness based upon a feeling for depersonalized others, 
the poor. In the judgment to reconcile with others out of solidarity, people 
“establish deliberately, and, as it were, dispassionately a community of 
interest with the oppressed and exploited.”7 Solidarity moves beyond pity 
and embraces “the strong and the rich no less than the weak and the poor.”8 
Solidarity, therefore, is a conceptual judgment of reconciliation that is open 
to uniqueness and meaningful differences (of opinion, status, religion, and 
race), a judgment that appeals to a “common interest” not in majority opin-
ion but in “the grandeur of man,” or “the honor of the human race,” or the 
dignity of man. Political solidarity is the outcome of reconciliation insofar 
as we reconcile ourselves to faction, disagreement, and plurality.
Thesis 2: Reconciliation replaces guilt with mutual release.
In order to reconcile and fi nd solidarity with the human world inclusive 
of wrongdoing, reconciliation must not confront all wrong as proceeding 
from guilt. Reconciliation focuses less on the wrongdoer subjectively and 
instead confronts the wrongful act itself—as an act, rather than as the 
doing of a guilty person. “Reconciliation has its origin in the coming to 
terms with [Sich- abfi nden] what has been sent one as given [dem Geschick-
ten]”9 (D I.1.4). Reconciliation addresses not the sin of the wrongdoer but 
the fact of the wrong itself—that factual act or doing that has happened, 
that has been given.
Arendt expands upon her point that reconciliation avoids the assignment 
of guilt in a later Denktagebuch entry from April 1951. The wrong, she 
writes, is different from guilt. She distinguishes “the mere wrong- doing” 
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from “the reality of being- guilty” (D III.22.69). Guilt gives the wrongful act 
permanence and continuity in the world. She writes: “What is so diffi cult to 
understand is that wrong can have permanence and even continuity. We 
call this guilt—wrong as continuity of the that- which- cannot- once- again- 
be- undone”10 (D III.22.69). Where guilt is something that attaches to a 
person and lasts in the world, the permanence of wrong in the sense of guilt 
cannot be overcome. Lasting guilt rends the body politic and disrupts the 
solidarity amid a plurality that is the essential achievement of politics. This 
is because the “actually guilty—and not those who have done a wrong—are 
expelled by society and must be thrown out of society, because with such 
guilty people history is no longer possible”11 (D III.22.69). Guilt poisons 
politics. With guilty people, one cannot share a common world unless one 
punishes them or forgives them. While guilt is important for punishment 
and is the common foundation of Christian forgiveness, it is destructive of 
politics, which requires that we discover that common thing around which 
we affi rm our solidarity.
Arendt fi nds a way out of the problem guilt poses for politics by turning 
to reconciliation, which she develops from the example of Jesus Christ. 
Against the Christian conception of a guilty and a “perverted nature,” “Jesus 
seeks to dissolve being- guilty into a merely having- done- of- a- wrong [blosses 
Unrecht- getan- Haben]” (D III.22.69). The result is that the wrong does not 
stick to the wrongdoer himself, and the wrongdoer can be freed from the 
permanence of guilt.12 By separating guilt from wrong, it is possible for the 
wrong to be politically overcome and thus not allowed to persist as a rip in 
the body politic. The removal of wrong from the person to the world, while 
not suffi cient for reconciliation, is a condition of its possibility.
Arendt argues two further activities are required for reconciliation to 
reestablish solidarity in the wake of a wrong. First, the wrongdoer must show 
himself ready to immediately correct his wrongdoing. Second, the wronged 
person must be ready to no longer insist that a wrong has occurred—that is, 
must no longer comport himself as if a wrong has occurred. “This,” she 
writes, “is the sense of reconciliation, in which, in distinction from for-
giveness, always both parties are engaged” (D III.22.69). There is in rec-
onciliation a “mutual release,” the sense that both the wrongdoer and the 
wronged affi rm their willingness to accept the wrong, albeit in different 
ways. The wrongdoer accepts the wrong and changes his action, and the 
wronged accepts the wrong as something that has happened, as simply a part 
of the world. They thus both make the judgment that continued coexistence 
in a shared political world is preferable to persisting in the doing or naming 
of a wrong.
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To explicate what she means by the mutual release of reconciliation, 
Arendt enlists two sayings of Jesus. Jesus, she writes, had reconciliation—
and not forgiveness—in mind when he wrote, in the Lord’s Prayer, “And 
forgive us from our sins, as we forgive our sinners,” and second, from the 
book of John, that the sinners must “go forth and sin no more” (D III.22.69). 
The very “sense of reconciliation” is this two- sided approach in which 
both wrongdoer and wronged are engaged. The wronged person must 
release the wrongdoer, but only if and when the wrongdoer admits and 
repents his wrong.
Even though the English translation of the Lord’s Prayer speaks of for-
giveness, Arendt argues that Jesus’s teaching is better understood as coun-
seling reconciliation. We do not make peace with the wrongdoer who does 
not repay; that wrongdoer has done a wrong, and we neither erase that guilt 
nor affi rm that we might have acted in the same way. What Jesus calls for, 
in Arendt’s interpretation, is that we focus not on the wrongdoing of the 
debtor but on the fact of his wrong. To reconcile, she writes, means to judge 
that the wrongful act is something the wronged person can live with. Rec-
onciliation means that one make a judgment not to hold the very- real- and- 
not- forgiven wrongs of the wrongdoers against them. But reconciliation is 
just only when the wrongdoer also admits and repudiates his act.
When both parties reconcile themselves—the one by admitting error 
and ceasing further wrongdoing and the other by accepting the wrong-
doing as something he can live with—they can and do affi rm their willing-
ness to live together in a world of common understanding amidst their 
plurality and disagreements. It is in this way that reconciliation offers to 
rebuild political a common world together, a world that is threatened by 
wrongful acts. Reconciliation as the mutual release leading to an affi rma-
tion of solidarity is what Arendt means when she says that reconciliation is 
at the very core of political judgment.
Thesis 3: Reconciliation is the political side of forgiveness that 
rebuilds a broken common world.
Arendt picks up this sense of reconciliation as a mutual release when she 
writes about forgiveness in The Human Condition. Once again, Arendt turns 
to Jesus: “The discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human 
affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.”13 Arendt cites numerous sources from the 
New Testament where Jesus preaches that the power to forgive is foremost 
a human power and not a prerogative of God. Thus in Matthew, Jesus says: 
“The Son of man hath power upon earth to forgive sins,” and Arendt adds 
that “the emphasis being ‘upon earth.’ ”14 She cites Matthew, again, where 
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Jesus says, “For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will 
also forgive you: But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your 
Father forgive your trespasses.”15 Her point is that “the power to forgive is 
primarily a human power.”16 It is humans, not God, for whom forgiveness 
is a fundamental capacity.
Arendt traces the reason for Jesus’s insistence on human forgiveness to 
the insight that men “know not what they do.” Since human action is irre-
versible and unpredictable, forgiveness is necessary to enable action. The 
human capacity to forgive becomes an ontological ground for action and 
politics. Since no man can know the distant and unpredictable conse-
quences of his action, he is “ ‘guilty’ of consequences he never intended or 
even foresaw.”17 Without the capacity to forgive and thus free man from 
the burden of the irreversibility and unpredictability of his actions, man 
would cease all action: “The possible redemption from the predicament of 
irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one has done though one did 
not, and could not, have known what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiv-
ing.”18 Forgiveness, in Arendt’s telling, offers the solution to the predica-
ment of action.
Arendt’s use of the word “forgiveness” in The Human Condition is decep-
tive. Even as she insists on the need for forgiveness in politics, she limits 
the province of forgiveness. Human forgiveness, she writes, “does not 
apply to the extremity of crime and willed evil, for then it would not have 
been necessary to teach in the Gospel of Luke: ‘And if he trespass against 
thee seven times a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, 
I repent; thou shalt forgive him.’ ”19 If we usually think of forgiveness as a 
response to willful wrongs, Arendt here uses it otherwise. She is not talking 
about forgiving sins or crimes, but mere “trespasses.”
The emphasis on trespasses rather than on wrongs is important. If 
wrongs are rare, “trespassing is an everyday occurrence.”20 Trespass is sim-
ply part of action, the fact that every human act will create “new relation-
ships within a web of relationships” that will inevitably lead to some wrongs. 
It is in this sense that forgiveness is necessary for action, and forgiveness is 
addressed not to intentional or willful wrongs but simply to the trespasses 
that inhere in human actions in the public realm.
Arendt’s attention to Luke’s limitation of forgiveness to everyday tres-
passes allows her to clarify her idiosyncratic understanding of forgiveness. 
The original Greek word in the Gospel that is traditionally translated as 
“forgiveness” is aphienai, which Arendt suggests means to “ ‘dismiss’ and 
‘release’ rather than ‘forgive.’ ”21 By forgiveness, then, Arendt does not mean 
the act of forgiving one his sins—the Christian act of fi nding solidarity in a 
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human sinfulness—but rather the “constant mutual release” that allows men 
to continue to act in the world. As Arendt argues: “Only through this con-
stant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by 
constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted 
with so great a power that to begin something new.”22
In turning to the language of “mutual release” in her redefi nition of 
forgiveness, Arendt surreptitiously points back to her understanding of 
reconciliation developed in the Denktagebuch and discussed earlier here. 
Her discussion of forgiveness in The Human Condition—often mistakenly 
thought to address questions of criminal and moral wrongs—is actually an 
argument about the possibility of political action; political action is possible 
only insofar as those whose acts lead to wrongs ask to be released from their 
past decisions and those who have been wronged agree to release them. 
This mutual release is what Arendt understands to be reconciliation as 
opposed to forgiveness, a distinction Arendt once made in a letter to W. H. 
Auden.23
Why, in defi ning forgiveness as a “mutual release,” does Arendt col-
lapse the distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation that occupied 
much of her earlier work? One possible answer is that Arendt actually 
integrates forgiveness into her political idea of reconciliation. This is pos-
sible because reconciliation and the act of forgiveness are, as Arendt wrote 
already in a 1953 note in the Denktagebuch, two sides of a single coin: 
“Therefore no action is possible without mutual forgiveness (what is called 
reconciliation in politics)” (D VIII.17.303). Mutual forgiveness, or mutual 
release, is actually called reconciliation in politics, even if in The Human 
Condition she leaves out the word “reconciliation” itself. “Forgiveness” is 
the name for the ontological possibility of action based in mutual release, 
while “reconciliation” names the political impact of the possibility of mutual 
release.
Both forgiveness and reconciliation are human capacities that make 
action possible, albeit in response to different kinds of wrongs. Forgiveness 
is what makes human action possible in light of the unavoidable fact that all 
human action carries with it the uncertain risk of transgression, of inten-
tionally or not, causing harm and doing wrong. Forgiveness is geared to 
trespasses. Reconciliation, as opposed to forgiveness, is what makes human 
action possible when the offending action is elevated from a mere trans-
gression to a sin or a crime. Once the transgression becomes crime and 
inserts itself in the public realm to demand a political response, forgiveness 
remains politically impotent.
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In criminal law, the question is neither forgiveness nor reconciliation, 
but punishment—although punishment is itself a version of reconciliation 
in which the criminal’s accepting of his punishment allows for him eventu-
ally to be reintegrated into political society. But in response to certain 
crimes—such as the Nazi genocide and the trial of Adolf Eichmann—even 
punishment becomes impossible because Eichmann’s wrongs are of such 
an enormity as to explode the possibility of political solidarity with a world 
in which actions such as bureaucratic genocide can exist. In extreme cases, 
legal judgment must cede to political judgments of reconciliation or non-
reconciliation.24
It is in this sense that reconciliation offers an understanding politics 
based upon a conceptual solidarity that attends to “ ‘the grandeur of man,’ 
or the ‘honour of the human race’, or the dignity of man,’ ” as opposed to a 
politics based upon pity that aspires to unity only of the unfortunate and 
poor.25 Reconciliation is what makes possible the political reconstitution of 
a common world that includes a meaningful plurality. Thus, Arendt can 
say that no political action is possible without reconciliation.
Thesis 4: Reconciliation is an act of understanding and imagina-
tion that enables politics amidst plurality.
One essential difference between forgiveness and reconciliation con-
cerns the question of understanding. Forgiveness, Arendt writes, “has so 
little to do with understanding that it is neither its condition nor its conse-
quence.”26 Take the example of totalitarianism: “To understand totalitari-
anism is not to condone anything, but to reconcile ourselves to a world in 
which such things are possible at all.”27 Instead of forgiveness, understand-
ing is connected to both reconciliation and action.
As Arendt elaborates in the Denktagebuch: “In understanding happens 
the reconciliation with the world that fi rst makes possible all acting” (D 
XIV.16.331). Writing in 1953, one year before “Understanding and Poli-
tics” was published, Arendt emphasizes that understanding is an “a priori 
condition for acting.” In reconciliation and understanding, we “come to 
terms with” what is in the world and thus “come to terms with my belong-
ing to that reality as an acting person” (D XIV.16.331). In other words, in 
understanding, one reconciles with what is even when it is not what it ought 
to be; understanding commits oneself to acting in the world as one tries to 
make it anew. This is why “Understanding is the specifi cally political way of 
thinking (‘the other fellow’s point of view!’)” (D XIV.16.332). Only some-
one who is reconciled with the world even when it is not as he or she would 
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have it—someone who accepts the world as it is and comes to terms with the 
world with others in it—can politically act in that world among people who 
are unique and thus have divergent opinions. It is in understanding that we 
experience the political virtues of friendship and respect for others with 
whom we differ. Thus do understanding and reconciliation open the door 
to politics amidst a world of plurality.
When Arendt publishes her account of reconciliation and understand-
ing in “Understanding and Politics (The Diffi culties of Understanding),” 
in Partisan Review in 1954,28 she raises the core question of reconciliation 
with regard to evil: How can one reconcile with a totalitarian world and 
with individuals who bring it about? Understanding means reconciling and 
facing up to totalitarianism, and making knowledge of totalitarianism 
meaningful. Understanding is a “strange enterprise,” and an “unending 
activity” by which we “come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to real-
ity, that is, try to be at home in the world.”29 But why should we make 
totalitarianism meaningful? Why reconcile with evil? Arendt argues that 
by making what it understands “meaningful,” and reconciling with what 
we hate, understanding “prepare[s] a new resourcefulness of the human 
mind and heart.”30 Reconciliation does not mean embracing evil, but 
understanding it and accepting it as real. Pursuing further the example of 
totalitarianism, understanding means seeing that totalitarianism is a new 
governmental form that has ruined “our categories of thought and our 
standards of judgment.”31 It is only such a reconciling understanding—a 
facing up to the new and unprecedented in totalitarianism—that makes a 
space for “a being whose essence is beginning” to respond to totalitarian-
ism by judging “without the customary rules” of morality; only under-
standing and reconciliation can rebuild a new home amidst others with 
whom one disagrees in a political way.32
Both understanding and reconciliation, as political judgments, depend 
upon imagination. Arendt explains the importance of imagination to rec-
onciliation through a discussion of King Solomon’s prayer asking God for 
the gift of an understanding heart. Solomon prayed for this gift “because 
he was a king and knew that only an ‘understanding heart,’ and not mere 
refl ection or mere feeling, makes it bearable for us to live with other people, 
strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to bear 
with us.”33 Imagination, “which actually is understanding,” is what “allows 
us to take our bearings in the world.”34 It is through imagination that we 
take the world we are given, even a world of totalitarianism and evil, and 
make ourselves at home in this world. That is what it means to reconcile 
oneself to the world.
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Thesis 5: Reconciliation travels “the Path of Wrong.”
One frequent heading under which Arendt explores reconciliation is 
“the Path of Wrong” (Der Pfad des Unrechts)”35—a title that Ursula Ludz 
and Ingeborg Nordmann, editors of the Denktagebuch, tell us Arendt at one 
point considered for the German edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(D III.22 n. 1.937). In one passage on “The Path of Wrong,” Arendt says 
that “the cardinal question” is to understand and reconcile ourselves to the 
importance of wrongs.
“The Path of Wrong”—anti- Semitism—imperialism—world histori-
cally—totalitarianism—. How is it that only the paths of wrong have 
been accessible (gangbar), have been relevant, above all still had a rela-
tion to the actual questions, diffi culties and catastrophes and that there 
are never paths of right and cannot be? This is the cardinal question. 
(D III.27.72)
Arendt makes the same point about the privilege of wrongs in history at 
the end of her preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism.36 The path of this 
evil is no doubt harrowing and inhuman, but “it is also true that without it 
we might never have known the truly radical nature of Evil.”37 This is not 
to defend totalitarianism or deny its wrongness—and just to be clear, she is 
speaking of totalitarianism, which is different from the Final Solution. 
Arendt does say that wrongs like totalitarianism are important events in 
human history. They are tragedies. But tragedies, for Arendt, are part of 
human history, even the main parts.
Tragic wrongs are the only meaningful events of human history. Arendt 
quotes Hegel’s maxim that “a ripped stocking is better than a darned stock-
ing,” which she glosses to mean, “being ripped fi rst makes noticeable the 
original unity. . . . The stocking thus appears as a ‘living unity’ in the ripped 
stocking precisely then when it proves its uselessness for life” (D 
XXVI.28.726). As Arendt writes, “Hegel’s original personal experience is of 
being ripped, his fi rst worldly- experience is the French Revolution. Both 
lead 1) to negation as the beginning and the power that brings forth think-
ing, and 2) to the ideal living within thinking—reconciliation, and recon-
ciliation with thought itself and with the world” (D XXVI.27.725). The root 
of Hegelian reconciliation is the profound need to make whole in thought a 
world that is broken in reality. In thinking and reconciling with the wrongs 
of the world, we can reaffi rm the unity and goodness of a common world.
There are obvious limitations to Hegel’s account of reconciling with 
what is. Hegel’s refusal of politics and his reconciliation with the present—
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his claim that what is is what is rational—can justify inaction in the face of 
even the worst injustice. As Arendt writes, “Hegel’s satisfaction with the 
present may be risible (empörend)” (D III.28.72). But Arendt rightly insists 
that Hegel’s “purely contemplative” political method is actually born from 
utterly correct “political instincts” to heal the real world in thought and to 
remove philosophical concepts from the political will to improve the future. 
That is why Hegel has better political instincts than does Marx, as she 
explains in a later entry on the “Path of Wrong.” Arendt repeats the thought- 
chain of wrongs linking anti- Semitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism, 
while also adding to the list “Marxist world history” (D III.22.68). A few 
entries later, Arendt explains what she means by the addition of Marxist 
world history. There is, she writes, “only one essential difference between 
Hegel and Marx, one that has in any case a catastrophic and decisive sig-
nifi cance.” The difference is that Hegel’s world- historical view is only 
backward- glancing, ending in the present, while Marx’s history is “ ‘pro-
phetic,’ projected to the future and understands the present only as a 
springboard” (D III.28.72). It is Marx’s forward- looking world history, his 
effort to mobilize philosophy for politics, which “introduced the truly 
deadly anti- political principle into politics” (D III.28.72).
The antipolitical principle that Marx introduces to politics is scientifi c 
materialism, the “tyrannical” principle of logic. Plato, in Arendt’s telling, 
was the fi rst to corrupt politics with the antipolitical principle of logic. 
Leibniz and Descartes brought politics into the scientifi c age with their 
declaration “adequatio rei et intellectus,” insisting that the world conform to 
laws of reason and science.38 Hegel’s political logic followed, holding the 
world to logic and reason. For Plato, Leibniz, and Hegel, the rationality of 
world was a perpetual limitation on human freedom and thus on politics: 
“Against the unalterable laws of logic there is no freedom” (D II.20.45). All 
human action is, when seen under the rationalist perspective, simply a 
working out of rational laws. Scientifi c politics thus cannot allow for either 
freedom or plurality.
Marx goes further, however. Under Marx’s world history, it is the sin-
gular laborer (the sovereign individual) who in the service of his own free-
dom sets out to master and remake the world of plurality that both 
confronts and frustrates his own plans. It is this “plurality, which since 
Plato (and through until Heidegger) is in the way of the [individual] man—
in the sense that it does not allow him his sovereignty” (D IV.1.79–80). In 
the name of the sovereignty of the individual laborer or politician, “every-
thing is permitted that serves the end.” For Marx, “The statesman produces 
the ideal society, for which he uses and abuses all others only as a helper” 
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(D IV.1.80). Marx’s unwillingness to reconcile with the wrongs of the 
world leads him, Arendt argues, to justify the ultimate wrong of tyranny 
and totalitarianism.
What all these wrongs from totalitarianism to Marxism show us—if we 
are willing to truly face up to them—is the antipolitical face of evil in our 
world today. Modern evil is the ideological, thoughtless, and superfi cial 
denial of human action and human judgment encapsulated in all theories 
and ideologies that offer a single and all- inclusive explanation of human 
events. What evil requires is not escapism, but that we face up to the seduc-
tiveness of modern evil in an age of scientifi c explanation. Wrongs call for 
comprehension, “the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting 
of, reality—whatever it may be.”39 The path of wrong requires thinking 
and understanding and, in Arendt’s words, reconciliation.
Thesis 6: Reconciliation beyond Hegel requires settling down in 
the gap between thinking and the world.
In Between Past and Future, Arendt writes: “The task of the mind is to 
understand what happened, and this understanding, according to Hegel, is 
man’s way of reconciling himself with reality; its actual end is to be at peace 
with the world.”40 In Truth and Politics, Arendt again raises the problem of a 
thoughtful reconciliation to reality alongside a reference to Hegel: “Who 
says what is always tells a story. To the extent that the teller of factual truth 
is also a storyteller, he brings about that ‘reconciliation with reality’ which 
Hegel, the philosopher of history par excellence, understood as the ultimate 
goal of all philosophical thought.”41 And in The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
addresses the Hegelian foundation of reconciliation in two places. Recon-
ciliation, she writes in the section on “Willing,” “is at the center of the 
whole Hegelian system.” It is a “reconciliation . . . between the ‘Divine,’ with 
which man spends his time while thinking, and the ‘secular,’ the affairs of 
men.” The importance of reconciliation is that it gives meaning to human 
life that has been severed from the meaning of truth and tradition. Recon-
ciliation, for Hegel, affi rms that “the course of history would no longer be 
haphazard and the realm of human affairs no longer devoid of meaning.”42
The touchstone for Arendt’s own thinking about reconciliation is 
Hegel. Hegelian thinking, as a kind of reconciliation with the world, is the 
activity in which human beings work to understand and comprehend the 
world around them. This understanding- reconciliation is necessary 
because without it we would not live in a world that we could understand 
or make our way in. Objects for which we have no understanding and no 
language to describe them are nonexistent. There is a basic truth to Hegel’s 
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idealism: that the real world only is for humans insofar as we humans think 
that world and reconcile ourselves to it.
Even as she founds her approach to reconciliation on Hegel’s thinking, 
it is also clear that Arendt fi nds Hegel’s view of reconciliation incomplete 
and in need of revision. There is a hint of her critique in one sentence from 
“The Gap Between Past and Future;” after the lines quoted earlier ground-
ing her thinking on Hegel’s view of reconciliation, Arendt adds a caveat: 
While reconciliation is necessary to be at peace with the world, we thinkers 
of politics may no longer be in position to seek peace in the world: “The 
task of the mind is to understand what happened, and this understanding, 
according to Hegel, is man’s way of reconciling himself with reality; its actual 
end is to be at peace with the world. The trouble is that if the mind is unable to 
bring peace and to induce reconciliation, it fi nds itself immediately engaged in its 
own kind of warfare.”43
Arendt explicitly questions whether reconciliation and the peace it 
would bring are possible. Against Hegel, Arendt asks: What happens when 
reconciliation fails?
The problem Arendt grasps hold of under the title of reconciliation is 
that the “break in tradition” and the “death of God” disrupt the traditional 
philosophical effort to rationalize politics. The Marxian response—to force 
reality into a new progressive reason guided by science—is part and parcel 
of totalitarianism. Instead, Arendt councils a new idea of reconciliation: 
reconciliation to a world without political truths, one in which politics is 
closer to a kind of warfare—one specifi cally suited to the human mind.
Arendt reiterates her worries about Hegelian reconciliation in a passage 
from The Human Condition:
The idea that only what I am going to make will be real . . . is forever 
defeated by the actual course of events, where nothing happens more 
frequently than the totally unexpected. . . . The political philosophy of 
the modern age, whose great representative is still Hobbes, founders 
on the perplexity that modern rationalism is unreal and modern real-
ism is irrational—which is only another way of saying that reality and 
human reason have parted company. Hegel’s gigantic enterprise to 
reconcile spirit with reality (den Geist mit der Wirklichkeit zu versöhnen), 
a reconciliation that is the deepest concern of all modern theories of 
history, rested on the insight that modern reason foundered on the 
rock of reality.44
The political philosophy of the modern age “founders on the perplexity” 
that reconciliation—the effort to prove and sustain the rationality of the 
world—has fi nally been shown to be impossible. Hegel’s “gigantic enter-
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prise,” Hobbes’s scientifi c reconceptualization of reason as interest, and 
Marx’s scientifi c materialism are all heroic yet futile efforts to submit reality 
to rationality and thought. They represent a striving to have the political 
world make sense. To institute peace.
In questioning Hegelian reconciliation, however, Arendt does not aban-
don reconciliation. Rather, she reimagines reconciliation as a facing up to 
the basic fact of the modern world: That Hegelian reconciliation fails to 
institute peace and that politics in the age of the death of God is necessarily 
a battle. Arendt insists we reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is no 
truth in politics, and all politics is a struggle among opposing opinions, or 
doxai. This does not mean there are no political facts or that truth is 
politically irrelevant, but there are fewer political facts than most people 
think. Further, such facts as there may be are themselves cemented only by 
persuasion and opinion. They are settled political facts that come, by 
weight of overwhelming persuasiveness, to be part of the shared common 
world. Political truth, in Arendt’s poetic formulation, is “the ground on 
which we stand and the sky that stretches above us.”45 We must reconcile 
ourselves, she argues, to a world of plurality absent authority and absent all 
but the most foundational truths.
The Denktagebuch offers a path toward deepening our understanding of 
the scattered comments about reconciliation in Arendt’s published writings. 
This is especially true with regard to Arendt’s understanding of and her 
critique of Hegel’s theory of reconciliation. In an entry from 1953 titled 
“Concerning Hegel’s Historical Philosophy,” Arendt writes:
This rests on the concept of reconciliation. The central sentence 
stands at the end of the Philosophy of World History and reads: 
“That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which 
its annals present, is the process of development and the realization of 
Spirit—this is the true Theodicea, the justifi cation of God in History. 
Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—
viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only 
not ‘without God,’ but is essentially His Work.”46 Hegel’s philosophy 
says ultimately: Only if “the infi nite is the truth of the fi nite” (Philos-
ophy of Religion), can I bear that I am fi nite; only if “world history 
and actuality” is the “work of God himself,” can I bear to live in 
them. That is reconciliation.” (D XIV.23.337)
In a later passage from 1970, Arendt points toward certain passages from 
Hegel’s Encyclopedia that are central to her reading of reconciliation. Hegel 
clarifi es the specifi c importance of reconciliation in his philosophical sys-
tem with these words from his Encyclopedia:
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“The highest and fi nal aim of philosophic science is to bring about . . . 
a reconciliation of the self- conscious reason with the reason which is in 
the world—in other words, with actuality.”47 What this means, Hegel 
writes in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, is that “the ultimate 
aim and business of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the Notion 
with reality.”48
For Hegel, reconciliation means all that is is only insofar as it is thought. 
This is “completely correct,” Arendt adds, this is true at least subjectively 
(D XXVII.50.776–777).
Arendt’s response to Hegel appears in another entry from the same 
year. She asks: “What makes us think? Hegel’s answer: Reconciliation. 
Reconciliation with what? With things as they are. But this we do con-
stantly anyhow by establishing ourselves in the world. Why repeat it in 
thought?” (D XXVII. 58.782). For Hegel, reconciliation is experienced as 
a response to his fundamental experience of the world ripped asunder. In 
other words, the world appears to man as that which is foreign, wrong, and 
in need of rationalization. Man stands against the objects and things of the 
world, which are separate from him. And man’s dream and drive is to 
reunite himself with the world. But if reconciliation is almost unconscious 
and natural, why then, Arendt asks, do we have to repeat this reconciliation 
in thought?
Arendt’s rethinking of reconciliation follows her conviction that some-
time in the early part of the twentieth century, philosophy and thinking 
ceased to be able “to perform the task assigned to it by Hegel and the 
philosophy of history, that is, to understand and grasp conceptually his-
torical reality and the events that made the modern world what it is.”49 For 
Arendt, somehow, the “human mind had ceased, for some mysterious 
reasons, to function properly.”50 In other words, what happens in the 
twentieth century is that a gap emerges between reality and thinking. This 
gap between thinking and reality itself, Arendt writes, is not new. It may 
be, she supposes, “coeval with the existence of man on earth.” But for cen-
turies and millennia, the gap was “bridged over by tradition.” At a time 
when our efforts to understand the real world forever fall short, reconcili-
ation assumes a different and distinctly non- Hegelian sense. Reconciliation 
demands that we forgo the will to absolute knowledge or scientifi c mastery 
of the world. We must instead reconcile ourselves to the reality of the gap 
between thinking and acting. We must, in other words, reconcile ourselves 
to our irreconcilability to the world.
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Thinking today requires accepting the irreconcilability of the world 
that Arendt names “settling down in the gap between past and future.” It 
demands that we continually recommit ourselves to the loss of a knowable 
and hospitable world and instead commit ourselves to the struggle of 
thinking and acting in a world without banisters. Only if we think and 
reconcile ourselves to the reality of our irreconcilable world can we hope 
to resist the ever- present possibility of totalitarianism.
Thesis 7: Arendt’s reconciliation is a response to Heidegger’s 
worldless thinking.
Unlike Hegel, Heidegger is not known as a thinker of reconciliation. 
And in Arendt’s published writings, there is no discussion of Heidegger in 
connection to reconciliation. In the Denktagebuch, however, the connec-
tion between Heidegger and reconciliation is powerful and explicit. The 
Denktagebuch reveals that Heidegger is the silent partner in Arendt’s life-
long refl ection on reconciliation.
As discussed earlier, Arendt begins the Denktagebuch with an essay on 
reconciliation that was inspired at least in part by her visit with Heidegger 
in the winter of 1949. In the same letter in which Heidegger answers 
Arendt’s query about the Hölderlin poem “Reif Sind,” he adds: “Hannah, 
reconciliation is rich, but apparently we must wait for a turning point, 
when the world changes and overcomes the spirit of revenge.”51 In another 
letter one week later, Heidegger continues: “But you remember: on a walk 
in a valley, we talked about language. You are right about reconciliation 
and revenge. I have been thinking about that a great deal. In all this think-
ing, you are so near.”52 Invoking Nietzsche’s refl ections on revenge and 
reconciliation53 in Also Sprach Zarathustra, Heidegger offers wariness about 
reconciliation, suggesting that redemption from revenge would be very 
nearly superhuman or, as Nietzsche expressed it, “the bridge to the highest 
hope, and a rainbow after long storms.”54 What is clear, however, is that 
Arendt’s earliest thinking about reconciliation emerges out of a conversa-
tion with Heidegger.
Twenty years after her original conversation with Heidegger, Arendt 
resumes her meditation, this time thinking through the place of recon-
ciliation in Heidegger’s own thought. The occasion is her preparation for 
her speech honoring Heidegger on his eightieth birthday. In her longest 
entry on Heidegger in the Denktagebuch that concludes with a discussion 
of reconciliation, Arendt takes her bearings from Heidegger’s book Zur 
Sache des Denkens.
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The question she takes up is: “What is it that most properly goes on in 
thinking?” For Heidegger, thinking means to hearken to Being (“Sein 
vernimmt= Denken”). Such a “pure thinking, thus thinking as thinking” is 
timeless. It is, as Heidegger writes, standing- in (einstehen) in the time in 
which Being is most properly heard. What is decisive, Arendt writes, is the 
experience of thinking as standing- in; as an experience, thinking is not a 
process or a method but simply that which brings a person to himself. To 
be human is to have the experience of thinking, that is, of standing- in in 
the nearness of Being. It is the Heideggerian claim that “I become a self 
qua self fi rst and most properly insofar as I think” that Arendt argues is the 
“error of Being and Time” (D XXVI.27.723).
Heidegger’s “error,” Arendt writes, is the error of all professional phi-
losophers. It is to imagine that “insofar as I think I cease to be a being. I am 
ageless, without qualities, etc. It is as if I am not a man, but man” (D 
XXVI.27.723). Thinking thus becomes a kind of Kantian “thing in itself,” 
a non- thing: It is “worldless.” Thinking is something we cannot talk about. 
It has the character of a retreat or an evacuation from the world.
Once she has established Heidegger’s error with regard to thinking, 
Arendt contrasts Heidegger and Hegel on the question of thinking. For 
Hegel, thinking is reconciliation. From out of Hegel’s “original personal 
experience” of being- ripped and separated from the world, he develops the 
ideal of thinking as the reunifi cation of the self with the world. Arendt then 
returns to Heidegger and writes: “For Heidegger instead of reconciliation: 
to erect oneself in the fi nite as what is most properly given to one: the 
Ereignis as the manifestation of this fi nitude (being limited) qua property” 
(D XXVI.27.725). Unlike Hegel, whose original experience is negation, 
from which follows the need for thinking as a reunifying reconciliation, 
Heidegger’s “fundamental experience” is the “seeing and hearing of what 
is absent” (D XXVI.27.725–726). Thinking for Heidegger is a standing in 
the presence of what withdraws: “The Matter of Thinking: To transform 
the absent into the present” (D XXVI.27.726). In all thinking there is an 
act of transcending, of stepping beyond oneself into the clearing of being.
In a much earlier entry from 1950—one of the many in the Denktagebuch 
titled “Acting and Thinking”—Arendt argues that Heidegger’s idea of 
thinking is a “fulfi lled concentration” or “absolute wakefulness.” It is a wak-
ing to the experience of the world; thus, thinking is understood as a way of 
being for men that is also active: “Thinking would then be the being- freed- 
for action in man” (D I.11.12). Understood in this way Heidegger’s activity 
of thinking can be seen as one precursor for Arendt’s reconciliation with 
thinking as the settling down in the gap between past and future.
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By the 1970s, however, Arendt is clear that Heidegger’s approach to 
thinking goes wrong insofar as the thinker withdraws from the world. “In 
thinking,” she writes in 1970, there is a partial “pulling of oneself back out 
of the world of appearances” (D XXVII.76.792). Thinking, in other words, 
can be apolitical and unworldly. Thinking is trapped within itself: “The 
activity of thinking is as relentless and repetitive as life itself, and the ques-
tion whether thought has any meaning at all constitutes the same unan-
swerable riddle as the question for the meaning of life.”55 As a seeing into 
the unseeable and the unsayable, thinking is even analogous to death in its 
rejection of the world.
Thesis 8: Reconciliation is thinking as the battleground between 
past and future.
If Heidegger chooses a worldless thinking instead of Hegelian recon-
ciliation of world and thought, Arendt comes by the late 1960s and 1970s 
to see reconciliation as a facing up to the fact that politics is a battle. Arendt 
repeatedly invokes Kafka’s parable of “He” who is pushed forward by the 
past and who is pushed backward by the future. The parable illustrates, 
metaphorically, “the activity of thought.”56 Elsewhere, Arendt writes that 
the metaphor names “the location of thought.”57 The place of thinking, 
Arendt writes, is “a battleground.”58 “This battleground for Kafka is the 
metaphor for man’s home on earth.”59 The dream of the “He” in Kafka’s 
parable is the ability to jump outside of the “Now” where the forces meet, 
to become an umpire, spectator, or judge, to be able to judge the battle 
from “outside the game of life.”60 That is the “old dream Western meta-
physics has dreamt from Parmenides to Hegel, of a timeless region,” the 
dream of Hegelian reconciliation. But man, Arendt insists, “Man lives in 
this in- between.”61
The battleground of the past and future as well as the place and time of 
thinking between them is not something true. There is no one true and 
eternal space of thinking. It proceeds from what Arendt calls her “basic 
assumption of this investigation”: that metaphysics and philosophy must 
be dismantled because “the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall 
not be able to renew it.”62 Reconciliation is no longer possible. Or, in 
other words, the act of reconciliation— of thinking the unity of thought 
and action—requires today a reconciliation to the irreconcilability of the 
world with thought, which is another way of saying that reconciliation 
becomes a question amidst the break of the tradition and the failure of the 
metaphysical effort to subordinate the world to truth. This may be why 
Arendt embraces for reconciliation Kafka’s metaphor of a battleground and 
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abandons Hölderlin’s image from “Reif Sind” of a boat rocking on the 
waves of the hear and now, having let go of the past and the future.63
We have, in the end, only one judgment and decision before us. Here is 
Arendt: “Finally, we shall be left with the only alternative there is in these 
matters—we either can say with Hegel: Die Weltgeschichte ist das Welt-
gericht, leaving the ultimate judgment to Success, or we can maintain with 
Kant the autonomy of the minds of men and their possible independence 
of things as they are or as they have come into being” (LOM, 216). This is 
the judgment we have before, us, our burden. To reconcile ourselves with 
the break in our tradition and with the loss of the guarantee of dignity and 
of truth. To follow what Arendt calls the “path of wrong” to its conclusion 
means that we must love the world with wrong in it and without the now 
shattered promise of truth and solidarity.
The challenge of reconciliation is to love the world as it is, that is, as 
potentially irreconcilable and inclusive of evil. It is well known that Arendt 
considered calling the book that would become The Human Condition by the 
title Amor Mundi—For the Love of the World. In 1955, there are at least 
three entries in the Denktagebuch dedicated to Amor Mundi. The fi rst asks 
simply: “Amor Mundi—Why is it so diffi cult to love the world?” (D 
XXI.21.522). The answer is clear enough: anti- Semitism, racism, totalitari-
anism, poverty, corruption, and a feeling of utter powerlessness to make 
change. What reconciliation and understanding require is a commitment to 
politics and plurality that can come about only through a dedication to the 
world as it is.
Thesis 9: Arendt’s fi nal judgment of Adolf Eichmann is a judg-
ment of nonreconciliation and a paramount example of political 
judgment.
Arendt began thinking about reconciliation in the aftermath of World 
War II during her fi rst return to Germany and her reunion with Heidegger. 
In distinguishing reconciliation from forgiveness, she was clearly grappling 
with her own response to the wrongs of her friends and acquaintances. 
Arendt determined that she could reconcile with even those people she 
could not forgive. If they would admit their error, she could make the effort 
to live with them in a common world. Reconciliation names this power to 
face up to wrongs of the world and still commit oneself to living with them 
in a political community.
The case that tested Arendt’s limits of the power of reconciliation was 
that of Adolf Eichmann. In Eichmann she confronted someone who did not 
admit his error in participating in the machinery of genocide—or, to the 
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extent he did repent of his errors, so fully misunderstood his error to be that 
he simply followed the wrong side. Eichmann could be neither reconciled 
with nor forgiven. Faced with a wrong and a wrongdoer who refuses to 
repent, reconciliation would preserve the existence of the wrong and persis-
tence of the wrongdoer. Reconciliation, therefore, would be powerless to 
remake the shattered human community.
In cases such as Eichmann’s, there is another choice beyond reconcilia-
tion, forgiveness, or punishment. In the face of that which is irreconcilable, 
one can choose to deny reconciliation. This is the choice that Arendt makes 
in her own judgment of Eichmann: to act beyond the boundary of reconcili-
ation’s power to inaugurate a common world. “Reconciliation has a merci-
less boundary,” Arendt writes, a boundary that “forgiveness and revenge 
don’t recognize—namely, at that about which one must say: This ought not 
to have happened” (D I.1.7). Arendt explains what she means by reference to 
Kant’s discussion of the rules of war, where Kant says that actions in war that 
might make a subsequent peace impossible are not permitted. Such acts, 
like pogroms and genocides, whether in war or peace, are examples of 
“radical evil”; they are “what ought not to have come to pass.” Such acts are 
also those that cannot be reconciled, “what cannot be accepted under any 
circumstances as our fate” (D I.1.7). Nor can one simply silently pass by in 
the face of radical evil.
Arendt cannot forgive Eichmann. But neither can she reconcile either 
with him or with what he has done. That is the meaning of her fi nal judg-
ment offered in the epilogue, the one she says the judges in Jerusalem should 
have “dared” to offer. Arendt’s judgment reads: 
You admitted that the crime committed against the Jewish people 
during the war was the greatest crime in recorded history, and you 
admitted your role in it. . . . We are concerned here only with what 
you did, and not with the possible noncriminal nature of your inner 
life and of your motives. . . . Let us assume, for the sake of argument, 
that it was nothing more than misfortune that made you a willing 
instrument in the organization of mass murder; there still remains 
the fact that you have carried out, and therefore actively supported, a 
policy of mass murder. For politics is not like the nursery; in politics 
obedience and support are the same. And just as you supported and 
carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish 
people and the people of a number of other nations . . . we fi nd that 
no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want 
to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, 
you must hang.64
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The reason Eichmann must hang is that no human being must be 
expected to share the earth with him. He must hang, in other words, because 
what he did was so horrifi c that it must simply be rejected, eradicated, and 
said no to. This does not mean it should be forgotten, not at all. Rather, the 
world in which Eichmann’s crimes could and did happen must simply be 
said no to. In short, Eichmann must hang because his crimes are irreconcil-
able with a civilized world.
In an interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt says that Eichmann’s role in 
the Final Solution exceed the bounds of what is reconcilable.65 She 
describes how she and her husband, Heinrich Blücher, originally could not 
believe the reports emerging from Auschwitz, reports based on the testi-
mony of two escapees Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler. Once the facts 
were confi rmed and irrefutable, her response was: “Well, one has enemies. 
That is entirely natural. Why shouldn’t a people have enemies? But this 
was different. It was really as if an abyss had opened.”66 The abyss that 
opened separates the Nazis involved in Auschwitz from humanity.
Most wrongs can be reconciled. Before she knew of the mass killings in 
administrative massacres, Arendt tells Gaus, she “had the idea that amends 
could somehow be made for everything else, as amends can be made for 
just about everything at some point in politics.” But the administrative 
terror and genocide in Auschwitz was something new and different, some-
thing that, in her words, “ought not to have happened.” What ought never to 
have been is not the number of victims, but the “method, the fabrication of 
corpses and so on.” These horrors, these abominations, meant that “some-
thing happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves. None of us 
ever can.”67 It is the irreconcilable nature of simply inhuman and unbeliev-
able crimes that, for Arendt, is the lesson she takes from the Holocaust. 
And it is this irreconcilability to the crimes that underlies Arendt’s judg-
ment of Adolf Eichmann.
Arendt’s embrace of reconciliation as a response to the wrongs of the 
world is not absolute. Not every wrong and not every wrongdoer can or 
should be reconciled. And some wrongs, while not irreconcilable, are bad 
enough that they do not merit active reconciliation. This indeed is the 
framework through which she approaches her judgment of Eichmann. 
While Eichmann himself and thousands like him “were, and still are, ter-
ribly and terrifyingly normal,” while his subjective will was banal rather 
than consumed by willful evil, it is nevertheless the case that his deeds—his 
willing participation in the machinery of genocide—are horrifi c and radi-
cally evil. Arendt condemns Eichmann to be banished from the Earth. 
Even if the memory of Eichmann’s deeds is inextinguishable, the judgment 
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to banish Eichmann and refuse reconciliation to a world with him and his 
actions in it is a political judgment that affi rms one’s solidarity with a world 
in which Eichmann’s actions are not simply criminal, but unimaginable.
Eichmann and his crimes are incapable of reconciliation. Such an act of 
nonreconciliation is—as is forgiveness in the private sphere—a spontane-
ous and unexpected act. Unlike a legal judgment grounded in precedent, 
an act of reconciliation or nonreconciliation has the revolutionary quality 
of a break, a crisis, a new beginning, one that makes a claim either to reaf-
fi rm a common world (reconciliation) or to reimagine and reform our 
common world (nonreconciliation). Just as politics might depend on rec-
onciliation as a way of binding oneself to a common world, so too may 
politics at times demand that actions and persons be excluded from that 
world so that it might remain a world we can share.
Reconciliation and nonreconciliation both are judgments made on the 
battlegrounds of past and future and thought and action. Both affi rm a 
political solidarity inclusive of plurality, but with limits. The great decision 
facing all of us is whether we can and will reconcile ourselves to the world 
as it is. In this sense, judgments of reconciliation and nonreconciliation are 
exemplary actions of political judgment in a world without banisters.
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“Wahrheit und Politik” (Truth and Politics) is entered in the Denktagebuch 
like a title on page 1 of Notebook XXIV, introducing a section that actually 
consists of forty- three individual entries. Unlike the other notebooks con-
stituting Arendt’s thought diary, which usually record a month and a year, 
Notebook XXIV does not give a date at the beginning. Here the title 
replaces the date, while the fi rst date appears on handwritten page 28 as 
“Weihnachten [Christmas] 1964.” Notebook XXIII covers the period 
from August 1958 through January 1961. Only thirty pages of this note-
book were used, the rest left empty. The empty pages indicate a remark-
able gap in the Denktagebuch, a gap that parallels a highly dramatic period 
in Hannah Arendt’s life and intellectual biography.
In April 1961, Arendt traveled to Jerusalem to attend the Eichmann trial. 
As a reporter for The New Yorker, she stayed in the courtroom between 
April 11 and May 7 and a second time from June 20 through June 23, during 
the fi rst sessions when Eichmann was on the witness stand. Between these 
two visits in Israel and afterward, she traveled and worked in Europe, 
returning to the United States at the end of July. In 1962, she began to write 
her report. The manuscript she delivered to The New Yorker in October 
c h a p t e r  2
On the Truth- and- Politics Section 
in the Denktagebuch
Ursula Ludz
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1962 was fi rst published between February 16 and March 16, 1963, in a 
series of fi ve installments. Apparently Arendt did not take her Denktagebuch 
with her when she was visiting Israel and various places in Europe in 1961, 
and she did not use it when she was writing her report in 1962. For the 
evaluation of the diary character of the Denktagebuch, this is highly signifi -
cant, since, as we know, encountering Eichmann in the courtroom and 
reporting about the trial was a highly emotional undertaking for Arendt.
It seems likely that Arendt started Notebook XXIV with the section on 
“Wahrheit und Politik” in 1963, either shortly before or after she had 
made a decision concerning the attacks launched against her after the pub-
lication of Eichmann in Jerusalem. On October 3, 1963, she wrote to Mary 
McCarthy from Chicago: “I am convinced that I should not answer indi-
vidual critics. I probably shall fi nally make, not an answer, but a kind of 
evaluation of the whole strange business. This, I think, should be done after 
the furor has run its course and I think that next spring will be a good time. 
I also intend to write an essay about ‘Truth and Politics,’ which would be an 
implicit answer.”1
Interestingly enough, most of the entries introduced by the title “Wahr-
heit und Politik” in the Denktagebuch are written in German, although the 
bulk of the public attacks on Arendt, her articles and her book were pub-
lished in English. In addition, another striking observation should be men-
tioned: “Truth and Politics,” she wrote to McCarthy, was meant as an 
“implicit answer” to her critics. Indeed, the answer is so “implicit” that 
there is hardly any mention of a critic’s name or of a special argument, 
neither in the Denktagebuch nor in any version of her later articles on “Truth 
and Politics.” In the Denktagebuch Arendt simply jots down notes of thought 
with regard to “Truth and Politics” she wanted to keep, to save from getting 
lost. As she said to Günter Gaus in the 1964 interview: “If I had a good 
enough memory to really retain everything that I think, I doubt very much 
that I would have written anything—I know my own laziness.”2 In other 
words, in the section “Wahrheit und Politik” in the Denktagebuch, Arendt 
was collecting material that she might or might not ultimately use when 
composing on “Truth and Politics” itself. There is nothing refi ned about 
most of these notes in the sense that Arendt put much thinking into them, 
as she did in many previous Denktagebuch entries. They are hasty notes, 
certainly not meant to be published as such. Compared to other Denktage-
buch entries, they lack the quality of free- fl oating thought found by so many 
of the other authors in this volume. Neither can something like a thinking 
process be detected in them: indeed, Arendt hardly engages in “exercises in 
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political thought.” Only in entry no. 21 do we see beginnings of a refl ection 
that shows signs of that exercise.
Understanding this solitary section “Wahrheit und Politik” requires 
fi rst a report of its forty- three entries in a kind of systematic overview. I 
will then single out two entries (nos. 10 and 21) for more specifi c presenta-
tion. They are the ones in which Arendt refers directly to her personal case 
and condition at the time, being complemented by the fi rst entry following 
the truth- and- politics section, entry no. 44: “Weihnachten 1964.” Finally, 
I return to the question that haunted the seminar discussion and indeed 
many of the essays in this volume: What is “truth on a factual level”?
An Overview
Arendt begins the truth- and- politics section in the Denktagebuch by noting 
distinctions3 important to her treatment of the issue: truth vs. opinion (no. 
1); truth vs. lie (no. 2). Actually, most of the entries can be systematized 
under the Arendtian effort of making distinctions. Truth vs. opinion is the 
topic of entry no. 30 too, while truth vs. lie can also be found under nos. 34 
and 41 as well as entry no. 46. In addition, Arendt concerns herself with a 
constellation of related distinctions: truth vs. ideology (nos. 8 and 12); 
philosophical truth vs. scientifi c validity (no. 9); truth and thinking (no. 
14); truth by agreement (no. 15); general vs. particular truth (no. 20); abso-
lute or philosophical truth vs. factual truth (no. 32); facts or political facts 
(nos. 27 and 35). However, the Denktagebuch provides no elaborate for-
mulations for any of these distinctions. One has to turn to the published 
essays in order to fi nd out what her respective thoughts are, which requires 
rather extensive work of textual criticism, since Arendt published several 
pieces under the heading of “Wahrheit und Politik” or “Truth and Poli-
tics.”4 But even if one consults the published essays, one may not fi nd 
defi nitive answers.
In addition to making distinctions, in the Denktagebuch Arendt refers to 
examples5 for lies by noting the following keywords or phrases: “France,” 
“Resistance Movement,” “Jewish martyrs,” “greatest pogrom” (all in no. 
3); “Silesians” (in no. 5); “Diaspora vs. Jewish home” (in nos. 8 and 11); 
“class struggle” (in no. 12); “Elders of Zion” (in no. 17); “man at the watch-
tower” (in no. 19); the “stab- in- the- back legends” (in no. 29). Again, she 
is hardly specifi c about these examples; why they are indications for lies 
needs explanation, which would require an extensive interpretation in each 
case and thus go beyond this essay’s scope. For the purposes at hand, it may 
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suffi ce to mention those examples she uses in her fi nal essay “Truth and 
Politics:” (1) the lie held and presented by Adenauer, who claimed “that the 
barbarism of National Socialism had affected only a relatively small per-
centage of the country;” (2) De Gaulle’s lie that, as she puts it, “France 
belongs among the victors of the last war and hence is one of the great 
powers.” Lies of this kind, she continues, “whether their authors know it 
or not, harbor an element of violence; organized lying always tends to 
destroy whatever it has decided to negate.”6 Furthermore, she notes some 
examples more pertinent to the Eichmann case, which appear under the 
keywords “Jewish martyrs” and “greatest pogrom” in no. 3; they are treated 
more elaborately in entries nos. 8 and 11; in no. 17 she mentions the “Elders 
of Zion.”
Arendt concerns herself, then, with the mechanisms of distorting truth, 
e.g., by interests and interest groups (nos. 24, 25, and 28), or just by creat-
ing and communicating factual errors (no. 38). In two entries, she points 
out that lies and factual errors, for whatever reasons they may have been 
invented or accepted in public, become dangerous not only to the liar but 
also endanger the world in which they are communicated (nos. 26 and 29). 
“A ‘world,’ ” she notes, “can also be erected on the basis of a lie: An organi-
zation based on a lie is no less powerful than that erected on the basis of the 
truth” (no. 29), it may even be more powerful, but in the end “the strength 
of truth” outlasts “the power of the lie” (no. 34). “Images,” she writes in 
“Truth and Politics,”7 “have a relatively short life expectancy.”
There are two entries, however, that merit special attention. As men-
tioned before, nos. 10 and 21 are related directly to Arendt’s personal 
case, that is, to the controversy that arose after the publication of Eich-
mann in Jerusalem. These as well as note no. 44 (“Weihnachten 1964”), 
examined in detail, provide us with something more of the fl esh of “Truth 
and Politics.”
“Die Rolle der Big Lie”
Entry 10 in Notebook XXIV is entitled “Die Rolle der Big Lie” (The Role 
of the Big Lie), but there is no indication to what Arendt means by Big Lie, 
both capitalized. Not knowing a specifi c answer to this question, Ingeborg 
Nordmann and I, when editing the Denktagebuch, gave a rather general 
hint to Arendt’s essay “Lying in Politics” (1095). Now, however, we know 
a bit more. It was Patchen Markell who, by browsing through the New York 
Times index, found an article titled “German Posters Done from ‘19 to ‘61 
Demonstrate Effect of Propaganda.” The article, which hints at the “big 
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lie” in Germany’s history of the twentieth century, reports about the exhi-
bition “Weimar–Nürnberg–Bonn: Art as a Political Weapon” organized 
by the Art Center of the New School for Social Research.8 Arendt may 
have read this article, but she could not have seen the exhibition, since it 
was shown (May 8 through June 15, 1963) when she was traveling in 
Europe. The Times reported that the example of posters displayed at the 
exhibition “vividly” illustrated “how the ‘big lie’ was put over in Germany,” 
from the Weimar Republic through the Nazi era to the Cold War period. 
In any case, this would have reminded Arendt of the “Big Lie” as it became 
known by an anticommunist propaganda fi lm produced by the US Army in 
1951, which became a centerpiece of American political rhetoric against 
the USSR. The fi lm begins with a quote from Hitler’s Mein Kampf: “The 
great masses will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a small one.” In 
terms of content, Hitler’s “big lie” seems intuitively related to what Arendt 
in Entry 17 of Notebook XXIV refers to as the “Elders of Zion,” that is, 
the forged “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” which she had addressed in an 
article in 1945.9
Entry no. 10 deserves to be considered more carefully because of the 
way it refl ects on the reasoning it contains with regard to Arendt’s personal 
case. She states: “I am reproached for saying certain things because I am a 
‘self- hating Jew.’ ”10 This, she refl ects, is an accusation against which she 
could defend herself if she wished, while against other accusations, such as 
that she is a defender of Eichmann or a “behaviorist” thinker, there is no 
possibility of defense since these accusations have no relation to reality and 
are thus absurd. Nevertheless, she asks herself: “If these statements are 
absurd, why then are they uttered”? Without giving a direct answer, she 
adds that reality is limited, but that absurd statements presented as facts 
belong to a sphere of unlimited possibilities, thus pointing to her argument 
that lies, like images, create a reality which “can always be explained and 
made plausible,” while factual truth is characterized by “this stubborn there-
ness, whose inherent contingency ultimately defi es all attempts at conclu-
sive explanation.”11
Framing the problem in the terms of jurisprudence, Arendt continues, “I 
would have to fi le a libel suit, and this would mean that I would have to 
defend myself. It would force me to present12 everything I have ever written. 
If one is completely innocent, then one cannot argue. This is why in court it 
is always the prosecutor who must prove the defendant’s guilt. ‘Proof of 
innocence’ cannot be given.” In the same vein and later in the Denktagebuch 
as well as in “Truth and Politics,” Arendt notes a quote from Montaigne: “If 
falsehood, like truth, had but one face, we should know better where we are, 
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for we should then take for certain the opposite of what the liar tells us. But 
the reverse of truth has a thousand shapes and a boundless fi eld.”13
“Fang an mit”
Entry no. 21, the longest in the “Wahrheit und Politik” section, is the only 
one that includes questions and answers Arendt posed to herself when 
engaging in an inner dialogue on truth and politics. She asks herself ques-
tions, for instance, about Socrates. Was he cautious? No, she answers. Was 
he moderate? Yes, insofar as he admitted that no man is wise. She discusses 
possible interpretations with regard to Lessing’s quote that seems so 
meaningful to her thoughts: “Let each man say what he deems truth, and 
let truth itself be commended unto God.”14 She then concerns herself with 
the question “Who am I to judge?” and notes, just as a reminder, the old 
saying “Fiat justitia, et pereat mundus” (Let there be justice, though the 
world perish). This is followed by a quote from Bacon and refl ections on 
the “obligation of the scholar to ‘the truth as he fi nds it.’ ”
Entry 21 starts as an admonition of the author to herself: “Fang an mit” 
(begin with), which is a rather rare feature in the Denktagebuch. Presum-
ably, she wrote this when planning her essay “Truth and Politics.” How-
ever, what she writes thereafter hardly can qualify as an outline for that 
essay, but it is highly telling with regard to her self- perception in this 
“whole strange business.” Arendt conceives of herself as having sought and 
found “some truth.”15
She elaborates on this thought in “Truth and Politics” when she writes 
about the standpoint of the truthteller. “This standpoint . . . is clearly char-
acterized as one of the various modes of being alone. Outstanding among 
the existential modes of truthtelling are the solitude of the philosopher, the 
isolation of the scientist and the artist, the impartiality of the historian and 
the judge, and the independence of the fact- fi nder, the witness, and the 
reporter.”16 From Entry 21, it is quite obvious that she considers herself to 
be the truthteller regarding Eichmann: “None of the things I spoke of 
were secret, all were in the Trial. It speaks for the power of the press or 
rather the magazines that they appeared in the open only after I had pub-
lished them” (626). Even more clearly, in a letter to Mary McCarthy: “My 
point would be that what the whole furor is about are facts, and neither 
theories nor ideas. The hostility against me is a hostility against someone 
who tells the truth on a factual level.”17
Arendt ends Entry 21 with the statement “Truth . . . because it can be 
discovered and told by the One only, has no power; it lacks the capacity to 
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organize. Only if Many consent to one truth, then truth develops power. 
However, what creates power in this case is the fact of consenting, not 
truth as such” (627). It is this generally skeptical view regarding truth that 
informs Arendt’s essay on “Truth and Politics,” and that she specifi es with 
regard to “truth on a factual level,” as will be shown later.
“Weihnachten 1964”
Like Entry 21, Entry 44 is unique, but this time because it reveals some of 
Arendt’s inner life, which in principle she keeps hidden almost all through 
her thought diary. This entry, following the “Wahrheit und Politik” sec-
tion, is dated Christmas 1964.18 It was written at a time when “die Welt 
lächelt,” that is, when the world was smiling on the author of the Denktage-
buch, a surprising notation. In Arendt’s life, 1964, like the second half of 
1963, was a time in which she had to cope with the many private and pub-
lic, mostly unfair criticisms after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem 
in the spring of 1963—a year, one would think, that rather would have 
made her doubt whether the world will ever smile on her again.
The good mood, however, may not have been due only to what Arendt 
mentions in Entry 44, namely, as she puts it, the fact that the world com-
plies with her vanity and rewards her ambition in such a way that she is 
willing to settle her posthumous affairs, among them the preservation of 
her papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. But it 
also may have been owing to an occurrence in 1964, which is known from 
the “Kant- Heft,”19 included in the published Denktagebuch. There we fi nd 
a telling entry under the heading “Nacht vom 28. zum 29. April 1964” 
(Night of April 28–29, 1964), which she presumably noted in Chicago 
when she was struck by an inspiration concerning Kant’s Critique of Judg-
ment: “In the Critique of Judgment . . . the political man has his say.”20 This 
discovery at night, probably an allusion to the well- known anecdote from 
the life of the young Descartes,21 seems to have overwhelmed her, although 
there had been signals for it in former times.22 It points to the path ahead 
for Arendt’s work—the path that leads her, via “Thinking and Moral Con-
siderations,” to the Judgment part of The Life of the Mind.
The Haunting Question: What Is “Truth on a Factual Level”?
Among the many distinction, examples, and thoughts Arendt notes in her 
Denktagebuch truth- and- politics section, one item can be singled out as 
fundamental. It may be phrased in the question, What is truth on a factual 
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level? This question receives a specifi c twist when debated within the realm 
of Arendt’s now notorious concept of the “banality of evil,” which, by the 
way, is never mentioned in the Denktagebuch. Roger Berkowitz, in his 
introductory remarks to the Conference on “Truthtelling: Democracy in 
an Age Without Facts,” held at Bard College in 2011, proposed that in 
Arendt’s terms “Eichmann is banal” and that Arendt had meant this to be 
a statement of factual truth.23 But did she really? The question has lingered 
ever since.
Before entering into the discussion, a short reminder may be appropri-
ate. At the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt reports the last words 
uttered by Eichmann on the gallows, concerning which she comments: “It 
was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this 
long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fear-
some, word- and- thought- defying banality of evil.”24 This is the only place 
in the book where Arendt uses the formula she had put in the subtitle. Only 
later, in her 1964 preface to the German edition (and accordingly in 1965 
in the postscript to the second English edition), does “banality of evil” 
come up again. She writes (in the second English edition): “When I speak 
of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to 
a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial.”25 The “banality of 
evil,” a phenomenon staring the reporter in the face, which is “fearsome” 
in such a way that it is “word- and- speech- defying”—these component 
parts of Arendt’s interpretation cannot be overemphasized. Many critics, 
however, have overlooked both the adjectives “fearsome” and “word- and- 
speech defying,” a point made by Ernst Vollrath in his speech of acceptance 
of the Bremen Hannah Arendt Prize for Political Thinking in 2001.26 
Vollrath also highlighted that for Arendt the phenomenologist, the “banal-
ity of evil” is a “phenomenon” and in so doing implied that a statement like 
“Eichmann is banal” remains off the mark. Arendt may have confi rmed 
“banalities” (in Jerome Kohn’s phrasing) of Eichmann, but she never made 
a statement to the effect that Eichmann was banal. The fearsome “phe-
nomenon” was word- and- thought- defying, but Arendt was able to describe 
what she had experienced in confronting herself with the reality of Eich-
mann. She could write a report; however, as she later confessed in a letter 
written to Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg in 1966: “The whole truth is that I did 
not know the answers myself when I wrote the book.”27
In Arendt’s understanding, then, may we consider “Eichmann is banal” 
a statement of factual truth? Since Arendt writes explicitly in “Truth and 
Politics” that she wants to understand truth in the sense in which men 
commonly understand the word,28 we cannot simply look up philosophical 
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dictionaries for defi nitions and then decide how to answer the question. 
However, it does make sense to look at Arendt’s concept of factual truth by 
examining the concept in the works of thinkers to whom she is indebted: 
Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and, as Peg Birmingham points out,29 
Walter Benjamin.
Arendt’s hint to the distinction (known since Leibniz) between rational 
truth and factual truth does not help much, since she writes: “I shall use 
this distinction for the sake of convenience without discussing its intrinsic 
legitimacy.”30 Rather, we are left with the examples she provides and with 
those statements she formulates in the course of her refl ections on “Truth 
and Politics.” Concerning the examples, Arendt is very clear about what 
Eichmann is not. He “was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would 
have been farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to 
prove a villain.’ ”31 He was not a monster, as has often been pointed out. 
But are these negative examples suffi cient to empirically feed the statement 
“Eichmann is banal” in a way that it can be claimed to be a statement of 
factual truth?
With regard to Arendt’s refl ections on truth and politics, things become 
even more complicated. “Factual truth,” she writes, is “political by nature,”32 
it “informs political thought,” and, as she has it in the fi nal German version, 
“hält Spekulation in Grenzen”33 (provides limits to speculative thinking). 
There exist “brutally elementary data” like that to which the French politi-
cian Georges Clemenceau is said to have referred during a talk on the ques-
tion of guilt for the outbreak of the First World War: “I know for certain 
that they [i.e., future historians] will not say Belgium invaded Germany.”34 
Certainly, the statement “Eichmann is banal,” does not belong to these 
“brutally elementary data,” but there is a striking parallel between the two. 
Arendt’s guess holds for both: “It is as if people commonly are incapable of 
coming to terms with things of which cannot be said any other way than 
that they are as they are—things in their naked facticity.”35 However, when 
she continues to say that factual truth is “beyond agreement, dispute, opin-
ion, or consent,”36—or put even more directly, when it comes to factual 
truth, persuasion is useless, so is discussion—one can no longer follow the 
argument on factual truth with regard to her view on Eichmann.
Furthermore, Arendt differentiates her description of Eichmann from 
the concept “banality of evil” by declaring that with the latter she is draw-
ing one conclusion, or rather “the most general” conclusion from what she 
had seen and described: “My ‘basic notion’ of the ordinariness of Eichmann 
is much less a notion than a faithful description of a phenomenon. I am 
sure there can be drawn many conclusions from this phenomenon and the 
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most general I drew is indicated: ‘banality of evil.’ I may sometime want to 
write about this, and then I would write about the nature of evil.”37 Unfor-
tunately, this is a work she never wrote.
Arendt’s views on Eichmann as well as her way of introducing the “banal-
ity of evil,” are basically tentative and open to debate. The portrait she 
painted of Eichmann was multifaceted, which Jerome Kohn brings to atten-
tion. Arendt’s Eichmann, Kohn argues, is a “murderer,” an “idealist,” and a 
“clown.”38 To claim as a statement of factual truth that Arendt’s Eichmann 
is banal would reduce this multifacetedness. One would miss part of the story 
Arendt wanted to tell and did tell, even though she did not claim to have told 
a story, but rather to have learned a lesson39. She had sought to initiate a 
“real” or “authentic” controversy, as she wrote to Rabbi Hertzberg: “I had 
hoped for a real controversy.”40 It was a debate that she did not get.
Such defi ciency, if it is really one, hardly comes as a surprise to those, 
myself included, who believe that Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and par-
ticularly the concept “banality of evil” left not only truths on a factual level 
but also a Socratic sting to posterity.
Two Concluding Observations
Returning to the “Wahrheit und Politik” section in the Denktagebuch, I 
want to put on record two more general observations. One is directly 
related to the Denktagebuch entries discussed here, the other one places the 
section in the broader context of the Denktagebuch as a literary genre.
The “Wahrheit und Politik” entries are a collection of eclectic observa-
tions, thoughts or “trains of thought” (to use Margaret Canovan’s phrase), 
and quotations; they obtain some structure only if seen in the light of the 
later publications on “Wahrheit und Politik” and “Truth and Politics.” 
When reviewing “Truth and Politics” for the second edition of Between 
Past and Future, Arendt gave a decisive hint by adding an asterisked foot-
note: “This essay was caused by the so- called controversy after the publica-
tion of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Its aim is to clarify two different, though 
interconnected, issues of which I had not been aware before and whose 
importance seemed to transcend the occasion. The fi rst concerns the ques-
tion of whether it is always legitimate to tell the truth—did I believe without 
qualifi cation in ‘Fiat veritas, et pereat mundus’—Be there truth, even if the 
world may perish? The second arose through the amazing amount of lies 
used in the ‘controversy’—lies about what I had written, on one hand, and 
about the facts I had reported, on the other.”41 It is with both these issues 
that Arendt tried to come to grips in her essay “Truth and Politics,” and it 
is for both these issues that she collected materials in the Denktagebuch. But 
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there are also thoughts and materials in the Denktagebuch section that did 
not enter the “Truth and Politics” publications, and vice versa.
Considered in the context of the Denktagebuch as a whole, the “Wahrheit 
und Politik” section is proof of the “Arbeitsjournal” (logbook) or “Werk-
statt” (workshop) character of the Denktagebuch, namely, Arendt’s practice 
of using her thought diary during a period when she was preparing a special 
publication. Only marginally does this section show the real quality of the 
Denktagebuch: the kind of Socratic inner dialogue, the two- in- one dialogue, 
and the free fl ow of thinking that our working group has enjoyed and has 
been concerned with in other sessions. One may even argue that after the 
break or gap in 1961–62, a general change in the Denktagebuch can be 
detected. The prolifi c time of the 1950s is over, more and more the diary 
becomes instrumental up to the end in the 1970s, when it serves the pur-
poses of only a traveling calendar.42
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“The question is: Is there a way of thinking which is not tyrannical?” (Die 
Frage ist: Gibt es ein Denken, das nicht tyrannisch ist?), wrote Hannah Arendt 
in December 1950, a few months after she began writing the Denktagebuch 
(D II. 20.45). It is a thought in the form of a question, which begins and 
forms the center of Arendt’s work of the next several years as she rethinks 
the political, rereads dominant and hidden traditions of philosophy, and 
develops unprecedented modes of writing in the face of an unprecedented 
break in history and tradition (dealing with the legacy of totalitarianism, 
the Nazi past, and the Shoah). At the time of this entry, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism was already in manuscript form. In the winter of 1949–50, 
Arendt had returned to Germany for the fi rst time since her fl ight in 1933. 
In her “Report from Germany,” published in October 1950 in Commen-
tary, she formulated the challenge of the present era: “to face and to come 
to terms with what really happened.”1 It is a challenge of understanding, of 
judgment, and not least of writing itself regarding the literal process of 
“coming to terms with.”
What is the context of Arendt’s question about the possibility of non-
tyrannical thought in the Denktagebuch? What do the surroundings of this 
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passage look like? The entry itself deals with “the affi nity of the philoso-
pher and the tyrant since Plato” (D II. 20.45). The tradition of Western 
thought that identifi es thinking and reason with logic begins with Plato. 
The irrevocable laws of logic, according to Arendt, are “by defi nition” con-
nected not to freedom, but rather to tyranny. If one understands this tradi-
tion where the political is the concern of man and of a rational constitution, 
then only tyranny can produce good politics. The political, however, is not 
intrinsic to humans, it is not part of the human essence: The human being 
is apolitical, Arendt states in a neighboring entry. As Arendt conceptualizes 
it and explains in The Human Condition, the birthplace of freedom and the 
political lies “between people” (Zwischen- den- Menschen): “Politics arises in 
the space between people and establishes itself as the relationship” (Politik 
entsteht im Zwischen und etabliert sich als der Bezug; 17, my emphasis).
The question of the relationship between tyranny and thought is a 
political and theoretical one. How can the connection between the occur-
rences of the world and the capacity of humans to understand and think 
through them be effectively conceived? In an immediately preceding entry 
from December 1950, Arendt recalls a powerful guiding principle of the 
philosophical tradition: adaequatio rei et intellectus, the correspondence 
theory of truth which claims the adequacy of knowledge, or intellect and 
subject. According to Hegel, Arendt notes, the movements of the mind 
and the movements of events match insofar as the intellectual “swimming” 
(Schwimmbewegungen) of man continues to match the “tide” (Strombewe-
gungen) of world events. Marx, according to Arendt, concludes from this 
that the swimmer is in fact stronger than the tide, and even able to channel 
the river of world events into specifi c channels. “Naturally, this is possible 
only within the laws of the tide” (innerhalb der Stromgesetze), since the laws 
of the tide “are also the laws of swimming” (zugleich auch die Schwimm-
gesetze sind), she comments. In anaphoric unison with her question about 
nontyrannical thought, Arendt responds: “The question is how one can 
avoid swimming in the tide at all” (Die Frage ist gerade, wie man das Schwim-
men im Strom überhaupt vermeiden kann; D II.19.45).
Arendt calls into question the et/and between rei and intellectus in a two-
fold manner, as well as the conjunction in “the conception of truth and 
world security” (Wahrheitsbegriff und Weltsicherheit), as the entry is titled in 
the Denktagebuch. In questioning the binding power of these conjunctions, 
she breaks up the assumptions of traditional connectors.
The cited notes, including Arendt’s emphatic questions, precede an entry 
that is literally broken up. “The path of life” (Der Lebensweg), as it is titled, 
runs metaphorically on land, instead of swimming in the tide of history. The 
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“deserts and wildernesses of life” (Wüsten und Wildnisse des Lebens), with 
which the entry begins, however, lay no solid ground for the paths of thought 
to follow. As protection from the worst perils of the “human jungles” (Men-
schendschungel), society has built “a few tracks” (ein paar Wege), which provide 
orientation, at least in “bright times” (in ruhigen Zeiten). And what happens 
to men in dark times? After a dash she begins the contrary argument: “Who-
ever does not these tracks . . .” (Wer diese Wege nicht . . .) and the note breaks 
off. But just two entries later (D II.21.45), a voice seems to continue this 
refl ection on the “path of life”:
Up life’s hill with my little bundle,
If I prove it steep,
If a discouragement withhold me,
If my newest step
Older feel than the hope that prompted,
Spotless be from blame
Heart that proposed as heart that accepted,
Homelessness for home.
The voice that speaks here in Arendt’s Denktagebuch belongs to Emily 
Dickinson. Like Arendt, she vexed her contemporaries and left no one 
untouched but many uncomprehending. The theorist answers her own 
question about the unsettled relationship between reality and the contem-
plation of reality with a poem. Is there a conjunction that connects these 
disparate pieces that Arendt places next to one another in her Thinking 
Notebook?
To accept “homelessness for home” was a new kind of experience for 
Arendt upon her reencounter with Germany. Her “Report from Ger-
many” uses the word twice in the fi rst paragraph. The “peculiarly modern 
touches of physical homelessness,” Arendt says, had been added to the 
general picture of catastrophe in the devastated land of postwar Europe; 
she describes “homelessness on an unprecedented scale” in her preface to 
the Origins, written at the same time in summer 1950. “Heartlessness,” 
which rhymes with “homelessness” and echoes Dickinson’s poem, is the 
remarkable word with which Arendt brings the core observation of her 
report to light.2
The heartless and stubborn refusal of many Germans to accept the bla-
tant and shocking realities revealed a diffi cult legacy of the Nazi regime. 
Arendt saw the inability of many of those she spoke with to distinguish 
facts from opinions as a variation on this problem. “The reality of the death 
factories” had often been “transformed into a mere potentiality,” Arendt 
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reports from numerous conversations.3 This was the burdensome inheri-
tance of totalitarian rule, which fostered an understanding of reality in 
which “what is true today may already be false tomorrow.”4 The refusal of 
countless Germans to confront and understand what actually happened 
comes to Arendt as an image: “Amid the ruins, Germans mail each other 
picture postcards still showing the cathedrals and marketplaces, the public 
buildings and bridges that no longer exist.”5 Arendt does not look “behind 
the facades,” but rather describes what she perceives in front of her eyes. 
She does not refer to a preexisting system of conception, nor does she 
deduce a theory to present her thoughtful observations. Her way of writ-
ing describes a process: “to face and to come to terms with what really 
happened.”6
Arendt does not arrange the two activities “to face” and “to come to 
terms with” in a chronological, intentional, or causal order. Instead, the 
sentence expresses a mode: to look reality in the face, to confront what 
happened and to fi nd words for what one thus discovers, to bring it into 
language. An oscillating “and” that joins, and creates distance. A break and 
a space between. “Stop and think.” “Between” is a political word for 
Arendt: It is a place for interactions that are unpredictable and not fully 
controllable; it is a birthplace for freedom. Totalitarianism tried to radi-
cally destroy this space of freedom with an “iron band” of ideology and 
terror, Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism. In the Denktagebuch 
she takes up the word “band” and links it in a new and different way. It is 
not the coercive logic of reason but rather the imagination that forms a 
“band between people” (Nicht die Vernunft, sondern die Einbildungskraft bil-
det das Band zwischen den Menschen), she says, in regard to the political 
aptitude of different intellectual capacities: “Against the self- sense, reason, 
which grows from the thought of the “I”/ego, stand the world- sense, public 
spirit (passive) and imagination (active) which grow from others” (Gegen 
den Selbst- Sinn, die Vernunft, die aus dem Ich- denke lebt, steht der Welt- Sinn, 
der als Gemeinsinn (passiv) und als Einbildungskraft (aktiv) von den Anderen 
lebt; D XXII.19.570).
In the immediately following paragraph of the same entry (from August 
1957), Arendt considers the relationship between art and politics and comes 
to the conclusion that “both have to do with the world” (beide haben es mit 
der Welt zu tun). A year later, the thought resurfaces in The Human Condition 
(as well as in the German version Vita activa of 1960). In the section on “The 
Permanence of the World and the Work of Art” (Die Beständigkeit der Welt 
und das Kunstwerk) Arendt speaks of the human faculty to be “open and re-
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lated to the world” (weltoffene und weltbezogene Fähigkeit) from which art is 
produced. This is the human capacity “to think and to sense” (zu denken und 
zu sinnen) as she refers to it later in the same paragraph.7 It is a surprising 
“and”- connection of two traditionally separate capacities again reminiscent 
of the mode “to face and to come to terms with.”
This wording exists only in the German edition of Vita Activa, while in 
the American Human Condition merely “the human capacity for thought” is 
discussed. Whereas the connection “to face and to come to terms with” is 
only in Arendt’s publications in English (see “Report from Germany” and 
Origins), compared with simply “verstehen” (understand) or “begreifen” 
(grasp, conceive) in the German (Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft). 
In one of two entries in the Denktagebuch on “Metaphor(s) and Truth” that 
directly follow the Dickinson poem “Up life’s hill with my little bundle,” 
Arendt creates another counterpart for “come to terms” which carries 
signifi cant and remarkable echoes of the English, down to the very syllable: 
First the “coming- to- words” (Zum- Wort- Werden) makes the “shock of 
reality” (Schock der Wirklichkeit) bearable; “this may indeed underlie the 
‘adaequatio rei et intellectus’ ” (dies liege vielleicht doch der ‘adaequatio rei et intel-
lectus’ zugrunde; D II.25.48). As fragile as the already diffi cult relationship 
between reality and the refl ection on reality becomes in the face of the mod-
ern breaks in tradition, Arendt persistently considers the particles of that 
divide, while “shock of reality” and “coming to words” act as if they were 
transcriptions of rei and intellectus, the focus remains on et/and. The question 
then becomes how these conjunctions can be conceived and presented today.
In Arendt’s writing, the word “and” continually appears not as a simple 
connector to be taken for granted, but rather as a word for making distinc-
tions and as a particle noting engagement (Verbindlichkeit). “And” can make 
seemingly incompatible concepts confront each other. Such arrangements 
can be surprising and confusing. “And” can hold abutting concepts in 
limbo and leaves space for further thought, regroupings, and new begin-
nings. “And” cannot be resolved into one concept; it needs two to come to 
life. “And” brooks no negation. Metaphorically, “and” is a word of poetry—
and of poetic thinking.
In her speech accepting the Lessing Prize, “On Humanity in Dark 
Times,” Arendt pursues the question of “how much reality must be retained 
even in a world become inhuman if humanity is not to be reduced to an 
empty phrase or phantom” (wieviel Wirklichkeit auch in einer unmenschlich 
gewordenen Welt festgehalten werden muss, um Menschlichkeit nicht zu einer 
Phrase oder einem Phantom werden zu lassen).8 Arendt imagines a friendship 
between a German and a Jew under the conditions of the Third Reich. 
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Under such circumstances, would it not have been a sign of humanness, if 
these friends had said, “Are we not both human beings” (Sind wir nicht beide 
Menschen)? No, according to Arendt: “in keeping with a humanness that 
had not lost the solid ground of reality, a humanness in the midst of the 
reality of persecution, they would have had to say to each other: ‘A German 
and a Jew, and friends’ (‘Ein Deutscher und ein Jude, und Freunde’).” It is a 
double “and” that enables an “unpremeditated facing up to, and resisting 
of, reality” in thought and writing,9 a doubled “and” whose two sides can-
not be united, but that rather live from and in the distinction.
This thought of Hannah Arendt’s on distinctions that are binding with-
out being tyrannical is related to her refl ections on “plurality.” The begin-
nings of these thoughts are noted in her early entries in the Denktagebuch. 
We know from later writings, such as The Human Condition (1958) or On 
Violence (1968) that plurality—the existence of the many and the various—
was a prerequisite for politics for Arendt. Politics, whose raison d’etre is 
freedom, arises from the spontaneous thinking and acting together of the 
many and the various. At the beginning of the Denktagebuch, she makes a 
connection between her refl ection on plurality (as a political concept) and 
a “plurality of languages” (Pluralität der Sprachen), and in fact renews and 
contextualizes her original question of nontyrannical thought.
“If there were only one language, perhaps we would be sure of the nature 
of things,” Arendt writes (Gäbe es nur eine Sprache, so wären wir vielleicht des 
Wesens der Dinge sicher; D II.15.42). “Gäbe,” “wäre,” “vielleicht”/“If,” “were,” 
“perhaps”—the distance between this uncertainty and the certainty of “one 
language” or “the nature of things” has the potential for humor, or at least 
polemical possibility. This is intentional, as Arendt sees concepts like one 
“world language” (Weltsprache) not only as “nonsense” (Unsinn) but also as 
“artifi cially enforced disambiguation of the ambiguous” (künstlich gewalt-
same Vereindeutigung des Vieldeutigen), a totalizing abolition of plurality. The 
decisive case for a plurality of languages is made in her opinion by the fact 
that a multiplicity of languages exists. These languages differ in vocabulary 
and grammar, and therefore in their “mode of thinking” (Denkweise), and all 
are learnable. It is primarily the learnability of foreign languages, according 
to Arendt—who knew Greek, Latin, French, and English—which enables 
the discovery that there are other “ ‘counterparts’ to the physically identical 
world that we have in common” (dass es noch andere ‘Entsprechungen’ zur 
gemeinsam- identischen Welt gibt als die unsere). We, who are many and vari-
ous, and more than simply descendants of one “animal rationale” or “zoon 
logikon,” we are beings gifted not with reason or language, but with languages 
and with the faculty of speaking to one another.
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But why does Hannah Arendt put the “other ‘counterparts’ of our col-
lectively shared world” in quotes? If one now reconsiders this entry on 
the “fl uctuating ambiguity of the world and the insecurity of humans in 
it” (schwankenden Vieldeutigkeit der Welt und [der] Unsicherheit des Menschen 
darin) as a refl ection of the fl uctuating relationship of rei and intellectus, one 
notices that Arendt speaks of the adaequatio, with echoes of the original 
Latin (‘adäquierende’ . . . adjustierende Erkenntnis), as “adjusting knowledge” 
(D II.15.43). So why “Entsprechungen /counterparts”? This German entry 
on the “plurality of languages” is bordered by a quote in French (Blaise 
Pascal), and an entry by Arendt in English. In this echo chamber, what 
would be the counterparts of the German Entsprechungen? Equivalences, 
analogies, counterparts—pendants, adéquations, équivalents? Or perhaps cor-
respondents—correspondances?
“What fascinated him about the matter was that the spirit and its mate-
rial manifestation were so intimately connected that it seemed permissible 
to discover everywhere Baudelaire’s correspondences, which clarifi ed and 
illuminated one another if they were properly correlated, so that fi nally 
they would no longer require any interpretative or explanatory commen-
tary.”10 “What fascinated him” refers to Walter Benjamin. In the original 
German version of her essay, Arendt characterizes Benjamin’s writing style 
through the plural words “Entspechungen/correspondances.” She uses the 
word Entsprechungen once again in this essay when she sums up his unique 
way of thinking on “the intellectual and its material appearance” (das Geis-
tige und seine materielle Erscheinung)—“intellectus et rei”—as follows: “What 
is so hard to understand about Benjamin,” Arendt writes, “is that without 
being a poet he thought poetically”11 (Was an Benjamin so schwer zu verste-
hen war ist, daß er, ohne ein Dichter zu sein, dichterisch dachte). To think 
poetically, to think philosophically, to think politically—what connections, 
conjunctions, relationships does Arendt open up here surrounding her 
question whether there is a kind of thought that is not tyrannical?
In the following entry, after she cites the poetic thought of “Entspechun-
gen/correspondances,” Arendt notes in English, “If Man is the topic of phi-
losophy and Men the subject of politics, then totalitarianism signifi es a 
victory of ‘philosophy’ over politics—and not the other way round.” And 
she continues: “It is as though the fi nal victory of philosophy would mean 
the fi nal extermination of philosophers. Perhaps they have become ‘super-
fl uous’ ” (D II, 16:43). “Superfl uous,” like “counterparts” in the preceding 
entry on the “plurality of languages,” is set in quotes. For what reason? No 
other English word is thus marked in the surrounding entries on the prob-
lem of totalitarian regimes—where “the omnipotence of Man corresponds 
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to the superfl uousness of Men” (die Allmacht des Menschen der Überfl üssigkeit 
der Menschen entspricht) (D II.21.53). Where does this quoted “superfl uous” 
come from?
“Superfl uous were the Sun / When Excellence be dead,” begins a poem 
by Emily Dickinson. It was written in the same year as “Up life’s hill with 
my little bundle.” In the Complete Poems, the two are neighbors (No. 999 
and No. 1010). “Superfl uous were the Sun” was published in a 1950 edi-
tion that Arendt owned. It is a poem that presents the absence, indeed the 
death of an all- seeing majesty, and also deals with one presumed dead: 
“dead/said” is the rhyme of the fi rst strophe. Arendt juxtaposes the inter-
nally rhyming “fi nal victory of philosophy” with the potential “fi nal exter-
mination of the philosophers.” Would it be the assassination of a tyrant or 
rather his suicide? Would this mark the end of the time of philosophical 
thought? How could one continue to write in such an era? The iambs of 
the last verses both narrow it down and open it up:
Upon His dateless Fame
Our Periods may lie
As Stars that drop anonymous
From an abundant sky.12
Which “periods” are falling from the sky here? Eras, punctuation marks? 
Which conjunction(s) could stand between them? And they drop “as 
stars”—the time when the stars were brought to the earth was a time of 
Revolutions. Constellations of tides, times, terms—characters, signs?
One could call Arendt’s system of writing in the Denktagebuch creating 
constellations: It is a collection and juxtaposition of notes, excerpts, refl ec-
tions, fragments, quotes, poems; assemblages that establish connections and 
leave them open, because they are being questioned; or fi gurations, whose 
traces are reworked in Arendt’s texts, from The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951) to The Life of the Mind (1977). This characteristic of Arendt’s writing 
remains, up to today, largely without response. To accept “Homelessness 
for Home,” as Dickinson writes, can thus also be read in relation to Arendt’s 
barely answered way of writing.
It might not be a coincidence that it was a poet who responds to Arendt’s 
way of scrutinizing the questions “Is there a way of thinking which is not 
tyrannical” and “how one can avoid swimming in the tide” most precisely. 
In her novel Das zweite Paradies (Second Paradise), Hilde Domin gives the 
following line to an Arendt- voice: “ ‘Auf dem Atlantik,’ sagte eine, ‘bau ich 
mein Haus. Beide Kontinente sind unmöglich. Ich lebe zwischen Ihnen,’ ” (“I’ll 
build my house in the Atlantic,” she said. “Both continents are impossible. 
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I’ll live between them”).13 It is a moving and apt image for Hannah Arendt’s 
“place” between different languages, audiences, and traditions, and it is the 
emerging outline of a thinker of conjunctions and relations.
In the “Postscriptum” to Thinking, at the end of the fi rst section of The Life 
of the Mind, the question of a way of thinking that is not tyrannical resur-
faces. Here this “distinct capacity of our minds” is closely associated with 
another: the capacity of “judging.”14 In “contradistinction” to the intellec-
tual activities of thinking and willing, “judgments are not arrived at by 
 either deduction or induction,” Arendt says, “in short, they have nothing 
in common with logical operations.”15 While the sonorous voice of con-
sciousness confers its commands to action on the basis of generalization, 
the quiet praxis of judgment is constantly concerned with uniquenesses. 
Arendt, in agreement with Kant, characterized judgment as “a peculiar tal-
ent which can be practiced only and cannot be taught.” Correspondingly, 
Aristotle recognized that scientifi c rules could not be applied to ethical 
matters; rather, moral actions are situationally determined, in individual 
cases and according to particularities. Any discussion of matters of ethics 
and action he adds, echoing ethics and aesthetics, “cannot be more than an 
outline and is bound to lack precision.”16
In order to be able “to arrive at a halfway plausible theory of ethics,” 
according to Arendt, it is important to separate judgment from other 
intellectual capacities and to grant it its own modus operandi.17 For the 
question of whether a person is able to make this distinction, Arendt devises 
an interesting litmus test. How does one understand the relationship of 
judgment and history? Does one accept with Hegel and Marx that history 
is the tribunal of the world and that questions of ethics are essentially 
questions of development and progress? Or does one believe with Kant in 
human autonomy, in the ability to spontaneously start a series from the 
beginning?
Arendt has a characteristic way of dealing with such questions of the 
development of traditions and possibilities of thinking, in which she dives 
down to the moment in the past when a common word was transformed 
into a concept, when the crystallization of a concept happened. She thereby 
recreates a moment of undecidedness, and therefore the possibility of 
deciding. With the word “Geschichte/history,” she starts her refl ections at 
its Greek stem historein. The word once had several meanings: to see, to 
know, to report, to investigate and question an eyewitness, to evaluate 
testimony like an impartial judge. While Arendt understands the will as a 
sense of the future, she understands judgment as a capacity for dealing with 
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the past. “If judgment is our faculty for dealing with the past, the historian 
is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgment over it.”
How should this emphatic “by relating it” be read? The decisive aspect, 
the place where the judgment becomes manifest, seems to be the (way of ) 
presenting (the story/history). The English expression “by relating it” has 
a double meaning here: the process of telling, and a way of relating things, 
of putting them in relation to each other. Which relationships are created 
here? Which capacities are addressed? How is the relationship that Arendt 
invokes between Homer and Herodotus—authors that fall somewhere 
between writers of history and poets—to be understood? Why does Arendt 
focus on the relationship of judgment (to writing, and) to history? What 
door does the insertion of the phrase “by relating it” open in our under-
standing of judgment? What grammars (English, German, Greek) are 
folded into each other here, what plurality of ways of thinking are intro-
duced to the reader?18
In the “Postscriptum” to the fi rst volume of The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
had already decided and announced that her investigation of judgment 
would come at the end of the second volume, which is dedicated to willing. 
That Judging should become its own—however unwritten—book, was at 
that point unforeseeable. In the last section of Willing, we again encounter 
the constellation that is introduced in the “Postscriptum.” Here again she 
talks about the turning point in the traditional understanding of history: of 
the modern conception of historical progress, which is connected with 
Hegel and Marx, as well as its counterpart in Kant’s thinking on freedom.
But here Arendt tells the story a bit differently, and with a surprise: with 
John Donne. In the seventeenth century, as a new scientifi c understanding 
of history was already emerging, John Donne, who was not a scientist, but 
a poet, wrote an astounding observation “in immediate reaction to what he 
knew was going on in the sciences” in 1611. Without a colon, which would 
demote what follows to the status of an illustration, but rather with a new, 
indented paragraph that interrupts and resets the discursive text, Arendt 
says what she has to say at this moment in her train of thought with another 
voice, namely the voice of John Donne’s poetry:
[Donne] did not have to wait for Descartes, or Pascal, to draw all the 
conclusions from what he perceived.
And new Philosophy calls all in doubt,
. . .
’Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
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Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot. . . .
And he ends with lamentations that needed roughly three hundred years 
to be heard again. . . .19
Arendt sets in motion all John Donne’s conclusions, reached indepen-
dently of Descartes and Pascal, whose ideas are still formative today, by 
picking up on precisely this word—“all.” In this way a plurality of sentences 
emerges from all- embracing completeness. Arendt’s and Donne’s observa-
tions do not seem complete, but instead offer possible combinations. 
Arendt’s “all the conclusions” is posed as an echo of Donne’s “all in doubt” 
and “all in pieces.” The verses diagnose a state of affairs: “all cohaerence 
gone . . . and all Relation.” What follows is a string of powerful entities—
ruler, subject, father, son—that have been forgotten: That is to say, their 
relationships to each other must be reconsidered. The only conjunction in 
this poem is “and”: conclusive connecting particles like “because” or “thus” 
are absent. The verses she cites begin with “and,” and it is with “and” that 
Arendt continues her text. Arendt’s passage deals with history, with the 
oscillation between “all” and “and,” and seeks “to draw all conclusions” 
from history “by relating it.”
In this mode of “relating,” philosophy, poetry, history, and politics 
come into relation with each other. In Notebook XX of Arendt’s Denktage-
buch there is a passage of about twenty pages (477– 496) notable because of 
the density with which poetry, philosophy, history, and politics are brought 
into relation, and because of the density or urgency with which at the same 
time she questions their relationship to judgment.20
Those who know Arendt’s later writings will hear hints of judging 
already at the beginning of Notebook XX: one with “common sense ‘argues,’ 
because otherwise he would have no way of ordering particular sense- data 
in the common world. This ‘common sense’ always works with working 
hypotheses that serve to control the particular in reference to its ‘general 
validity’ ” (D XX.1.477). Although “judging” is not specifi cally mentioned, 
the use of expressions like “common sense” (as “gesunder Menschenverstand” 
and as “Gemeinsinn”), with which Arendt was to develop her refl ections on 
judging over the next two decades, shows that it is already clearly under 
consideration here. This early passage from the Denktagebuch, in which the 
“particular” is twice mentioned, and its relationship to “general validity” 
emphasized seems directly echoed by the end of Arendt’s Kant Lectures. “In 
conclusion,” she writes there, “The chief diffi culty in judgment is that it is 
‘the faculty of thinking the particular’ [Kant, Section IV of the Introduc-
tion to KdU]; but to think means to generalize, hence it is the faculty of 
mysteriously combining the particular and the general.”21
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   61 11/2/16   11:12 AM
62 Thomas Wild
The keyword of Notebook XX appears right at the beginning in entry 2: 
athanasia, the Greek word for immortality, for deathlessness, imperishabil-
ity, which can also be understood as persisting or living on. In the polis, 
glorious deeds were helped toward immortality and their heroes made 
deathless by being told over and over again, so that they remained a vital 
element of life in the polis, the political sphere. Arendt confronts this 
ancient understanding of history, according to which “the polis was the site 
of ‘historicity’ and so politics was ‘the medium of history,’ ” with a modern 
way of thinking about history as a Prozess, as a process or trial, according to 
which history was seen as the medium of politics (D XX.6.480). If one 
accepts the modern conception of nature and history as a process of devel-
opment and progress, history is in the position to be understood as “pro-
duced,” which results from a quasi- mechanical understanding of the making 
of history. For our traditional conception of athanasia/deathlessness, Chris-
tianity also plays an important role. “In antiquity, man is perishable, but the 
world is not,” according to Arendt’s aphoristic distinction, and “in Christi-
anity the world is perishable but man is not” (D XX.7.482). In modernity 
meaning is won for individual deeds and lives from their arrangement in a 
universal design, while in antiquity the history of men and deeds was given 
meaning in relation to a specifi c, unique occurrence.
“What the concept of process implies is that the concrete and the general, 
the single thing or event and the universal meaning have parted company,” 
Arendt writes in her essay “The Concept of History” at the beginning of the 
section on “History and Earthly Immortality”: “The process, which alone 
makes meaningful whatever it happens to carry along, has thus acquired a 
monopoly of universality and signifi cance.”22 While this understanding of 
history as a universal meaning- creating process has its representatives in 
Hegel and Marx, Arendt invokes the author of the Histories in her consider-
ation of the other conception of history. Herodotus “never would have 
doubted that each thing that is or was carries its meaning within itself and 
needs only the word to make it manifest,” according to Arendt in the same 
passage: “Everything that was done or happened contained and disclosed its 
share of ‘general’ meaning within the confi nes of its individual shape and did 
not need a developing and engulfi ng process to become signifi cant.”
It is astounding, this sentence in which Arendt concretizes Herodotus’s 
concept of history. “The fl ux of his narrative,” she writes, “is suffi ciently 
loose to leave room for many stories, but there is nothing in this fl ux indica-
tive that the general bestows meaning and signifi cance on the particular.”23 
Herodotus’s writing style, the presentation of his Histories, is what makes the 
difference. This way of writing makes distinctions that open possibilities; it 
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   62 11/2/16   11:12 AM
Modes of Writing and Judgment in the Denktagebuch 63
creates relationships without subordinating. It is able to think the particular 
by relating it, which characterizes the capacity of judging, according to Arendt 
and Kant. Is it a suffi ciently loose fl ow of presentation to deal with the ques-
tion of “how one can avoid swimming in the tide at all”?
How does Arendt deal with the relationship between history, politics, 
presentation, and judging in the German version of her essay? In the clos-
ing of Geschichte und Politik in der Neuzeit, she turns her criticism of history- 
making decisively on the present; in the English version this is presented in 
an epilogue. The monstrous destruction that characterizes the “political 
experiences and catastrophes of the 20th century,” according to Arendt in 
a 1957 text, “arose from the disposition” to see politics as a process of 
production.24 Understanding politics as the consequent product of a given 
aim ultimately took away the meaning of politics as an action of freedom 
that includes incalculabilities. The “totalitarian regimes, the tyrannies and 
dictatorships of our century” would in fact “ultimately aim to achieve this.” 
When people are forced into an inescapable, inevitable course, there is no 
room to jump out of this line and begin a new sequence. According to 
Arendt what is set in motion through action cannot be controlled, since its 
interaction with the actions of others is unforeseeable. Not only are the 
outcomes of acting (together) unpredictable, but even their general ten-
dencies cannot be clearly determined. The vectors of political action, 
which consolidate into history, do not have a defi nable direction; rather, 
they move in a space of time, which points into “an endless future and an 
endless past.” Herein lies the foundation of an experience of history as 
related moments, which is strictly distinct from history as development. 
This former experience rather questions the way relationships are formed, 
it asks about the mode of “relating.” How can the experiences of such a 
“potential earthly immortality” be written?
Arendt addresses this question with four lines of a poem by Rainer Maria 
Rilke from the tenth poem in his cycle “From the Remains of Count C.W.” 
In Arendt’s copy of the published edition of this “poem cycle,” which is 
preserved in her library at Bard College, the afterword notes that Rilke said 
precisely these four lines aloud to himself as if in passing one evening, and 
subsequently remarked “in astonishment” that these verses “are not written 
by you.”25 With a mixture of strangeness and familiarity, Arendt puts these 
verses in both the German and English versions of her essays on “The Con-
cept of History.” There—as later John Donne’s words would in The Life of 
the Mind—they continue the thought process of the essay without a colon, 
transitioning to the German original also in the English version of her 
essay, simply beginning a new paragraph:
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Berge ruhn, von Sternen überprächtigt;
aber auch in ihnen fl immert Zeit.
Ach in meinem wilden Herzen nächtigt
obdachlos die Unvergänglichkeit.26
Here the Greek athanasia has disappeared from the world; it no longer 
lives in the public retellings of men, presented in the bright light of the 
polis. The “immortality” is relocated to the darkness of the human heart. It 
is a process of internalization through which “earthly immortality” loses its 
shelter and becomes homeless in the world. Rilke’s verses are not the inspi-
ration for Arendt’s criticism of a now- dominant understanding of history as 
the result of a process of development, in which context this inward retreat 
occurred. The lines’ purpose is not exhausted in serving as a quotation. 
They host something independent. They stand for themselves—as verses.
Rilke’s verses describe a phenomenon that Arendt called the reversal of 
the Greek relationships between man and the world. Whereas in antiquity 
man was the only perishable entity in the boundless immortality of the 
world, in modern times he has become the last refuge of immortality. 
Arendt’s text presents the reversal of this relationship in verse. The poetry 
here does not propose an eternal truth. Rather, it invokes that endangered 
immortality (athanasia) that accompanies the experience of a political 
action, pointing “into an endless future and an endless past.” It is for this 
purpose that Arendt interrupts the linear development of her essay and 
opens it to the turns, the phrasings of this poem. The presentation of this 
reversal of discourse (the reversal of the relationships between man and 
world) and this performative reversal (the interruption of the progression 
of the text and insertion of verse) is resolved neither into discourse nor into 
rhetoric. Arendt puts these particularities in relation to each other without 
predetermining their relationship (without grammatical subordination, for 
example, and without proposing a resolution).
Even in the English version, Arendt quotes the verses in the original 
German, since “their perfection seems to defy translation.”27 Rilke’s lines 
do not fundamentally resist translation, for Arendt provides the reader 
with a prose version in the notes to her essay.28 Nonetheless, the gesture of 
interrupting the discursive text is made particularly explicit here, as the 
change of mode of writing is accompanied by a leap into another language. 
It is a gesture that acknowledges the singularity of the fact that only in 
German can “fl immernde Zeit” be rhymed with “obdachlose Unvergänglich-
keit,” and that “Nacht” can neither be made into a verb (“nächtigt”) in Eng-
lish nor echoed with a confusingly clear neologism like “überprächtigt.” In 
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other words, Arendt’s writing offers an experience of how the particular is 
not replaceable and cannot be rendered into a general meaning. In this way 
Arendt extends her observation of the capacity of judging in Herodotus’s 
Histories, “that the general [does not] bestow meaning and signifi cance on 
the particular,” and that instead the author sits in judgment of history “by 
relating it.”29
Judging describes a mode of “mysteriously combining the particular and 
the general,” Arendt writes.30 Her method of combining, her constellating 
mode of writing has a somewhat less mysterious effect in the Denktagebuch, 
since one can ascribe this structure of the writing to the genre of the note-
book. How does the particular character of the Denktagebuch comment on 
the capacity of judging in Arendt’s writing in general? How do the differ-
ent spaces of writing relate to each other?
“Book,” Arendt notes in the XX Notebook in April 1953: “Possibly three 
essays: Forms of government—Vita Activa—Philosophy and Politics” (D 
XX.9.482). Such entries are rare. Arendt seldom reaches beyond the con-
crete moment of thought or reading notes and plans future publications in 
the Denktagebuch. Nonetheless, she remained faithful to the plan sketched 
here, and it previews her writings of the next twenty years. Arendt began 
writing “Forms of Government” a bit later as “Introduction to Politics,” 
an unchanged project that became the nucleus of her attempts at and varia-
tions on rethinking the political. “Vita Activa” was the title she originally 
considered for her 1958 book The Human Condition in English and the one 
she actually chose for the 1960 German edition, which revolves around the 
human activities of labor, work, and action in modern times. Many con-
sider it her “most philosophical” book. In the United States it is as good as 
canonized as such. But what would it mean to read Vita Activa, in contrast 
to its canonization as a philosophical monograph, as an “essay,” in agreement 
with her earlier note from the Denktagebuch?
Arendt elaborated on the third project of her plan: “Philosophy and 
Politics. Including ‘common sense’ (Hobbes) and history as ‘Ersatz’ for the 
polis” (D XX.9.483). If one adds to this an entry written shortly before, it 
becomes clear that these few lines essentially outline Arendt’s entire project. 
Hobbes transformed common sense into its logical conclusion—“reckoning 
with consequences” (D XIX.44.473). Arendt challenges this tradition with 
her question of the possibility of nontyrannical thought. Her question like-
wise challenges Hegel, whose speculative reason was inspired by Hobbes 
through a dialectical- conclusive process- thinking. According to Arendt, 
Hegel’s universal theory of history had dismissed the praxis of the Greek 
polis, which understood history as the remembrance of continually retold 
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deeds of great heroes. This is the context, Arendt writes in parentheses, of 
“Hegel’s contempt for Kant’s power of judgment.” In this way the early 
entries, which opened up a line of thought that associates history and judg-
ing, once again establishes a relationship to Arendt’s late writings.
The side question about the temporality of thought raised by the rela-
tionship of thoughts in Arendt’s early and late writings stretches out another 
“rainbow of concepts” than the one Arendt mentions near the end of the 
second volume of The Life of the Mind. With one of Nietzsche’s words, she 
speaks of the “rainbow bridge of concepts” by which so many modern 
thinkers attempted directly to reach the ancient world. It is a harmonization 
that glosses over ruptures. Arendt was not able to cross this bridge, saying 
that she was “not homesick enough.”31 Here in the Denktagebuch the rain-
bow bridge of concepts, which helps to think about and address the ruptures 
of the twentieth century, seems to lead not only to Herodotus but also to 
thinkers like Kant and Goethe.
In the same passage of the Life of the Mind where the “rainbow bridge of 
concepts” appears, Kant and Goethe are referred to as thinkers who resist a 
totalizing tendency toward idealism. This tendency attempts to harmonize 
the diversity and contradictions of history, whether in the form of personi-
fi cations like Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” or in metaphors of human-
kind’s collectively fostered design like Hegel’s “Cunning of Reason.” Arendt 
opposes this with the “dismal reign of chance” with which Kant described 
the turmoil of history in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View (1784) or Goethe’s remark on history as “mishmash of error 
and violence” (D XX.21.488). “Do not think that I ramble, that I ver-
sify, / Look and fi nd me in a different form!” Goethe writes in a rare poeto-
logical quatrain of his late collection of aphorisms Zahme Xenien/Tame 
Xenia (1820–24): “Church history / is a mishmash of error, outrage, and 
force.”32 Arendt takes the liberty of extracting and varying the fragment that 
she fi nds useful. These verses allow this room for play. They share a core 
quality with other fragment collections by authors Arendt quotes in the 
same section of her Denktagebuch—Pascal’s Pensées, Nietzsche’s Will to 
Power, and not the least the epitome of the genre, Novalis’s collection of 
fragments Blossom- dust (Blütenstaubfragemente) from 1800: These fragments 
stand only for themselves; they do not lead to an all- encompassing frame-
work of meaning. To encounter them in any way other than to recognize 
their particularity is pointless; it is from this very pointlessness that they 
derive their power. In the same year Zahme Xenien/Tame Xenia was pub-
lished (1827), Goethe wrote: “The view that every creature exists for its 
own sake and that, for example, the cork tree does not grow so that we may 
stop our bottles, is something Kant and I have in common.”33
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Arendt cites Goethe yet again in the context of these passages in Note-
book XX of her Denktagebuch, in fact this time she cites from a work that the 
poet of the era himself declared to be fragmentary: Goethe’s Farbenlehre/
Theory of Colors (1810). This book is also a thinking notebook, if you will, it 
was written over decades, a collection of experiments, attempts, observa-
tions and refl ections, accompanied by a scattering of poems from across the 
four decades of its creation. “Goethe’s Theory of Colors” (Goethes Farben-
lehre) is the title of a poem noted by Arendt in the Denktagebuch (496):
Gelb ist der Tag.
Blau ist die Nacht.
Grün liegt die Welt.
Licht und Finsternis vermählen
sich im Dunkeln wie im Hellen.
Farbe lässt das All erscheinen,
Farben scheiden Ding von Ding.
Wenn der Regen und die Sonne
ihrer Wolkenzwiste müde
noch das Trockene und das Nasse
in die Farbenhochzeit einen,
glänzet Dunkles so wie Helles—
Bogenförmig strahlt vom Himmel
Unser Auge, unsere Welt.
The day is yellow.
The night is blue.
The world lies green.
Light and darkness marry
in shadow as in daylight.
Color allows all cosmos to appear,
Colors separate thing from thing.
When rain and sun,
tired of their cloud- strife
unite the dry and the wet
in a wedding of the colors,
dark will shine like brightness—
beaming in a bow from heaven
our eye, our world.
Right from the beginning, there is a plurality of colors. The world lies 
in the mixture of day and night, light and darkness. When the singular 
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“color” appears in the poem, it is quickly followed by “all,” the same uni-
versal from which John Donne drew his conclusions: the all- encompassing 
coherence is past, dissolved in a multiplicity of relationships. According to 
Goethe in his Theory of Colors, colors never exist in the world as absolutes, 
but rather always in relation to the other colors that exist with and around 
them, surrounding and bordering them. “Colors,” now plural again, “sepa-
rate thing from thing” according to the poem, they correspond to judg-
ment. In other words, they are capable of separating out particularities and 
setting them in relation to each other. It is a capacity of judgment that “our 
eye, our world” comprehends both actively and passively when it beams 
from heaven in the form of a bow. When it is able to separate “thing from 
thing,” like the power of colors, like another rainbow of concepts. Which 
rainbow “Goethe’s Theory of Colors” crossed over to arrive as a poem in 
Arendt’s Denktagebuch remains an open question. A reference in Goethe 
cannot be proven, and it does not fi t into the archipelago of poems by 
Arendt in her notebooks. A gem, a fragment of thought, a curiosity, a phe-
nomenon of uncertain origin?
According to Arendt, Goethe’s Urphänomen (essential phenomenon) 
was central to Benjamin’s way of thinking—a thinking that she connected 
with the gift of thinking poetically. Understood in this way, Goethe’s 
essential phenomenon is not an idea and cannot be deduced from any 
philosophical or theological theory, but rather material and concretely 
traceable, in that “word and thing, idea and experience collapse” (Wort und 
Ding, Idee und Erfahrung zusammenfallen).34 The word “zusammenfallen/
collapse” is a remarkable choice, since it can be read in the sense of “coin-
cide” as well as in the sense of “break down.” It formulates an echo of the 
opposition and relation of destruction and crystallization with which 
Arendt outlined Benjamin’s gift of thinking poetically. In his fragments for 
the Arcades Project, he sought to trace the essential phenomena of history, 
which were comprehensible to him only because the “breakdown of tradi-
tion had exposed the ‘prehistoric moments’ of all history.” Quotation and 
thought- fragment are key phenomena that are exposed here. Poetic think-
ing, as it exists in Benjamin, has a “strange power to settle down, piecemeal, 
in the present,” and to deprive “the mindless peace of complacency” from 
transmitted authority.35 Quotation and/as thought- fragment describes two 
capacities: both to “interrupt . . . the fl ow of presentation” and “to assemble 
together what is presented.” Is it a mode of presentation and of thinking 
that could deal with avoiding “swimming in the stream at all”? Ways of 
reading that could be associated with Herodotus’s “fl ux of narrative,” in 
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order to investigate the possibility of a way of thinking that is not tyranni-
cal? Attempts to think our ability “of mysteriously combining the particu-
lar and the general” to judge, for example, or to present “by relating it”?
Translated by Anne Posten
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Thinking without Contemplation
The Denktagebuch is a strange “book.”1 In fact, it cannot be read as a book 
just as any of or next to Arendt’s “other” books, such as The Human Condi-
tion or even The Life of the Mind, for it does not contain any single theory 
or a coherent set of propositions it argues for. Perhaps it is better to be 
considered as a collection of “thought fragments” (Denkbruchstücke), a term 
used by Arendt in her essay on Walter Benjamin. By this term, she refers 
to a peculiar use of quotations within a text, as having “the double task of 
interrupting the fl ow of the presentation with ‘transcendent force’ . . . and 
at the same time of concentrating within themselves that which is pre-
sented.”2 A thought fragment is not so much to be considered as a piece of 
knowledge, the fi nal outcome of a thought process, “a nugget of pure truth 
to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantel-
piece forever” (Virginia Woolf ).3 Rather, interpreting and quoting is to 
have “witnesses, also friends” (D XXVII.7.756), as Arendt suggests toward 
the end of the Denktagebuch. We might say that each fragment serves as a 
witness attesting to some aspect of, or a particular perspective on, a specifi c 
c h a p t e r  4
Thinking in Metaphors
Wout Cornelissen
What connects thinking and poetry [Dichtung] is metaphor.
In philosophy one calls concept what in poetry 
[Dichtkunst] is called metaphor.
Thinking creates its “concepts” out of the visible, 
in order to designate the invisible.
—HANNAH ARENDT,  D XXVI.30.728
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matter of interest. Arendt’s Denktagebuch consists of many such perspec-
tives, the correspondences and contradictions between which may provoke 
us to think a matter through by and for ourselves, as if we were drawn into 
a conversation with friends.
In fact, the fragmentary form of the Denktagebuch makes us more atten-
tive to the fragmentary aspects of her published work as well. Usually, The 
Human Condition is read as a plea in favor of the vita activa, as embodied in 
the Greek polis especially, over and against the vita contemplativa, as embod-
ied in “the Socratic school” and especially by Plato. More specifi cally, 
Arendt is often taken to defend (the founding of ) the polis as “the Greek 
solution” to “the frailty of human affairs” over and against the philoso-
pher’s remedy of “the traditional substitution of making for acting,” the 
latter of which had resulted in the replacement of politics—as acting and 
speaking in concert—by rule.4
We may doubt, however, whether it is in fact the case that Arendt advo-
cates one such theory or proposal over the other. Foremost, she tries to 
understand adequately the phenomenon of politics— or, rather, “to think 
what we are doing,” as she states in the prologue of The Human Condition.5 
In order to do so, she needs to liberate our understanding of action from 
the allegedly superior perspective of contemplation. Hence, her aim is not 
so much to reverse the traditional hierarchy of the two ways of life—raising 
politics above philosophy—but rather to liberate us from the interpretative 
framework that is implied in this traditional hierarchy and which has 
blurred our understanding of the proper distinctions between the diverse 
range of human activities—including the activity of thinking itself.
Against this background, it is perfectly understandable why Arendt 
devotes the penultimate paragraph of The Human Condition— or of Vita 
Activa, as she initially intended to title her book—to thought, about 
which she says: “if no other test but the experience of being active, no 
other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the 
various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as 
such would surpass them all.”6 In the introduction to The Life of the Mind 
Arendt explicitly admits that the term vita activa itself remains too much 
tied to its traditional polemical counterpart, the vita contemplativa. Thought 
had been conceived of as a mere means to lead up to the end of contempla-
tion: “thinking aims at and ends in contemplation, and contemplation is 
not an activity but a passivity; it is the point where mental activity comes 
to rest.”7 As a result of this interpretation, the specifi c nature of thought’s 
being an activity had been forgotten. Analogously to The Human Condi-
tion’s aim “to think what we are doing,” in The Life of the Mind Arendt 
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asks: “What are we “doing” when we do nothing but think?”8 In order to 
answer this question, she needs to liberate our understanding of thought 
from the perspective of contemplation—the distinction between which 
had already been introduced by her in The Human Condition—that is, 
from conceiving of thinking as nothing but a process strictly obeying the 
rules of logic, a mere means in service of the higher end of contemplating 
the truth.
Accordingly, Arendt draws a distinction between thought on the one 
hand and knowledge or cognition on the other, the former of which has 
always been interpreted after the model of the latter, and the latter of 
which has always been interpreted after the model of seeing—contemplat-
ing—the truth. In fact however, Arendt claims, the “end” of thought is not 
truth, but meaning. Whereas cognition establishes what something is and 
whether it exists at all, thought asks what it means for something to exist. 
The function of thought is “to come to terms with” whatever we may expe-
rience: “The sheer naming of things, the creation of words, is the human 
way of appropriating and, as it were, disalienating the world into which, 
after all, each of us is born as a newcomer and a stranger.”9
In other words, both acting and thinking have been understood after the 
model of the experience of making (Herstellen). To be more precise, 
whereas acting and speaking together have been instrumentalized and then 
substituted by fabrication, the activity of thinking has been instrumental-
ized and then substituted by contemplation. In her Denktagebuch, Arendt 
already expressed this in 1953:
All making [Herstellen] rests upon contemplation and violence. Thus, 
in the western tradition, by taking its cue from the experience in mak-
ing, everything has been split into contemplative thought, in which 
the “Ideas,” the ends, etc. are given, and into violent action, which 
realizes these contemplated ends by violent means. Our concepts of 
theory and praxis are equally oriented on making. (D XIII.20.305)
While fabrication implies the use of mute violence, contemplation is 
reached in a state of speechless wonder. What contemplative thought and 
violent action have in common, therefore, is that they are both speechless, 
that they both entail a loss of language.10 As a result, we may conclude, the 
element of “speech” has disappeared not only from our conception of 
action, including of politics, but also from our conception of thought, 
including of philosophy. According to Arendt, however, thought without 
speech is inconceivable: “Our mental activities . . . are conceived in speech 
even before being communicated.”11
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In this essay, I will address the question how Arendt conceives of the 
activity of thinking without the model of making (Herstellen). Thus, I 
believe, an answer can be found to the pressing question she raises in one of 
the earlier entries in the Denktagebuch, a question to which Thomas Wild 
also directs our attention elsewhere in this volume:
The question is: is there a thinking that is not tyrannical? This [is] 
really Jaspers’ effort, without him completely knowing it. For commu-
nication, in contradistinction to discussion—“advocatory” thinking—, 
does not wish to ascertain itself of the truth by the superior weight of 
argumentation. (D II.20.45)
Three Motifs of Thinking
In order to offer some orientation, I will fi rst introduce three different 
motifs of the activity of thinking which can be traced throughout Arendt’s 
oeuvre. All three center on a specifi c term or set of words, which at some 
point occur for the fi rst time, and then keep recurring throughout her 
work, although sometimes in different but still related constellations. 
These motifs may be characterized as “thought fragments” too: condensed 
meanings, wandering through her writings.
The fi rst and best- known motif used by her is that of “dialectical” 
thinking, of the solitary and soundless dialogue between me and myself, 
the inner “two- in- one.” It is introduced already in “Ideology and Terror” 
(1953), included in The Origins of Totalitarianism,12 and remains present 
throughout her entire oeuvre, including in The Human Condition and in 
The Life of the Mind. Arendt links it to the exemplary fi gure of Socrates 
especially, who engaged into friendly dialogues on the essence of concepts 
like justice, courage, etc. Although it is the single motif that stays around 
from the beginning to the end, and although she sometimes seems to 
identify dialectical thinking with thinking per se, there are two other 
distinct motifs that can be found within her work.
The second receives a name for the fi rst time in her essay “The Crisis in 
Culture” (1960), where she speaks of “representative thinking.” It is linked 
especially to the notion of “enlarged mentality” (erweiterte Denkart) from 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. Whereas dialectical thinking pre-
supposes a duality, the “two- in- one,” representative thinking attempts to 
“represent” the plurality of perspectives that are present in and constitute 
the public realm, in order thus to prepare the formation of opinions and 
judgments about future projects and past events.
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The third motif that can be found in her work receives a name only in 
her essay on Walter Benjamin (1968), where she speaks of “thinking 
poetically.”13 What it fundamentally refers to is the recognition that 
thought is conducted in language, and that language is essentially meta-
phorical. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt devotes two full chapters to meta-
phor. By thinking in metaphors, that is, by “transferring” (metapherein) 
words we use to grasp visible experiences within the external world of 
appearances to invisible concepts within the internal world of the mind, we 
may establish or reestablish some form of correspondence between our-
selves and the world. Since it may seem that Arendt’s attention for the 
importance of metaphor is restricted to these two later texts only, it is 
worthwhile emphasizing that she already attests to its importance in the 
Denktagebuch as early as 1950, in an entry on “Metaphor(s) and Truth”:
How a phrase is changed back into a word, how out of metaphor truth 
again arises, because reality has disclosed itself. How without this 
being- turned- into- word one could not sustain the shock of reality. In 
this moment, where reality discloses itself and a word comes into 
being in order to capture it and make it bearable for man, truth comes 
into being. Perhaps this is indeed what underlies the “adaequatio rei et 
intellectus.” (D II.25.48)
As we have indicated above, in her later work Arendt will no longer speak 
of “truth” being the end of thought, but of “meaning.” But apart from this 
terminology, her refl ections on metaphor remain remarkably consistent. As 
she explains in The Life of the Mind, traditionally the “adaequatio rei et intel-
lectus” had been interpreted as the correspondence of knowledge with its 
object, and this “adequacy” had been understood as being analogous to the 
correspondence of vision with the object it sees.14 Metaphor, by contrast, 
opens up an entirely different understanding of the nature of this corre-
spondence.
Directly following her explanation of the function of metaphor in The 
Life of the Mind, Arendt asks whether we may fi nd a metaphor for the activ-
ity of thinking itself, that is, whether, and, if so, how we may understand 
this invisible, mental activity by taking recourse to a visible, worldly experi-
ence. Traditionally, the activity of thinking had been interpreted after the 
model of cognition, that is, of seeing or beholding the truth. When pro-
posing a different metaphor, Arendt claims that it should do justice to the 
fact that thinking, in contradistinction to cognition, is an endless activity. 
She therefore suggests that there is a correspondence of thinking to “the 
sensation of being alive,” as well as to cyclical motion, both metaphors of 
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which she derives from Aristotle.15 Yet, she readily admits that these meta-
phors are not entirely satisfying, as they “remain singularly empty.”16 
Rather than search for an alternative metaphor, however, Arendt directs 
our attention away to a different kind of question: “What makes us think?”
I have always found this a rather abrupt shift. At least it could be asked 
in what sense the suggested metaphors are “empty.” For, as we have seen, 
what had vanished from our understanding of philosophy interpreted after 
the model of the speechless beholding of the truth is not only the endless 
character of the activity of thinking, but foremost its intrinsic connection 
to speech. It is precisely this element that is missing in the two Aristotelian 
metaphors mentioned. I would like to suggest that our understanding of 
the activity of thinking should somehow orient itself on or “correspond to” 
the phenomenon of speech.
Correspondences Between Thinking and Political Speech
On several occasions in the Denktagebuch, Arendt indicates that just as sci-
ence (as a form of cognition) is related to doing (making), thinking is 
related to acting: “Philosophy, or free thinking, is related to acting as sci-
ence [Wissenschaft] is related to doing [Tun]” (D XII.19.283). In addition, in 
several entries she claims that there is a “correspondence” (Entsprechung) 
between thinking and acting (D XIV.30.340). In her Benjamin essay, she 
uses the same word, “correspondence,” to signify the metaphorical relation 
between two concepts.17 In agreement with this, we will now turn to the 
activity of speaking (as a visible, audible experience) in order to understand 
the activity of thinking (as an invisible, soundless activity).
To this end, we will fi rst need to acquire an understanding of Arendt’s 
notion of speech. In The Human Condition, it is most clear that acting and 
speaking somehow coincide. Yet, it is notoriously diffi cult what is exactly 
meant by that. Arendt refers to Aristotle, who characterized Greek polis life 
as “a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the 
central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other.”18 Yet, what kind 
of speech is referred to here? At fi rst sight, what characterizes the polis is 
the art of rhetoric, or of persuasion (peithein): “To be political, to live in a 
polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion 
and not through force and violence.”19
Yet, Arendt says, political speech in this sense presupposes a separation 
between action and speech, which in the pre- polis experience still belonged 
together:
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speech and action were considered to be coeval and coequal, of the 
same rank and the same kind; and this originally meant not only that 
most political action, in so far as it remains outside the sphere of vio-
lence, is indeed transacted in words, but more fundamentally that 
fi nding the right words at the right moment, quite apart from the 
information or communication they may convey, is action.20
In a similar vein, Arendt characterizes speech as “the specifi cally human 
way of answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or 
was done.”21 What this means becomes clearer in the section of The Human 
Condition entitled “Action.” Here, she claims that the “revelatory quality of 
speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and nei-
ther for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness.”22 In 
addition, what they talk about or what they are concerned with in their speech 
is what lies between them, that is, “the matters of the world of things in 
which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which 
arise their specifi c, objective, worldly interests.”23 In other words, people 
do not only speak about something, that is, about the “objective” world 
which lies between them (inter- est) and which “interests” them, but they 
also speak to one another, out of which results the “in- between” world of 
human relationships.
Interestingly, the Denktagebuch has something to offer in further clarifying 
this. Most helpful is a motif which runs through it and which may give us 
some guidance: legein ti kata tinos. This fi xed set of Greek words is originally 
derived by Arendt from one of Heidegger’s lectures on the question “What is 
called thinking?” that she attended in 1952.24 Literally, it means “to say some-
thing about something.” Yet, Arendt gives it a twist: not merely (as in Hei-
degger’s explanation) to say something about something—a predicate and a 
subject which should somehow correspond to each other—but in her case it 
comes to signify: to talk with (or to) others about (über) something or with a 
view to (im Hinsicht auf) something. In her terminology, the “dative” case 
(speaking with or to others) is combined here with the “accusative” case 
(speaking about or with a view to something).
Just as in The Human Condition, in the Denktagebuch the fi rst type of 
speech that appears as political speech (politeuein) is persuasion (peithein).25 
Politeuein as such is characterized by Arendt as “to bear the fact that each 
thing has multiple sides (not just two; that is already a logical attitude)” (D 
XVI.20.390–391). Peithein is characterized by her as “to push one’s own 
aspect through” (D XVI.20.391). Yet, we now gain a clearer view than in 
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The Human Condition of the reasons for this type of speech being somehow 
derivative. For, insofar as persuasion consists in presenting one’s own 
aspect—“it appears to me” (dokei moi)—as the only aspect—the “absolute”—
under which something is to be considered, it becomes “demagogical” (D 
XVI.20.391). For, in this case one person isolates himself from the legein 
(speaking with others) in which he had his own specifi c kata (about) and 
presents his own aspect against the multitude (die Menge) (D XVI.21.393).
We will now ask how, if at all, the fi rst motif of thinking, that is, “dialec-
tical” thinking, can be said to “correspond” to speech, to talking (Reden) in 
the aforementioned sense of the legein ti kata tinos. Arendt continues the 
entry I quoted at the beginning of this section in the following way: “Because 
[free thinking], as dialogical- being- with- itself, is from the outset involved 
with others, it has to be communicative—which science does not need.” 
(D XII.19.283). This passage resonates her answer to her initial question 
whether there is a thinking that is not tyrannical, and in which she said that 
thinking ought to be “communicative” rather than “advocatory.” In Plato’s 
Gorgias, dialectics is conceived of as the counterpart to rhetoric.26 We will 
pay special attention, therefore, to aspects of dialectical speech that remain 
somehow polemically tied to certain aspects of rhetorical speech, most 
notably to the latter’s advocatory opposition to the multitude.
Usually, dialectical thought is characterized by Arendt as “to speak a 
matter through with oneself” (D XIV.21.392) or “to express and speak 
something through for and with oneself” (D XIV.30.340). In both cases, it 
is contrasted with acting as “to speak about something with others (legein ti 
kata tinos)” (D XIV.30.340), or “to talk about something with a view to 
something . . . : legein ti kata tinos” (D XIV.21.392). The contrast is clearly 
twofold. In the fi rst place, in the case of dialectical thought, talking about 
something is replaced by talking something through. In the second place, in 
dialectical thought, a plurality (talking with my fellow human beings) is 
replaced by a duality (talking with myself ).
Regarding the fi rst point, in the case of dialectics (dialegesthai), the object 
(the “about,” the accusative) is absolved from the in- between (the “with,” the 
dative), and hence ends up in direct accusative relation to the subject (D 
X.19.246).27 In this sense, Arendt says, thinking is related to “doing” (Tun) 
(in the sense of “making”) rather than to “acting.” For, here the subject holds 
on to the object it thinks through, and both the subject and the object become 
isolated from the “in- between” of the public realm within which people 
talk with each other about something. The subsequent step, that is, the 
opposition to the multitude (die Menge) is equally present in rhetoric (pei-
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thein), and from this point on, both rhetoric and dialectics may be character-
ized as “advocatory: “Who wants to show more than one’s own aspect, turns 
into a demagogue or (Platonically) into a tyrant.” (D XVI.20.391). Or, as 
Arendt explains most clearly in an earlier entry:
If one wishes to avoid the “about,” then one forces the other into one’s 
own thinking; here the coercion of someone else’s thinking arises. 
What is thus given up, is precisely that which I have in common with 
the other in the form of the “about.” One enforces a false identifi ca-
tion. The coercion exists in treating the other as one’s own alter ego. 
Without the form of the “about,” there is no conversation. What is 
expressed in the “about” is that we have the world in common, that we 
live on the earth together. (D IX.19.214).
In the second place, insofar as the inner “two- in- one” is indeed a dual-
ity, it seems thus to be a form of plurality, of talking with another, yet 
limited to only one “other.” Accordingly, one might say that one experi-
ences the self as “another friend.” By contrast, when Aristotle calls the 
friend “another self,” Arendt suggests, he inverses the order. For, in her 
view one is capable of talking with oneself precisely because one has had the 
experience of talking with others. Yet, even if this is true, she states that the 
presence of the inner dialogue between me and myself, of the “two- in- 
one,” is “not yet thinking,” but it is rather “the political side of all thinking: 
that plurality expresses itself even in thinking” (D XX.13.484). It may be 
doubted, however, whether the two- in- one may be called “political” in the 
full sense, for she usually claims that true plurality requires the presence of 
at least three.28
If all this is the case, it seems that the correspondence of “dialectical” 
thinking to speech in the sense of legein ti kata tinos is rather limited. The 
analogy between this type of thinking and speech is in fact a disanalogy. 
We will therefore turn to the second motif of thinking we traced, that of 
“representative” thinking. Clearly, this type of thinking represents the 
plurality of the world in a fuller way. For, when we are thinking in this way, 
we “represent” a conversation between more than two citizens (all citizens 
who happen to be present) about or with a view to a matter that interests 
us all. Hence, in this case, “talking” (Reden) does indeed “correspond” to 
this type of thinking. In the Denktagebuch, Arendt links it to Kant’s notion 
of “erweiterte Denkungsart” (introduced at D XXII.19.570, in 1957). Yet, she 
testifi ed to this kind of thinking already in the following entry from 1953, 
although without yet giving it a name:
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In politics, understanding never means: to understand others . . . but 
[to understand] the common world as it appears to others. If there is a 
virtue (wisdom) of the statesman, then it consists in the capability of 
viewing all sides of a certain thing, i.e., to view it as it appears to all 
participants. (D XIX.2.451)
The logical law of noncontradiction (agreeing with one’s other self ) is 
replaced by thinking in the place of others (agreeing with one’s fellow- 
citizens). Thus we seem to have found a way of thinking that truly “corre-
sponds” to acting in the sense of talking with others about something. 
Representative thinking, rather than dialectical thinking, “corresponds” to 
acting and speaking together.
Correspondences Between Thinking and Poetic Speech
Yet, if this “political side” of thinking is “not yet thinking,” as Arendt sug-
gested, how is thinking in the sense of “thinking something through” to be 
understood? We will now need to investigate the third motif of thinking we 
traced, “poetic” thinking. In this case we are confronted with a serious dif-
fi culty, however. In the fi rst place, poetry seems to be intrinsically linked up 
with the activity of making (Herstellen), as Arendt makes clear in The Human 
Condition and as is clear in the etymological relation between “poetry” and 
poièsis. By understanding thinking from the model of poetry, or of the poet 
who is “making” poetry in his or her room, isolated from his or her fellow 
human beings, we run the risk of bringing the elements of mute violence 
(which is inherent in the organization of means to a certain end) and of 
speechless contemplation (which is inherent in seeing the idea or blueprint) 
back in. Indeed, in The Human Condition, in Chapter 23, entitled “The Perma-
nence of the World and the Work of Art,” Arendt claims that writing poetry 
involves “the same workmanship which, through the primordial instrument 
of human hands, builds the other durable things of the human artifi ce.”29
In the second place, the poet is usually presented by Arendt as a rival of 
the polis, and hence also as a rival of (the aspirations of ) the kind of speech 
belonging to the polis, the legein ti kata tinos.30 It is important to understand 
the nature of this rivalry correctly, however. In her essay “The Crisis in 
Culture,” Arendt draws a distinction between two aspects of making or 
work: “The chief reason of the distrust of fabrication in all forms is that it 
is utilitarian by its very nature. Fabrication . . . always involves means and 
ends.”31 It is precisely this instrumental aspect of work— organizing mate-
rial as means to fabricate an end product—which threatens the durability 
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of the polis, the world. However, Arendt suggests, the confl ict vanishes as 
soon as we take into account the product of art, which becomes part of the 
world, both in its material appearance and in the fact that it is being talked 
about by the public. By adding beauty to it, art in fact fortifi es the polis, the 
world.32
We may ask however, whether the latter qualifi cation is of much help. 
In my view, it is no coincidence that Arendt does not mention any of the 
performative arts, let alone poetry, as an example here. Moreover, she shifts 
her attention to the “representative” thinking that is meant to prepare the 
judgments of taste of the public about the works of art. Instead, therefore, 
I propose to turn to a fascinating passage in the Denktagebuch in which 
Arendt says of the “singing poem” that it can “absolutize” without having 
the same problems as the “absolutization” that is committed either by mak-
ing (its use of violence) or by philosophy:
The accusative of violence, as of love, destroys the in- between, annihi-
lates or burns it, leaves the other without refuge, robs itself of its ref-
uge. Opposite is the dative of saying and speaking, which confi rms the 
in- between, moves within the in- between. And then there is the accu-
sative of the singing poem, which absolves and releases what is sung 
about from the in- between and its relations, without confi rming any-
thing. If poetry, and not philosophy, absolutizes, there is salvation. 
(D XVIII.11.428)
Clearly, poetry—that is to say, “the singing poem”—is distinguished not 
only from philosophy (of the contemplative sort), but also from talking with 
others about something (legein ti kata tinos). In my view, the crucial element 
of this fragment consists in Arendt’s suggestion that it is the poem insofar as 
it is sung which distinguishes it from philosophy and from talking. In fact, 
this element is also present in several other entries in the Denktagebuch 
addressing poetry, for instance when the poet—in his capacity as rival of the 
polis—is pictured as a singer (D XX.10.483) and when it is implied that in 
poetic speech “there is neither thinking dialegesthai nor speaking- about,” 
because people, insofar as they are poets, “do not talk [reden], and they do not 
speak [sprechen], but they resound [ertönen]” (D IX.19.214). We may say that 
in all these cases, Arendt conceives of poetry primarily as being a matter of 
oral linguistic expression, though of a different kind than of talking with 
others about something. It is this kind of speech that is capable of “absolv-
ing” the “about” from the “in- between,” yet “without confi rming anything,” 
or, we might say, without being “advocatory,” that is, without “ascertaining 
itself of the truth by the superior weight of argumentation.”
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In order to further determine the peculiar nature of poetic speech, we 
will turn to the passage from the Denktagebuch that I chose as epigraph to 
this essay. In it, Arendt explicitly speaks of a correspondence between 
thinking and poetry, and between their use of concepts and of metaphors 
respectively:
What connects thinking and poetry [Dichtung] is metaphor. In philos-
ophy one calls concept what in poetry [Dichtkunst] is called metaphor. 
Thinking creates its “concepts” out of the visible, in order to designate 
the invisible. (D XXVI.30.728).
In order to illuminate the conceptual activity of thinking, Arendt makes 
use of the analogy with poetry’s use of metaphors. When we combine both 
aspects—the emphasis on the singing poem and the use of metaphorical 
language—suddenly other aspects from the section in The Human Condition 
just mentioned manifest themselves. For, Arendt calls music and poetry 
“the least “materialistic” of the arts because their “material” consists of 
sounds and words”—note her use of quotation marks here—and she adds 
that the workmanship they demand is “kept to a minimum.”33 Moreover, 
after having suggested that the durability of a poem is not so much caused 
by the fact that it is written down, but by “condensation,” she speaks of 
poetry as “language spoken in utmost density and concentration.” The 
German word for condensation is “Verdichtung” and for density “Dichte.” 
While being absent in the English expression of “making poetry,” both 
words clearly resonate in the German verb “dichten.”
Although Arendt does not draw any explicit connection between the 
activity of Verdichtung (condensation) and the use of metaphor, she may 
have had it in mind. For, one page earlier, she calls “the human capacity for 
thought” “the immediate source of the art work,”34 and she says that thought 
transforms the “mute and inarticulate despondency” of feeling so that it is 
“fi t to enter the world and to be transformed into things, to become rei-
fi ed.”35 She calls this reifi cation “more than a mere transformation,” a 
“transfi guration,” a “veritable metamorphosis in which it is as though the 
course of nature which wills that all fi re burn to ashes is reverted and even 
dust can burst into fl ames.”36 Hence, a work of art is more than a matter of 
“making” in the ordinary sense. Arendt illustrates this by citing a poem of 
Rainer Maria Rilke, “Magic,” which is worthwhile quoting here in full. 
Consider especially the second stanza of this poem, which simultaneously 
articulates and performs the power of metaphor in using the visible in “call-
ing” the invisible:
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From indescribable transformation fl ash
such creations—: Feel! and trust!
We suffer it often: fl ames become ash;
yet, in art: fl ames come from dust.
Here is magic. In the realm of a spell
the common word seems lifted up above . . .
and yet is really like the call of the male
who calls for the invisible female dove.37
We are reminded here again of the entry in which Arendt praises the 
capability of metaphor to turn a phrase back into a word again, and thus 
to (re)establish a “correspondence” between our inner mind and the outer 
world.
To conclude this essay, we will return to the question of how Arendt 
conceives of the activity of thinking without contemplation. In accordance 
with her account of “poetic” thinking, we have searched for an adequate 
metaphor. Thus we have found that, in contradistinction to “dialectical” 
thinking, only “representative” thinking can truly be called “communica-
tive,” because of its analogy to speaking in the sense of legein ti kata tinos, of 
talking with others about or with a view to something. Yet, “poetic” think-
ing seems to be the only one of the three motifs that enables us to truly 
“appropriate,” “make sense of,” or “come to terms with” the conceptual 
activity of thinking itself, of thinking something through by making distinc-
tions, that is, by distinguishing metaphors which offer a “correspondence” 
between concept and experience from metaphors which do not. Moreover, 
the analogy works both ways, in the sense that by illuminating thinking by 
the model of poetic speech, we have also been able to draw attention to a 
crucial aspect of poetry itself that has hitherto remained less visible in 
Arendt’s work, but that subtly shapes her own thinking and writing.
notes
1. All translations of German fragments from the Denktagebuch are my 
own unless otherwise indicated.
2. Hannah Arendt, “Walter Benjamin: 1892–1940,” in Men in Dark 
Times (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), 153–206.
3. Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (London: Penguin Books, 
2000), 5.
4. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1998), Chapters 27 and 31.








10. Arendt, Denktagebuch, XV.1.345–346.
11. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1:32.
12. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 
1976), 476.
13. Arendt, “Walter Benjamin,” 205.
14. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1:122.
15. Ibid., 1:124.
16. Ibid.
17. Arendt, “Walter Benjamin,” 166.






24. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Perennial, 
2004), Part II, Lecture IV (148–157). Arendt attended the fourth session of 
the second part of Heidegger’s course in Freiburg on May 30, 1952.
25. Arendt, The Human Condition, 26.
26. Ibid., 26 n. 9; Arendt, Denktagebuch, XVI.1.381: “Socrates draws a 
distinction between technè rhètorikè and dialegesthai: clearly that rhetoric is the 
art to talk about something to others (and as such belongs to politics), whereas 
dialegesthai speaks something through with oneself or others.”
27. Cf. Arendt, Denktagebuch, IX.19.214, XIII.4.298.
28. Arendt, Denktagebuch, IX.26.220.
29. Arendt, The Human Condition, 169.
30. Ibid., 197; Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture,” in Between Past 
and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 
1993), 197–226, at 217; Arendt, Denktagebuch, XIX.21.461; XX.10.483– 484.
31. Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture,” 215.
32. See Patchen Markell, “Arendt’s Work: On the Architecture of The 
Human Condition,” College Literature 38, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 16– 44.
33. Arendt, The Human Condition, 169.
34. Ibid., 168.
35. Ibid.
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   86 11/2/16   11:12 AM
Thinking in Metaphors 87
36. Ibid.
37. Rainer Maria Rilke, Rilke on Love and Other Diffi culties, translated by 
John J. L. Mood (New York: Norton, 1975), 89. Arendt cites the German 
original only (The Human Condition, 168 n. 39): “Aus unbeschreiblicher Ver-
wandlung stammen / solche Gebilde—: Fühl! und glaub! / Wir leidens oft: zu Asche 
werden Flammen, / doch, in der Kunst: zur Flamme wird der Staub. / Hier ist 
Magie. In das Bereich des Zaubers / scheint das gemeine Wort hinaufgestuft . . . / und 
ist doch wirklich wie der Ruf des Taubers, / der nach der unsichtbaren Taube ruft.”
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   87 11/2/16   11:12 AM
88
In 1966, notes begin to appear in Arendt’s Denktagebuch about the Swiss 
zoologist Adolf Portmann and his studies of morphology, the appearances 
of animals.1 One of his early studies, The Beauty of Butterfl ies from 1936, 
concerns the variety in the size, shape, and color of butterfl ies, and the 
book’s title already suggests that this is an unusual scientist.2 His work evi-
dently begins in wonder and remains suffused with it throughout. Instead of 
submitting the phenomenon of this variety—and for him butterfl ies are 
just one terrifi cally fl amboyant example—to the demands of natural and 
sexual selection as the mainstream of evolutionary theory would have it, 
Portmann identifi es in pattern and color an Aristotelian desire to appear. 
Functionalism, the approach dominant in his discipline, would require him 
to ask why there should be such variety. What purpose does it serve? How 
does it further the evolutionary development of the species? What is its 
function? What is expressed in these colors? He insists, though, on speak-
ing of beauty and remaining at the level of appearance.
By this point in her career, Arendt had long been concerned with appear-
ance: Rahel Varnhagen’s appearance in high society; Pericles’s appearance 
before his fellow Athenians; the appearance of each of us as natal beings. 
c h a p t e r  5
The Task of Knowledgeable Love: 
Arendt and Portmann in Search of Meaning
Anne O’Byrne
When striving to re- form the pattern of our own way of life, we 
often invoke Nature as our great teacher, seeking to justify man’s 
actions by arguments based on what happens in nature.
—ADOLF PORTMANN,  Forms and Patterns of Animals
Grammatology must pursue and consolidate whatever, in scientifi c 
practice, has always already begun to exceed the logocentric closure.
—JACQUES DERRIDA,  Positions
The natural sciences . . . have done the “unthinkable,” and now use 
thinking to try to grasp what they have done.
—HANNAH ARENDT,  D XXIV.58.643
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She has also long been attuned to the work of scientists, whether on the 
Sputnik project or on splitting the atom or in basic research. What is new 
here is the fact that Portmann is a biologist, and that, for him, appearance is 
interesting specifi cally as the appearance of the natural world around us. 
His studies extend from butterfl ies to Mediterranean sea snails, and his 
examples include tulip poplars, wild carrots, tawny owls, and embryos of 
many species of mammal. His theory and practice of morphology became 
an unorthodox strand within evolutionary theory. In addition, he developed 
the thought of human neoteny in a work devoted to the various morpholo-
gies of the fi rst year of human life.
As a result, the Denktagebuch entries on Portmann turn out to be entrances 
onto the realm of life or, more to the point, onto a distinctive and dynamic 
thinking of life. What can this mean for Arendt, for whom life was another 
long- term, troublesome interest? What drew her to Portmann’s work? 
Sometimes life is for her a matter of zoe, the merely living existence that 
threatens to take over the sphere of human action and freedom, and some-
times it is bios, the worldly life of human beings. Sometimes it is both; natal-
ity, for example, is for Arendt a matter of our natural mammalian emergence 
from our mothers’ bodies but also the signal of our capacity for the highest, 
most distinctively human actions. But the bios/zoe distinction is hardly rele-
vant to Portmann, who regards his work as biology and zoology and eventu-
ally also as anthropology. Given this, what status can Arendt grant the 
insights he offers? Are they the incontrovertible, compelling truths of scien-
tifi c knowledge (D XXIV.14.622) or the more speculative—and therefore 
more politically and philosophically interesting—claims of a human sci-
ence? Are they the cognitive products of empirical study or the worldly 
manifestation of thought? Are they a matter, in Kantian terms, of Verstand or 
of Vernunft? Are they contributions to our knowledge of the functioning of 
bodies or to our appreciation of the intensities of life?
Philosophers who approach the sciences—and indeed other disciplines 
within the humanities—sometimes proceed as if they know more than 
they do, or as if their capacity for metalevel analysis equips them to under-
stand what they fi nd going on among the scientists. They may even behave 
as if their theoretical point of view makes it unnecessary to understand the 
detail and technicality of what they see, which might be part of the reason 
why Arendt, despite her philosophical training, refused to describe herself 
as a philosopher. She took seriously the need to avoid philosophical hubris 
by educating herself as any member of the reading public would; in the case 
of biology, this meant reading Portmann’s books, among others. Yet, while 
she may have turned to him as a popular scientist, to be appreciated for his 
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ability to translate his research into layman’s terms, she engages his work as 
a fellow thinker of the human condition, a fellow member of the reading 
and writing public. Passing through her Denktagebuch notes and The Life of 
the Mind to his thinking of life leads us to their meeting place in the 
question of meaning.3 There we fi nd both the thinker of political life and 
the observer of sea sponges, the student of the totalitarian system and the 
critic of technological thinking, the professor who urges us to love the 
world enough to take responsibility for it and the one who leads us back to 
a childish love for a zebra’s stripes, both of them reaching for a love of the 
shared world that must be both knowledgeable and thoughtful.
The Circle of Thought and the Metaphor of Life
The Life of the Mind, originally envisioned as a sequel to The Human Condi-
tion, begins with a volume on thinking, which in turn begins with a section 
on appearance. The book was fi rst published in 1978, having been pre-
sented as part of the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in 
1973, but the connection between thinking and appearing emerged earlier 
in Arendt’s thought and was concisely formulated in a Denktagebuch entry 
made in November 1968:
Re: volume II of Human Condition: All that lives strives to appear (see 
Portmann). All functions show themselves—but not the silent dialogue 
of thinking, not the will and also not judgment. They are, without 
necessarily coming into appearance.
“Being shows itself as thought” (Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
p. 48). And how does thinking show itself? (D XXVI.1.701)
The note captures the phenomenological sensibility that is evident 
throughout her work, not only with the quotation from Heidegger but also 
with the reference to Portmann’s morphology. Portmann is mentioned in 
the Denktagebuch between 1966 and 1968, in the period when the thinking 
that would come to light in the 1973 lectures was under way—whatever 
that might mean. This is Arendt’s question.
After all, we each appear into a world and it is not a matter of mere 
appearing or a mode of existence that is somehow second best. We are the 
sort of beings who see and are seen and for whom appearing is active, a 
vital element of existence. For us, being is appearing. As living beings we 
are not accidentally located in the world but belong to the world even as it 
belongs to us. It was old when we arrived in it, and it will persist even when 
we have gone, so our experience of time and fi nitude is shaped by the arc 
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of life between birth and death, that is, our appearance on the earth and 
eventual disappearance from it. Our fi rst appearing presupposed a specta-
tor, so our being in the world is never in the singular; we exist here in the 
plural. Also, seeing and sentience are not abstractions; the world appears to 
us in the ways made possible by the specifi c bodies and senses we have. 
Arendt writes: “Seen from the perspective of the world, every creature 
born into it arrives well equipped to deal with a world in which Being and 
Appearing coincide.”4 Without mentioning its source, she sets about cor-
recting Heidegger’s assertion that animals are poor in world by celebrating 
a diversity of rich human and nonhuman worlds. She writes:
Nothing perhaps is more surprising in this world of ours than the 
almost infi nite diversity of its appearances, the sheer entertainment 
value of its views, sounds and smells, something that is hardly men-
tioned by the thinkers and philosophers. . . . This diversity is matched 
by an equally astounding diverseness of sense organs among the ani-
mal species, so that what actually appears to living creatures assumes 
the greatest variety of form and shape: every animal species lives in a 
world of its own, [though] all sense- endowed creatures have appear-
ance as such in common, fi rst, an appearing world and second . . . the 
fact that they themselves are appearing and disappearing creatures.5
There is an important train in Arendt’s thought that stretches from The 
Human Condition, with its thinking of world and worldly action as appear-
ance, to the late Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, where attention is 
turned to the actor/spectators who together sense and make sense of the 
appearing world.6 The abiding image of the fi rst is of Pericles—statesman 
and general—addressing his fellow Athenians, while the image that endures 
from the second is that of the uninvolved spectators on the events of the 
French Revolution, whose watchful participation “make the event at home 
in the history of the world.”7 In those late lectures, the spectators’ participa-
tion relies on a distinctive human capacity, the sensus communis or Menschen-
verstand, the common understanding of man.8 As this thought train passes 
through The Life of the Mind and the question of how thinking appears, we 
will see Socrates emerge as the revelatory fi gure. Yet here, at the point early 
in The Life of the Mind where her thinking encounters Portmann’s, what is 
important is that appearances are sensed, and that sensing is the province of 
all sentient beings. Arendt now has the occasion to consider the material 
specifi city of every point of view; the world—any world—is the product of 
distinct, species- specifi c body forms. Beetles’ eyes give them a rich world 
quite different from ours. We do not share their world—we don’t have the 
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eyes for it—but we appear in it and they appear in ours. Indeed, they appear 
to us in a variety of sizes, shapes, and colors that confi rms Arendt’s insight 
that the fl ood of appearances, in all its diversity and abundance, is endlessly 
entertaining to us. If there is a fi gure to accompany this stage in her thought, 
it is that of the natural scientist observing the living world.
Elsewhere, when Arendt is concerned with the work of scientists, her 
examples are physicists, and the scientifi c projects that appear on the pages 
of her works are typically the great physics projects of the mid–twentieth 
century that culminated in splitting the atom and the technological develop-
ment of the atomic bomb. The worldly moment that opens The Human 
Condition is the launch of Sputnik, while the image of scientifi c work that 
concludes the book is of scientists working together to initiate a new process 
in nature. Biology could readily provide the model, but for Arendt the release 
of atomic energy into nature remains paradigmatic. This is not surprising. 
World War II and the Cold War meant that the work of Meitner, Hahn, 
Straussman, and Frisch would quickly surge to political signifi cance and 
public consciousness; they discovered nuclear fi ssion in 1938, and in 1945 
Hahn was awarded the Nobel Prize. In that same year the United States 
dropped atomic bombs on Japan. Crick, Watson, Wilkins, and Franklin dis-
covered the structure of DNA in 1953, and the discovery earned the Nobel 
Prize in 1962. The emergence of biotechnology happened rather more 
slowly, and the signifi cance of the changes underway in the science of life—
so present to us now—drew public attention more gradually.
Yet, since Arendt is a thinker concerned with the life conditions of natal-
ity and mortality, we could reasonably expect her to be attuned to changes 
in the understanding of life. After all, Sputnik was signifi cant for our human 
condition not because of the engineering and rocket science that brought it 
into being but because its launch promised to change the human condition 
of living on Earth and sharing the planet with all other humans. In fact, 
Arendt was clearly interested in biology. Her library holds several volumes, 
with marginalia in her hand, of contemporary works in popular biology 
including What Is Life? by Erwin Schrödinger, Man and the Living World by 
Karl Von Frisch (not to be confused with the fi ssion physicist Otto Robert 
Frisch), and The Language of Life: An Introduction to the Science of Genetics by 
George and Muriel Beadle.9 In addition, she followed Hans Jonas’s pre-
scient work on bioengineering, and, as we have seen, she owned and read 
several volumes of Portmann’s work.
What these have in common is a commitment to the scientifi c mode of 
encountering the world, paired with an appreciation of its limits. Arendt 
notes a passage where Schrödinger, writing about the physics of life, states:
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It is the four dimensional pattern of the “phenotype,” the visible and 
manifest nature of the individual, which is reproduced without appre-
ciable change for generations, permanent within centuries—though 
not within tens of thousands of years—and borne at each transmission 
by the material structure of the nuclei of the two cells which unite to 
form the fertilized egg cell. That is a marvel—than which only one is 
greater, one that is intimately connected with it, yet lies on a different 
plane. I mean the fact that we, whose total being is entirely based on a 
marvellous interplay of this very kind, yet possess the power of acquir-
ing considerable knowledge about it. I think it possible that this knowl-
edge may advance to little short of a complete understanding—of the 
fi rst marvel. The second may be beyond human understanding.10
The distinction Schrödinger couches in mystical terms is the distinc-
tion between knowledge, which holds out the promise of completeness, 
and the being of the knower, which inevitably exceeds knowledge and 
confounds all efforts at completion.
When Beadle and Beadle describe the process of genetic mutation and 
its workings in evolution, they, too, run up against a limit. Arendt marks 
this passage: “One gasps a bit on contemplating the exquisite timing that 
was necessary—not to bring us into being but just to make us possible. 
Nature must have made mistakes by the millions.”11 The gasp comes when 
we realize the scale of the universe and the fact that our existence depends 
on contingency upon contingency, but embedded in this experience is the 
additional realization that nature, which science must approach as though 
it were a rule- governed system, must have deviated from those rules many 
times in order for our existence to be even possible. Not only are we inca-
pable of accounting for our having come into being, but it is also beyond 
knowledge. Our existence as the beings we are could not have been pre-
dicted. What’s more, genetic mutation is only part of the picture. In Port-
mann’s Neue Wege in Biologie, Arendt marks this passage with an exclamation 
mark: “One of the most reliable arrangements there is for the regular 
occurrence of new combinations is that curious game that biologists call 
sexuality.”12
What we gain from scientifi c encounters with the world is truth, but the 
gap between knowing and being—indicated by Schrödinger, hinted at by 
Arendt in the closing pages of The Human Condition, and indeed worked 
through by Kant in the Transcendental Aesthetic—persists, and generates 
the distinction between truth and meaning. Along with a desire to know, we 
have a need for meaning, which is pursued through the activity of think-
ing.13 Cognition not only cannot give us meaning, but it also disguises that 
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fact by covering over the gap even as it uncovers truth. The science of life, 
and indeed our everyday way of knowing, approach the living organism as 
capable of full appearance in the course of its short life; it suggests that 
nothing bars our way to complete knowledge of it and, if knowledge is true 
and complete, why should there by a need for meaning?14 In contrast, 
Arendt argues that the living body does not give itself unreservedly to the 
observing eye; the constant changes that are part of metabolism, growth, 
and aging mean that any state of a living body is a passing state, and the 
condition of being alive does not allow living bodies to be revealed in the 
ways that dead matter can be. The incompleteness of our knowledge of 
living beings is constitutive rather than incidental or merely temporary. 
Thus science runs up against its limits, opening the space where the ques-
tion of meaning arises.
Philosophy is apt to occupy this space, but Arendt resists philosophy’s 
metaphysical tendency—established by Plato—to construe it as the gap 
between two worlds. Invariably, the otherworldly cause of appearance is 
granted more reality than the appearance itself—think not only of Plato’s 
forms but also Descartes’s causal argument from the Second Meditation—
so that appearances must be penetrated in order to get to their ground and 
therefore their meaning. More surprisingly, she regards modern science as 
giving new life to this old tendency.15 Science keeps its eyes turned toward 
this one world, but it persists in delving behind appearance in search of 
truth, privileging the base of appearance above the appearance itself. This 
is what happens when the colors of a bird are understood only in reference 
to the evolutionary function that they serve, that is, when the wealth of 
appearance is reduced to the life process.
This move beyond appearance is not our only alternative. Indeed, for 
Arendt, it is no alternative at all, since we must live in the world of appear-
ances. The choice between appearance and reality is a false dilemma that, 
in its modern version, has its roots in the failure to grasp the distinction 
between Kant’s Verstand or Intellect, which allows us to know, and Vernunft 
or Reason, which drives us to pursue meaning. The former gives access to 
the world that appears to our senses; the latter has been understood as 
leading us to ask for the meaning behind appearances. But what Kant does 
when he discerns a world where the things in themselves are as we are in 
our world of appearances is identify a semblance of reason or an authentic 
semblance. Earlier, Arendt cited Portmann’s distinction between authentic 
appearances, that is, appearances that present themselves, and inauthentic 
appearances, which are forced into view as an animal’s inner organs are 
brought to light by dissection. Now, applying the language of authenticity 
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and inauthenticity to semblance and tracing Kant’s discovery to the expe-
rience of thinking, she hones her thesis to a fi ne point:
Hence, in our context the only relevant question is whether the sem-
blances are inauthentic or authentic ones, whether they are caused by 
dogmatic beliefs and arbitrary assumptions, mere mirages that disap-
pear upon closer inspection, or whether they are inherent in the para-
doxical condition of a living being that though itself part of the world 
of appearances, is in possession of a faculty, the ability to think, that 
permits the mind to withdraw from the world without ever being able 
to leave it or transcend it.16
Does such worldly thinking appear? As we saw in the Denktagebuch 
note, the form that Arendt’s question for The Human Condition II took in 
1968 was “How does thinking show itself ?” In the course of these early 
sections of Life of the Mind she struggles to fi nd a way to think about think-
ing, and the formulations of the question accumulate, each one supple-
menting rather than supplanting its precursors. The initial version “What 
is thinking?” persists as an expression of the philosophical desire for an 
analytic starting point; “Why do we think?” is entertained briefl y, suggest-
ing a hope for existential insight into internal motivations; later, “What 
makes us think?” acknowledges the impossibility of grasping internal pro-
cesses and looks instead for the external circumstances that provoke the 
activity of thinking. Behind all three lingers the Denktagebuch formulation, 
reminding us that whatever habits of thinking we develop, and however 
insurmountable the requirement that thinking be conducted in withdrawal 
from the world, we continue to live in the world of appearances. Thinking 
is an activity of living beings. Thinking about thinking must somehow 
bridge the gulf between the visible and the invisible, the world of appear-
ance and the thinking ego, and it cannot do this using either empirical 
study or dialectical philosophical speculation, that is, what Arendt describes 
as Hegel’s “speculative cognition.”17 Rather, thought is carried across such 
gulfs by metaphor. But which metaphor? Arendt considers and rejects the 
traditional model of sight, which remains too fi rmly tied to the sense of 
sight and therefore to cognition, before concluding, “The only possible 
metaphor one may conceive of for the life of the mind is the sensation of 
being alive. Without the breath of life the human body is a corpse; without think-
ing the human mind is dead.”18
She embraces this metaphor. Just as the life process turns in a circle, 
so—citing Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger—she fi nds thinkers insisting on 
the circular motion of thought. If thinking were identical with cognition, it 
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would share its rectilinear trajectory from the quest for the object to cogni-
tion of that object; instead, thinking has an “unceasing motion, that is, 
motion in a circle” that has no end and no product (Aristotle). Certainly the 
trajectory of an individual life is rectilinear, stretching from birth to death, 
but it is also inevitably folded, with the birth and death of successive genera-
tions, into the natural cycles of the life process.
Yet, for all that, she pronounces the metaphor empty.19 “It obviously 
refuses to answer the inevitable question, Why do we think?, since there is 
no answer to the question, Why do we live?”20 Quickly—precipitously—
she abandons it and changes the question, quoting the Wittgenstein of the 
Philosophical Investigations:
How can we fi nd out why man thinks? Whereupon he answers: “It 
often happens that we only become aware of the important facts, if we 
suppress the question ‘why?’. . . . It is in a deliberate effort to suppress the 
question, Why do we think? that I shall deal with the question, What 
makes us think?”21
It is true that we cannot answer the question of why we live, but this alone 
does not render the metaphor useless. Moving more slowly and drawing on 
other resources in her thinking, it becomes clear that Wittgenstein’s strategy 
can be applied to the question of life too, leading us to give up “Why?” in 
favor of “What is life?” or “What is it, to live?” Indeed, even though at this 
point at the end of the “Appearance” section of The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
moves away from the metaphor of life toward the model of Socrates, life will 
soon emerge again in her specifi c attention to the life of Socrates. Moreover, 
by this same point, she has also made it possible to explicitly pursue the 
question of life in deeper and more revealing ways. In the course of her 
engagement with Portmann, she has implicitly mobilized a distinctive form 
of scientifi c thinking that is ready for these questions and committed to 
pursuing them hermeneutically in the world of appearances. It may turn out 
that thinking about thinking still requires models, but perhaps, along with 
the familiar model of Socrates, we can also have Thales, and Aristotle, and 
indeed the young Socrates. If Plato’s Socrates rarely ventured outside the 
walls of Athens and devoted his passionate attention to human affairs, Thales 
looked at the stars and Aristotle thought not only about politics and meta-
physics but also the parts and generation of animals.22
The Intensifi cation of Life
Portmann, whose career as a zoologist, biologist, and public intellectual 
stretched from the 1920s into the 1970s, saw himself as engaged in a shift 
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in the sciences that reoriented our relation to the natural world. This was 
not a paradigm shift, nor indeed a change that was distinctive to the twen-
tieth century or even to modernity, and it was not a change that would 
eventually be carried through and brought to completion; rather it hap-
pened in every epoch, to all peoples, and indeed in the course of each 
human life. What he described was a move from the primary, urprimitiv 
experience of being in relation to the world, on the one hand, to the sec-
ondary, scientifi c worldview on the other. “This drama renews itself in 
every experience of becoming,” he wrote in 1960.23 The form it took in his 
fi eld, in his time, was a move away from the observation and description of 
forms of life as they appear, and towards those investigations in physics, 
chemistry, and biology that delve into the unseen, reaching for their evi-
dence beyond what is available to the naked eye or indeed made available 
by the microscope. Why should subatomic physics and molecular biology 
come to dominate as they did? Because, according to Portmann, they are 
propelled by the conviction that it is in the realm of the unseen that the key 
to the mastery of nature lies.
The critique is not unfamiliar. Feminist philosophers took up a version 
of it in the 1980s as they reread early modern philosophers and found them 
deploying a masculinist, objectivist worldview that would turn out to 
destroy the intimacy of our relation with the mothering natural world.24 It 
would also have been familiar to Portmann’s audience in another version, 
Goethe’s botany, which was a study of the observed forms of living plants. 
As we have seen, Arendt shares this sensibility in her affi rmation of appear-
ance and her rejection of otherworldly sources of meaning. Portmann, for 
his part, had no illusion that his style of morphological research would or 
should supplant the predominant form of scientifi c research. He had a 
clear view of the forces that drove science to focus on questions involving 
the general functions of life and to pursue the most general laws of biology, 
but, in Animal Forms and Patterns (1948), he sketched them in a way that 
was far from celebratory.25 Certainly, the scientifi c knowledge that had 
been amassed using this method had been put to work healing the sick and 
making us more productive, but also simply exerting power over material 
things and developing technologies of destruction.26 This was three years 
after the liberation of Auschwitz and the destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.
He dramatized the distinction between the primary and secondary 
views of the natural world over the course of many works, and argued for 
the primitive view as a corrective to the dominant scientifi c approach. At 
some moments the arguments are epistemological. In Animal Forms, he 
notes that “the search for the general laws of life has produced more facts 
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than we can yet grasp.”27 Borrowing a metaphor from the biologist J. von 
Uexküll, he describes this blizzard of facts as initially allowing us to look at 
the world anew but soon hiding and immobilizing a great wealth of detail 
under a blanket of frozen truths. The sheer abundance of facts begins to 
hinder our attempts to understand them. Portmann writes:
By aiming all the time at discovering the laws of nature, it has been 
completely overlooked that, in doing this, one of the most important 
general laws has been utterly forgotten, one of the most universal phe-
nomena of all: the constant production in the course of the earth’s his-
tory of new organic life.28
In the face of the ever- changing, ever- expanding, frankly troublesome 
variety of manifestations of life, laws of nature that promise constancy— or 
at least relative stability—are certainly appealing. As Arendt might put it, 
they provide the banisters that could help scientists toward true claims 
about the world. As Portmann does put it, they help produce scientifi c 
knowledge that can be deployed in “the many utilitarian tasks which are 
associated with the building up of human civilization and the control of 
natural forces.”29 The problem comes when, falling between the two stools 
of abundant, uninterpretable facts and elusive general laws, we forget the 
value of looking attentively at the things in the world as themselves a source 
of meaning.
It is not a matter of just any sort of looking. When we allow function to 
provide the context for what we see, our observations turn out to reinforce 
the evolutionary principles of natural and sexual selection. Thus, the shape 
of a dolphin is the right shape for a fast swimmer; the long legs of the ante-
lope are appropriate for an animal that runs on grassland; the wing of a bird 
is perfectly adapted to fl ight. Portmann writes: “This utmost purposiveness, 
this perfect agreement between form and function, is considered to be the 
way in which Nature really works.”30 But this is backward thinking. It directs 
our attention almost exclusively to these technical forms of life, constantly 
reinforcing the signifi cance of whatever coincides with function and allow-
ing us to neglect “the immense fi eld of animal forms which mean little or 
nothing to our technical sense.”31 For Portmann, this is at least dissatisfying, 
at most a dangerous dismissal of other organisms that show a less compelling 
form- function relationship as “rabble or vermin, monsters or abortions, 
worm or maggots, a collection of monstrosities from which just a few groups 
are separated off to receive a one- sided aesthetic respect.”32 Remember: This 
work is from 1948. The critique is immanent to the theory of functionalism, 
but the moral impulse is undisguised.
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In Arendt’s thinking, this same resistance to instrumentality springs 
from a political impulse. If the political sphere is the place for activities 
that can only be understood in terms of means and ends, it can no longer 
be the realm of action. Action escapes this schema since it is an open- 
ended process that exceeds any purpose or use. For the Greeks, action and 
speech served no end beyond themselves; they were only in actuality and 
were therefore the highest activities of the political realm. Like healing, 
fl ute playing, and playacting, speech and action are activities where the 
product is identical with the performance, and performance needs specta-
tors, those who know how to look without looking for means and ends.
For Portmann, it is not a matter of contrasting overdetermined, techno-
logical looking with a pure, naive looking that lets the world simply show 
itself. When we turn our careful attention to the living world, we will make 
sense of it only if we bring categories of some sort to bear. Without them, 
we are forced to resort to life itself as the sole value, which (1) amounts to 
producing a biology with no logos and (2) reinforces the rise of animal labo-
rans that Arendt regards with such dismay and marks the destruction of 
political life. Portmann does not resist taxonomy or indeed hierarchy but, 
crucially, he does not endorse the hierarchical relationship between appear-
ance and a hidden reality. Rather, the signifi cant difference is between the 
dim life of simple marine animals on the one hand and “the higher type of 
existence” on the other, and the relevant gauge is the intensity of living, 
specifi cally, the intensity of communal life. He writes:
Barnacles which colonize the inter- tidal zones of the rocky shores in 
dense crowds . . . form a poor and dumb sort of animal association 
compared with the schools of fi sh or better still, with a noisy colony of 
breeding birds in which the living together shows many of the features 
which we meet in the life of the higher animals, as well as in our own 
human society.33
The argument is open to the objections Portmann himself made to the 
functionalists: if we choose technical effi ciency as the relevant value, we 
will get a hierarchy of functional forms; if we choose communal intensity 
as our value it will be a hierarchy of community life. Portmann was surely 
aware of this but does not allow it to dismantle his position. He proposes 
his alternative taxonomy in the spirit of liberal dissent, offering it as a point 
of resistance to the hegemony of instrumental thinking that subjects scien-
tifi c research to the aims of technology. There is room enough for both. 
Yet this is not a matter of dissent alone. Portmann’s preference for intensi-
fi ed life springs from a positive desire for a “fuller, richer concept of living 
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forms.”34 Despite his use of aesthetic language, and despite the fact that we 
will soon see him translate his view into economic, social and political 
terms, this emerges as a distinctly scientifi c value. He argues that “research 
has various aims, not only that of controlling the forces of nature, the one 
most intensively sought after and promoted at the present time.”35 A richer 
concept allows us to know more, and has the salutary effect of bringing us 
to the limits of knowledge. Scientifi c research leads us to mystery, and the 
humility forced on us in the experience of that limit is the antidote to the 
hubris that comes with technological prowess.36 From the point of view 
of technology, this is useless. In the Kantian terms Arendt uses in The 
Life of the Mind, functionalism presents itself as a matter of Reason (Ver-
nunft) generating an account of the meaning of appearances, but in fact it 
never reaches beyond knowledge and perception (Verstand). In contrast, 
and counterintuitively, it is Portmann’s insistence on the value of pat-
terns and surface, precisely on the value of appearance, that is the work 
of Reason.37
For Portmann, technological uselessness is to be celebrated. At the end 
of Animal Forms, the scientist emerges as social critic and issues his clarion 
call:
As soon as the powers of production are no longer organized and 
increased so overwhelmingly with a view to destruction, as soon as 
there is a real opportunity for the many to have free, true leisure, then 
the unquenchable urge for work will turn also towards those spheres 
where there are only “useless” values to be gained; where it is not only 
that feeling of power which comes from domination that will deter-
mine what shall be sought out, but it will be rather the awe that sur-
rounds the mysterious.38
If the deepest value is the intensifi cation of life in communal living, we 
fi nd ourselves gazing at the world as an artist might, allowing ourselves to 
be moved by the realization all around us of possibilities of existence that 
are different from our own, and experiencing something “which seems at 
times to be like the bonds of brotherhood, albeit one which it is diffi cult to 
grasp.”39
All of this is available to us thanks to appearances. Arendt does not share 
Portmann’s inclination toward fraternity or the mysterious but she does 
want the knowledge gathered from looking at the world in the way Port-
mann does to be brought to bear on our human condition. She writes in the 
Denktagebuch: “Whatever part of us is appearance is, among other things, ‘a 
broadcast meant to be picked up by receivers’ (Portmann), that is, it indi-
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   100 11/2/16   11:12 AM
The Task of Knowledgeable Love 101
cates a with- world [Mitwelt]. We are ‘social’ beings, insofar as we appear” 
(D XXIV.64.647).
In The Human Condition, fi rst birth, the biological event of appearing in 
the world, was the signal of our second birth, that is, our capacity for spon-
taneous action. Now appearance indicates the with- world. It is not a matter 
of biology providing a metaphor for understanding our existence. Nor is it 
a matter of scientifi c research producing incontrovertible truths that sim-
ply compel affi rmation. Nor is it a matter of substituting Thales for 
Socrates as a model of thinking. Rather, what is at work here is something 
more like Heidegger’s practice of formal indication. When Heidegger 
uses the phrase in his lecture courses of 1919 and the early 1920s, what he 
has in mind is the need for his students to reach into their own experience 
in search of the initial pointers that will get phenomenological research 
under way. (Arendt began to study with him in 1924.) Rather than take 
the world as merely given in its laws and its details, and rather than launch 
immediately into abstraction, they must examine their experience and set 
about describing it in ways that will lead to truth, phenomenologically 
understood.40
For Arendt and Portmann, this approach produces a hermeneutic phe-
nomenology, a way of looking at the world that engages and transforms 
the viewer. It is at work in The Human Condition and Eichmann in Jerusa-
lem, the two works Arendt cites as having prompted the questions that set 
The Life of the Mind under way.41 For Portmann, our experience of the 
variety of butterfl y colors opens up refl ection on the seen and the one who 
sees, moving us from the naïve—childlike—enjoyment of the colors to 
questions of what each one in particular means and what the very fact of 
their variety can mean. What might it mean for butterfl ies, and what 
might if mean for us? In Heidegger’s terminology, this is the shift from 
ontic information to ontological meaning, and this shift happens repeat-
edly as we move around the hermeneutic circle, never quite arriving back 
at the point from which we started because who we are has undergone its 
own changes along the way. We can imagine Portmann on his journey 
around the circle. Driven by the curiosity he describes himself as having 
felt from an early age, he turns his attention to the natural world and is 
struck by an awe that inspires him to keep looking ever more carefully and 
attentively. He accumulates knowledge, becomes an expert in certain 
marine life forms of the Baltic Sea, looks some more, and then more, and 
so on. The appearances continue to appear and the growing understand-
ing of them is not a matter of penetrating beneath the surface to the hid-
den depth or of surpassing mere appearance on the way to the essence of 
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the thing. Rather, it is a matter of learning to see. It is also a matter of 
learning to love.
Conclusion: Love and Knowledge
Arendt’s highest hope for thinking is that it should prevent the thinker 
doing evil, and that we should be able to require it of everyone. It is no 
accident that, once the question “How does thinking appear?” brought her 
to the thought of life, the model life she identifi es would be the one that 
most perfectly fulfi lls these hopes. Socrates was convinced that no one 
could knowingly commit evil, and his life was spent requiring thinking of 
everyone he met. This was not a matter of prescription. In the Apology he 
describes himself as having spent his life reproving his fellow Athenians, 
and indeed the fi nal favor he asks of them is that they do the same for his 
sons “if they value riches or anything over virtue or if they think they are 
something when they are nothing.”42 The requirement to think is not, 
then, a law to be enforced but a practice to be cultivated in the course of an 
education and a life lived in the polis.
To be sure, Arendt’s appeal to the model of Socrates’s life is immensely 
productive for her investigation of the life of the mind: It opens up a discus-
sion of thinking as the conversation of the two in one; the Socratic daimon 
provides a model of conscience; his habit of spending his time in the agora 
brings thinking to—if not exactly into—public life, where it becomes some-
thing we can all participate in, just as we all participate in the life of the 
city. Socrates devoted himself to thinking, yet refused to think of himself 
as possessed of any expertise, with one exception. As Arendt points out, he 
acknowledged that he did know something about love: “By some means or 
other I have received from heaven the gift of being able to detect at a glance 
both a lover and a beloved.”43 Yet how does love appear? The dialogue—in 
good Socratic fashion—delivers no defi nition of love or friendship, prefer-
ring to leave the readers and listeners more puzzled at the end than they 
were at the beginning. But throughout the conversation we are shown love 
in the glances that pass between the men, the blushes, the whispered conver-
sations, the gaze that Hippothales turns on the beloved Lysis, in a word, the 
attention that love pays. And no one is more attentive than Socrates.
In “The Crisis in Education,” Arendt describes education as the point at 
which we decide if we love the world enough to take responsibility for it.44 
The world she has in mind is the human world, the one made by the work of 
our hands, and what we are asked to be responsible for is the accumulation 
of human history that has made it as it is. The educator shows this world to 
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the new generation, asking the newcomers to attend to it and, in taking joint 
responsibility, to also tend to it. Socrates is a superbly worldly fi gure in this 
sense. The object of his attention, the focus of his questioning, and the object 
of his lifelong examination was life as it is lived by humans in the polis. 
Arendt’s writing on Portmann invites us to imagine a Socratic naturalist, 
someone who extends his attention beyond the affairs of the city to the natu-
ral world, a thinker for whom the examined life involves an examination of 
the lives of nonhuman living beings with whom we share the planet. It invites 
us to imagine a Socratic mode of encountering those beings that does not 
rely on either a Platonic theory of forms or an Aristotelian understanding of 
teleologies, but on a phenomenological practice of looking.45
Portmann was himself such an educator and such a naturalist. His col-
league at Basel Karl Jaspers described the task of the university teacher as 
bringing about in the student an internal turn (Umkehr). Portmann, speak-
ing on the same occasion—the fi ve hundredth anniversary of the founding 
of the University of Basel—concluded his lecture, “Natural Science and 
Humanity,” with this glance toward the future:
This, then, is my wish for the future working of our university: that 
the young people who come here seeking what they need for their 
development, on the one hand, and their instructors, on the other, will 
never lack the spirit that is essential if we are to bring the paradoxical 
mosaic of our life into the service of the tasks before us: what I mean is 
the great gift of knowledgeable love.46
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Hannah Arendt’s Denktagebuch is certainly the richest source for her 
thoughts on love, richer even than her dissertation about the concept of 
love in Augustine.1 Here, all loose ends converge, waiting to be tied up—it 
turns out in vain. Some of them go back to her earlier, even the earliest 
works, others appear here for the fi rst time. In June and December 1952, 
for example, she comments on Rilke’s “abandoned lovers,”2 a topic she had 
already discussed in an essay written with her fi rst husband Günter Anders 
in 1930. In 1952 and in 1969, she quotes Heidegger’s volo ut sis and refl ects 
on its ambiguous meaning. Plato’s myth of the spherical creatures makes an 
appearance; and of course, Augustine, her “old friend and benefactor,”3 
and his concept of charity show up time and again to be criticized. We fi nd 
her thoughts on passion and eros, on friendship and sexuality, on marriage 
and faithfulness. Many, but not all, of these “thought threads” will fi nd 
their way into the works to come.
As Barbara Hahn has pointed out, one entry in the Denktagebuch sug-
gests especially that love will play a superior role in her philosophy of 
plurality: “In this realm of plurality, which is the political realm, one has to 
ask the old questions—what is love, what is friendship, what is solitude, 
c h a p t e r  6
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Tatjana Noemi Tömmel
Heaven’s Sovereign saves all beings but himself
That hideous sight,—a naked human heart.
—EDWARD YOUNG,  Night Thoughts, Night iii, 226
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what is acting, thinking, etc., but not the one question of philosophy: Who 
is Man, nor the Was kann ich wissen, was darf ich hoffen, was soll ich tun?”4 
The three Kantian questions, which all come down to the one question 
“Who is man?” are not compatible with Arendt’s notion of plurality, which 
is so closely linked to her understanding of politics. The “old questions,” 
however, have lost nothing of their dignity; they have to be asked again and 
answered anew; and yet, there is no such thing as a “vita passiva.” Arendt 
does not write a book on love and friendship in addition to her works on 
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. In May 1955, she noted in her 
Denktagebuch: “Philosophy, which sees everything from the perspective of 
‘contemplatio,’ cared neither about ‘actio’ nor ‘passio.’ In the modern age, 
both step into the center of thinking, not for the sake of their own dignity, 
but because man is thrown back onto himself, tossed out of the common 
world. But then ‘actio’ is precisely misunderstood as work and ‘passio’ in 
the sense of desire.”5
One can hardly doubt that Arendt’s oeuvre as a whole is oriented at 
remedying philosophy’s neglect of actio. When she noted these lines, she 
was lecturing at Berkeley about amor mundi and thereby about the dignity 
of the active life, for which the highest activity is not labor or work but 
action. But what about the category of passio, which philosophy equally 
neglected?
In this essay, I claim that Arendt did not neglect the personal and inti-
mate life, as it has often been suggested even if it is true that Arendt’s main 
works concern the active life and the life of the mind; and although love 
does not fi t in with labor, work, or action— or with thinking, willing, and 
judging—love plays an important role in Arendt’s thinking.
In her preliminary work for The Human Condition for example, love fea-
tures among the fundamental modes of life for a while, but is left out later.6 
However, remarks like the one that desire is not the authentic form of passio 
point to the fact that Arendt was not indifferent toward the “heart.” Against 
Marx, for example, she claimed that the “elementary relation between 
humans” was not based on coercion but on need (dem Bedürfen), that it was, 
hence, essentially “Eros”: “Men get together as persons because they need 
each other (love).”7 The fundamental forms in which humans encounter 
each other, are neither labor, an isolated activity, nor production, in which 
one man sets himself up as a creator god, but action and love.
The Denktagebuch makes clear that the vita passiva must be understood 
as an independent mode of life. In the fi rst half of the 1950s, we fi nd sev-
eral lists about the “elementary human activities,” the “active modes of 
being alive” (die tätigen Modi des Lebendigseins), sometimes in relation to 
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their “political indications,”8 sometimes as “modifi cations of plurality.”9 
Arendt sketches as it were a landscape of the conditio humana, assuming that 
the fundamental modes of life (normally, she counts labor, work, action, 
thinking, and suffering among them), are assigned to specifi c spaces like 
the public, the social, or the intimate sphere, and specifi c relational forms 
like solitude, solidarity, or friendship. She supposes these assignments to 
be in the nature of the activities themselves.
But what does she mean by the odd activity of “suffering” (leiden)? Its 
meaning encompasses “being passive,” “enduring” in contrast to “acting” in 
the wider as well as the perturbationes animi, the passions of the soul, in the 
narrower sense.10 Related to suffering, pathein, is love, which Arendt some-
times calls the only true passion, because all other “passions” were really 
desire.11 Sometimes she gives the impression that love as desire was the 
inauthentic form, while passion was the authentic form: “Passion is always 
connected with love; the man of action—Achilles—knows love only as 
desire, and it then plays a minor role. Ulysses, the much enduring one, 
knows love as passion; the gods play on him.”12 Other entries however show 
that Arendt did not simply identify love with passion; she mentions forms 
of love, which are not passion, and forms of passion, which are not love.
Although her lists are still in a state of fl ux, they already show the basic 
structure of The Human Condition with its threefold division of the active 
life; in the book, however, she dedicates just a few paragraphs to thinking 
and suffering, not whole chapters or parts. What is left from her extensive 
refl ection on love in the Denktagebuch, is the claim that love was “by its 
very nature . . . unworldly,” “the most powerful of all antipolitical human 
forces.”13 I would like to argue that this somewhat undercomplex concept 
of love in The Human Condition is challenged by some of her entries in the 
Denktagebuch as well as other texts. There is more to love than just being a 
worldless passion.
What is love according to Arendt? What are we doing when we love? 
Where are we if we are neither alone with ourselves nor equally bound to 
all other people but entirely focused on one person?
Although it is not possible to fully reproduce the richness and original-
ity of the thoughts and themes that appear, reappear, morph, and develop, 
throughout the Denktagebuch, there are fundamental ideas, which allow a 
coherent reconstruction of her concept(s) of love. In the following, I will 
give an overview of these core thoughts. Though her notes on love are 
comprehensive, the scattered and sometimes fragmentary remarks cannot 
always be understood without contextualizing them within her published 
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works and correspondences. I take Arendt’s ambiguous relation between 
love and the world to be the Ariadne’s thread that will help lead a way 
through the labyrinth of Arendt’s voluminous notes. Given Arendt’s claim 
that love was “apolitical,” her notion of amor mundi (or love for the world) 
has been called “surprising,” “mysterious,” and “highly paradoxical.”14 The 
Denktagebuch helps to illuminate such seemingly contradictory claims. I 
would like to suggest that Arendt’s ambivalent, partly paradoxical thinking 
about love emerges from a—never systematic—differentiation between 
various forms of love. It is possible to distinguish three or even four differ-
ent concepts of love in the Denktagebuch. The characteristics of these dif-
ferent kinds of love may partly intersect, but they cannot be subsumed in a 
single, consistent concept of love:
1. Probably the best- known concept is love as a worldless passion. 
This is the same notion of love we fi nd in The Human Condition.
2. A less infl uential concept is love as eros in the sense of Aristo-
phanes’s speech in Plato’s Symposium, namely, as a desire of what one 
is not. The precondition for eros or desire is plurality, yet it is com-
pletely different from politics.
3. In 1955, Arendt makes notes about her plan to write a book called 
Amor Mundi. With it we fi nd a third notion of love, which at fi rst 
seems completely unconnected to the form of love that affects 
humans: the love for the world.
4. The forth notion of love we fi nd in Arendt is love understood as 
unconditional affi rmation, and its main source is the Augustinian (or 
Heideggerian) quote volo ut sis.15
I will, however, focus in the following almost exclusively on the fi rst and 
the last concept. Compared to “passion” and “affi rmation,” “desire” is sys-
tematically less relevant for Arendt’s philosophy. And although amor mundi 
is a very important notion for Arendt’s political theory, discussing it here in 
detail would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Given that it has a differ-
ent “object” than the other forms of love, the decision might be justifi ed.
With regard to the fi rst concept of love, love as passion, I will argue that 
the separation between love and the world is not as absolute as Arendt 
sometimes suggests. Arendt sees love as a creative force, one that while it is 
politically destructive nevertheless is generative of human plurality. Further-
more, I will argue that the forth notion, love as unconditional affi rmation, 
sheds some light on the seemingly paradoxical relation between love and the 
world.
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Love as Divine Power and Worldless Passion
“What I want to tell you now is nothing but, at heart, a very sober portrayal 
of the situation. I love you as I did on the fi rst day—you know that, and I 
have always known it, even before this reunion. The path you showed me 
is longer and more diffi cult than I thought. . . . The solitude of this path is 
self- chosen and is the only way of living given me. But the desolation that 
fate has kept in store not only would have taken from me the strength to 
live in the world, that is, not in isolation; it also would have blocked my 
path, which, as it is wide and not a leap, runs through the world.”16
Arendt’s claim that love is “worldless” is certainly the best known of her 
theses about love. Even in this early letter to Heidegger (actually her earli-
est extant letter to him), Arendt speaks about the confl ict between love and 
living- in- the- world, and closes with the lines: “And, if God exists, I shall 
but love thee better after death.”17 Decades later, she adds an interpreta-
tion to these verses by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, which Rilke had trans-
lated into German: “and not, namely, because I don’t ‘live’ anymore, and 
am therefore maybe able to be faithful or the like, but on condition that I 
continue to live after death and have lost in it only the world!”18
Since working on her dissertation Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (1929), 
Arendt abhorred the idea of founding a community on love, because 
Augustinian charity would turn the world into a desert, and not into a 
homeland. The believer does not love his neighbor for his own sake, but 
instead to lead him toward God. In her later works, too, Arendt claims that 
whereas the “world” as a space for politics was the “product of amor 
mundi,”19 love for another person was a passion, in which we suffer the 
“power of the universe”—as if under a divine spell. As did Heidegger, 
Arendt does not understand “passion” in modern, psychological terms, but 
as an overindividual power:20 Although love nests in man’s heart, she writes 
in the Denktagebuch, the heart is neither its origin nor its “home:”21 “As a 
universal power of life, love does not really have a human origin.”22 No 
one, she writes, can escape this power, which makes us a part of the “living 
universe.” To turn the divine event of love, which man can only endure, 
into a feeling or a friendship means to evade the power of love, to deny it.23 
Insofar as it takes power over the heart but does not originate from it, 
Arendt distinguishes between love as an event and as a mere feeling or 
emotion:24 “Passions degenerate into feelings . . . because we cannot stand 
to be purely seized by passion (the pathos), and fall back on feelings (under 
the pretense of internalization).”25 The difference between “passion” and 
“feeling” for Arendt is that feelings are always connected to a subject, while 
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all subjectivity is dissolved through passion: “To differentiate: I have feel-
ings, but love has me.”26 The widely held assumption that love was a rela-
tion between subject and object originates in the dominating experience of 
productive work. But love is as far from working as thinking or acting. 
Homo faber is neither capable of “thinking—namely being purely active—
nor of loving—namely being purely passive.”27
This last quotation from the Denktagebuch undergirds Arendt’s stance 
toward the vita passiva, insofar it shows that in addition to thought and 
action, love can be counted among the pure activities, which are assigned 
the highest dignity. Although she writes “Passion is the exact opposite of 
action,”28 Arendt also points out that “ ‘enduring’ in the sense of pathein is 
only the other side of acting, in the sense of prattein. The opposite of 
pathein is poein.”29 Action and endurance belong together, and they are 
both a far cry from production and its categories: subjects and objects, 
means and ends.
As early as in Rahel Varnhagen, the book in which Arendt discusses the 
nature of passion for the fi rst time, it becomes clear how closely her notion 
of love is connected to a certain notion of time. Love is a sudden irruption 
of an event that transforms one’s existence for good.30 In the Denktagebuch, 
too, Arendt claims, that love was “always a ‘coup de foudre,’ ”31 in stark 
contrast to friendship, which needs duration: “a two weeks old friendship 
does not exist.”32 As love is already accomplished in the “sublime moment”33 
of its beginning, its duration is not crucial, but the event alone—“out of 
which can emerge a story or fate” (aus dem eine Geschichte werden kann oder 
ein Geschick).34
For this reason, faith has a different meaning in love than in friendship. 
“Being faithful” does not necessarily mean to spend a life together, but to 
let the common story or the common fate evolve freely, “without all guar-
antees and faithful only in not forgetting what happened and what was sent 
[by fate].”35 Because all institutions have the tendency to consume events, 
passion can only be destroyed by marriage, which, subject to divorce, is no 
longer a real institution. As the “institution of love,” marriage makes love 
“completely and utterly homeless and defenseless.”36
The passion of love in its extreme intensity belongs certainly to the great-
est experiences man can have: “Who has never endured this power, does not 
live, does not belong to the living.”37 But this does not mean that love for 
Arendt is (as for Heidegger or Augustine), a reliable source of knowledge:
Love is not blind and makes not blind; rather the opposite is true; but 
love dedicates itself to the darkness of the heart, which lights up and 
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illuminates itself . . . for moments only. . . . The venture of love, its 
“blindness,” is that it does not reckon with deceit and cannot reckon 
with it. Therefore it is true: “Wer sich der Liebe ergibt, hält er sein Leben 
zu Rat?” [Who yields to love, does he spare his life? (Goethe)]38
Love and philosophy belong together, insofar they both “fl ee the world, 
are apolitical and antipolitical,”39 but they belong to each other only in this 
regard. While lovers are close to each other up to the point of symbiosis, 
thinking shifts its object in a distance to be able to look at it.40 Moreover, 
while thinking creates plurality through its inner dialogue, love inversely 
turns two people into one. By the “absoluteness of a relation, which is not 
a relation anymore, because one does not relate anymore, but one is,”41 the 
common realm between people disappears. This realm between people 
normally is the medium to relate to and understand others, whereas if we 
understand each other directly, without relation to anything that lies 
between us, we love.42 The thunderbolt of passion disrupts all human rela-
tions and opens up an experience of an absolute, which is not communi-
cable. The intensity of a passion seems to make love an embodiment of life 
itself, and, by the same token, an antagonist of death: “[Love] is the power 
of life and guaranties therefore its progression against death. This is why 
love ‘overcomes’ death.”43
From this point of view, the loss of the world in love is by no means only 
a privative state, because it brings man’s specifi c humaneness, “man as such,” 
as it were, to the fore. In “consuming” the world, love unveils the human 
being behind the persona, which always is, at least in part, a mask: “If [love] 
seizes humans, it becomes the most ‘humane’ [quality] that humans have, 
namely a humaneness that exists worldless, objectless (the beloved one is 
never object), spaceless.”44 Love reveals the specifi cally human element in 
the universe, because it shows that humans are more than the world they 
create: “as lovers,” she writes, “every human being is—in a unimaginably 
ironic way—also the human being as such [der Mensch].”45
But politically speaking, the experience of such an absolute is a form of 
death within the world, because there must not be any interfering of the 
“divine” within politics, that is, there must not be an absolute measure.46 
“In politics,” Arendt wrote to James Baldwin in an unpublished letter, 
“love is a stranger. . . . Hatred and love belong together, and they are both 
destructive; you can afford them only in the private.”47 Time and again 
Arendt warned not to mix love with politics, because in the heat of passion 
“the world between us, the world of plurality and homeliness, goes up in 
fl ames.”48 In The Human Condition and in On Revolution, she emphasizes 
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that introducing love into politics will inevitably change even the most 
authentic feeling into hypocrisy. The verses by William Blake: “Never 
seek to tell thy love, / love that never told can be” were for her a credo.49 
Love for the world (and not of mankind) can be the motif for political 
engagement, but it must neither be functionalized as a political argument 
nor regarded as the proper relation between people acting in concert. With 
these claims, Arendt does not want to debase private phenomena. She only 
fi ghts against any mixing of the private with the public: “Whenever we 
have souls in politics, we are perverted. Whenever we are soulless in pri-
vate life, we are perverted.”50
Creativity and Tragedy
For a long time, we had little reason to question that “worldless passion” 
was Arendt’s main, if not her only concept of love. But with the posthu-
mous publication of her correspondence and, most notably, her Denktage-
buch, the wall she raised between the private and the public realm has 
revealed some cracks. When we look closer, we fi nd a more complex model 
of how love and the world relate to each other. Although she repeatedly 
refers to love as apolitical, insisting that love has no role to play in politics, 
there are other passages where the positive and creative interaction between 
love and the world comes to the fore.
Arendt makes it clear that the state of worldlessness described earlier 
cannot last. As a life in the absolute is impossible, because it creates its own 
relativity,51 so too love without the world has no constancy: “the pure 
sounding of love urges one always back into communication, in which one 
shares something common with the other. The thou of the I becomes the 
other—if all goes well, the one closest to oneself.”52 From this perspective, 
there are only two possibilities for lovers: Either they try to conserve their 
passionate yet worldless symbiosis and live in eternal remembrance, or 
they return into the world. One possible way of returning is for Arendt 
“symbolized in the child,” who at the same time separates and connects his 
parents. But the return to the world as the only “happy ending” of love is 
at the same time the end of love.53 As the Denktagebuch testifi es, Arendt did 
not only discover the kernel of human freedom in the phenomenon of 
birth, but also refl ected on the symbolic meaning of the act of love that 
precedes it: The union of two people, by which a new person is created, is 
a double metamorphosis from duality to unity, and from unity to plurality: 
“It could be possible that mankind arises, because the two, having become 
one, ebbs away into plurality . . . but in a way that the principle of life 
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(which is the pure vitality of two becoming one), must necessarily survive 
even within plurality for the sake of mankind’s continuation.”54
But if the loving unifi cation of two people is the dynamic mediation 
between singularity and plurality, the separation between love and the 
world cannot be absolute. In 1953, Arendt notes in her Denktagebuch: “From 
the absolute world(=space)lessness of the lovers, a new world has its source, 
symbolized in the child. To this new in- between, the new space of a begin-
ning world, the lovers belong from now on, and they are responsible for 
it. . . . Love is living without a world. As such, it proves to be world- creating; 
it creates, engenders a new world. Every love is the beginning of a new 
world; that is its greatness and its tragedy. Because in this new world in so 
far as it is not only new but also world, it perishes.”55
I must admit that I am always struck by Arendt’s claim that every love was 
the beginning of a new world. To my knowledge, the Denktagebuch is the 
only source where Arendt discusses the creative force of love at such length. 
Love might be “worldless,” even world- destructive—but it is also “world- 
creating.” And yet, passion does not survive the act of birth, which forces 
the lovers to act, no matter if the lovers literally have a baby or accept 
another challenge in the world. For Arendt, love, like pregnancy, seems to 
be a state of transition only, an ephemeral process, the sense of which seems 
to be nothing else than to create something new—as if love was “only nec-
essary to make a beginning at all.”56
Consequently, the relation between love and the world is not simply that 
of mutual exclusion or destruction—it is, fi rst of all, a dialectic or a tragic 
relation. “Tragedy” must be understood here in the Hegelian sense: The 
confl ict between love and the world is tragic, because both are equally justi-
fi ed and yet cannot coexist. One principle has to yield, but in its negation, it 
is still there; abolished, but also preserved and elevated.57 Love creates a 
world as a result of which it perishes, but in sacrifi cing itself for the creation 
of a new world, love becomes immortal. As such, love is not simply a 
destructive force; it is a catalyst of togetherness and plurality in the world.
A World in Miniature
If I am right and the tragic relation between love and the world raises ques-
tions about the prejudice that Arendt did not assign much value to private 
love, it remains questionable how convincing her conception of the creative 
force of love is. Why should love perish with the return into the world; more 
important, why should it “be transformed into another mode of belonging 
together”? Until now, it seemed as if love and the world, although intimately 
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connected, could not coexist. But love is not only the complementary side of 
the world. There is also another generative idea of love as a world in minia-
ture that Arendt explores in some of her letters and other less “offi cial” texts.
After the death of her husband, Heinrich Blücher, Arendt wrote to Hei-
degger: “Between two people, sometimes, how rarely, a world grows. It is 
then one’s homeland; in any case it was the only homeland, we were willing 
to recognize. This tiny microworld where you can always save yourself 
from the world, disintegrates when the other has gone away.”58 This rare 
passage gives us a glimpse into how Arendt thought the relation between a 
long- lasting love and the world. Here, love is not a stranger in or an enemy 
to the world—it is “a” world, in addition to “the” world. But what is this 
little world—is it simply the oasis Arendt speaks of in Introduction into 
Politics, a refuge where one can hide from “the” world? Why does she call 
it a “world” at all?
In a laudatio for Karl Jaspers, Arendt described love as a space where the 
integrity of a person can endure in dark times:
It was thanks to good fortune that Jaspers could be isolated in the 
course of his life, but could not be driven into solitude. That good for-
tune is based on a marriage, in which a woman who is his peer has 
stood at his side ever since his youth. If two people do not succumb to 
the illusion that the ties binding them have made them one, they can 
create a world anew between them. Certainly for Jaspers this marriage 
has never been merely a private thing. It has proved that two people of 
different origins—Jaspers’ wife is Jewish—could create a world of 
their own. And from that world in miniature he has learned, as from a 
model, what happens or what could happen in the world.59
In this passage, Arendt abandons—as a tribute to Jaspers’s notion of 
love or out of conviction—her strict distinction between public and pri-
vate, oikos and polis, love and the world. Here, the space love creates is not 
ephemeral. Arendt contemplates togetherness as a form of playground 
providing the possibility of preparing for the world. But she makes it very 
clear that this kind of love can only occur under certain conditions— one 
of them being the renouncing of complete symbiosis. If two people are too 
close, there is no space between them for the world to appear, as it were.
Already in her earliest remark on love, which can be found in an unpub-
lished letter to Erwin Loewenson, Arendt emphasized the importance of 
equality in love. A loving relationship demands, she writes in 1927, “that 
the phenomenon of serfdom which obliterates the one person and thus 
makes love impossible, does not appear.”60 Given a relationship of equals, 
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love can overcome being only an ephemeral state or a protecting oasis, and 
transform itself into quite the reverse: At its best, love creates a space where 
two people can open up in complete frankness and interact with each other 
in a way that Jaspers beautifully called “a loving struggle.” In this sense, 
love is neither passion nor a “life- giving source,” but a space where one can 
exercise political virtue such as dialogue. Thus, the laudatio continues: 
“Within this small world [ Jaspers] unfolded and practiced his incompa-
rable faculty for dialogue . . . the constant readiness to give a candid account 
of himself . . . and above all the ability to lure what is otherwise passed over 
in silence into the area of discourse.”61
While Arendt normally emphasized that lovers understand each other 
immediately and therefore talk without relating to objects, the relationship 
here is plural and thus worldly. Arendt followed Jaspers in considering 
debates as essential for personal relationships because arguments are the 
condition for recognizing someone as equal. Thus, the dignity of a friend-
ship or a love does not depend on the unanimity with the alter ego but on 
a complete mutual trust, which can never occur in public. It may well be 
this trust that is expressed in the loving word as the absolute affi rmation: 
amo: volo ut sis.
Volo ut sis: Love as Unconditional Affi rmation
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the phrase amo: volo ut sis—“I love 
you, I want you to be”—was Arendt’s lifelong companion. Heidegger had 
sent her the words in a letter in May 1925, attributing them to Augustine.62 
While he understands the phrase as the will to the other’s being, a will that 
lets the other be and thus transforms the other’s existence, Arendt rejects 
the Augustinian idea of love in her dissertation as a form of domination or 
denial.63 Later, however, in her Denktagebuch, she is more ambiguous about 
its meaning. In 1952, she notes that volo ut sis could be related to one’s 
essence, the authentic being of someone, and as such would not be “love, 
but imperiousness, which, under the pretense of affi rming, subjects the 
other’s essence under the own will. But it can also mean: I want you to 
be—whatever you eventually will have been. That is to say, knowing, that 
no one is ‘ante mortem’ who he is, and trusting that it will have been just 
right in the end.”64 In contrast to her middle period, in which she charac-
terizes love above all as worldless passion, Arendt comes eventually to 
discuss love in the context of willing and judging; in these texts, she discov-
ers in love the supreme form of affi rmation.
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In 1969, she notes, “The highest form of recognition is love: volo ut 
sis.”65 In The Life of the Mind, too, Arendt repeatedly refers to love as the 
strongest and “unconditional acceptance.”66 “There is no greater assertion 
of something or somebody than to love it, that is, to say: I will that you 
be—Amo: Volo ut sis.”67 Love in this sense is the free choice of the other 
person comparable to the act of willing. It is the affi rmation of the other 
who is loved for his own sake and not as an object of desire: “The willing 
ego, when it says in its highest manifestation, ‘Amo: Volo ut sis,’ ‘I love you; 
I want you to be’—and not ‘I want to have you’ or ‘I want to rule you’—
shows itself capable of the same love with which supposedly God loves 
men, whom he created only because He willed them to exist and whom He 
loves without desiring them.”68 In Arendt’s understanding, “I want you to be” 
is not the will to the other person’s future possibilities, her potential, but 
the affi rmation of her present reality and givenness.
Although Arendt sometimes labels volo ut sis as a form of “recognition,” 
the Hegelian overtones of this notion and its association with struggle are 
not what Arendt implies. In contrast to other forms of affi rmation or 
appreciation, love is the pure gift of the lover to the beloved. Unlike for 
rights, for example, it would be absurd to fi ght for this gift. Therefore, love 
is the complementary side of other, less exclusive forms of recognition like 
law, respect and solidarity. In this regard, love itself is not political, but it 
becomes clear that the political or public sphere would be incomplete 
without the intimate realm. It is love’s specifi c humaneness to show and 
value that every person is more than what she creates and accomplishes:
The human being who has lost his place in a community, his political 
status in the struggle of his time, and the legal personality which 
makes his actions and part of his destiny a consistent whole, is left with 
those qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere 
of private life and must remain unqualifi ed, mere existence in all mat-
ters of public concern. This mere existence, that is, all that which is 
mysteriously given us by birth and which includes the shape of our 
bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt with only 
by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the 
great and incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, “Volo 
ut sis (I want you to be),” without being able to give any particular rea-
son for such supreme and unsurpassable affi rmation.69
What Arendt discusses here, in the chapter about the right to have rights 
in Origins of Totalitarianism, is that aspect of every person that cannot be 
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recognized by the public, because it is not based on words and deeds, on 
achievement and excellence, but ultimately on something unspeakably indi-
vidual and contingent. Love in this sense is not a divine power, it is a “con-
fi rmation of the sheer arbitrariness of being: We have not made ourselves, 
we stand in need of confi rmation. We are strangers, we stand in need of 
being welcome. I want you to be.”70
Fame and honor, the recognition of the public, can never be a substitute 
for this pure gift of love. It is this affi rmation of the other that forms the 
basis for unreserved dialogue. In discourse, the world of politics enters the 
small world of the lovers, as the example of Jaspers shows. The world inhab-
ited by the lovers is an object of their common care. Speaking seems to be 
that titration point in which the inwardness of thinking and feeling can 
become acting in the world. Thus, the world en miniature represents and 
relates to “the” world where the totality of mankind is assembled. Arendt 
therefore agrees with Lessing in considering personal relationships as the 
foundation for humaneness:71 As discourse gives intimate relationships a 
political meaning, it introduces humaneness into politics, a humaneness 
that teaches to prefer people to principles. And from this point of view, love 
as affi rmation would have an indirect infl uence on the political sphere.
Moreover, I claim that Arendt’s amor mundi can only be adequately 
understood by taking into account her understanding of volo ut sis. When 
she talks about the love for the world, she is not referring to a passion, but 
to love understood as unconditional affi rmation. With her conceptualiza-
tion of love as affi rmation, Arendt bases love and love for the world on a 
common conceptual ground. The concept they have in common is love as 
an engaged, but in the Kantian sense disinterested affi rmation of the 
beloved, of his dignity and autonomy. The amor mundi is a “disinterested 
interest in the world,”72 a lively engagement for the worldly inter homines 
esse, which is not based on self- interest. For “a true lover of this world”73 
politics are “sui generis,”74 not a means to an end, but an end in itself.
Affi rmation can be a stance towards the world as well as toward other 
people, and Arendt actually used the quote in both contexts alike. She did 
not only summarize the highest affi rmation of other people, but also the 
fulfi lled relation of men toward the world in these very words, as, among 
others, the manuscript for her seminar Kant’s Political Philosophy proves, on 
the margins of which she wrote in capitals “AMO UT SIS”75: The “politi-
cally minded”76 dilectores mundi do not only love the world, because it is, 
but because they want it to be, they love in order to create it.
By this concept of love, which is unrelated to passion, the concept of 
amor mundi is not only saved theoretically, but love for men and love for 
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the world can also be combined practically. He, who experiences in private 
that the dignity and autonomy of the other is not only unimpeachable, but 
also does not diminish one’s self- love, but on the contrary, nourishes it, 
may universalize this experience in forms of friendship, respect, solidarity 
or love for the world.
Conclusion
With Lessing, Arendt once said that she was not obliged to resolve the 
diffi culties she raised. The following conclusion is my attempt to deal with 
these diffi culties. I am quite sure that the implicit differentiation between 
several forms of love did not simply happen to Arendt. Arendt embraced 
contradictions and regarded them as characteristic of great thinking. She 
thought dialectically, in her very own way, not through a Hegelian dialec-
tic but with a certain “vividness” of her concepts. Her notions are never 
carved in tablets of stone as it were, because they react to new events and 
experiences and they do always implicate a process.
I do not advocate here blurring distinctions Arendt made. We should take 
her warning to keep the private and the public sphere separately very seri-
ously. But while we should not blur her distinctions, neither should we 
overestimate the importance of each and every one of her notions. Instead, 
we should keep the diversity of her concepts and the liveliness of her think-
ing. It is the variety of forms of love, which must not be given up in favor 
for a logical system, because it corresponds to the different modes of 
human existing. Arendt’s response to the perils of love she diagnosed 
throughout her work (the world- fl eeing égoïsme à deux or the metaphysical 
love for principles) can be found in the diversity of her concepts of love. It 
is the plurality of love that guarantees the mutual protection of the public 
and the intimate sphere. We need them both to turn a desert into a world.
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Arriving in America in 1941 as a European and a refugee, Hannah Arendt 
could not but look upon the new country as an outsider. As with other 
outsiders from Tocqueville on, she was struck by the difference between 
America and the European countries with which she was familiar. In par-
ticular, as she wrote to Karl Jaspers, America did not seem to be a nation- 
state of the kind that was prevalent in Europe. There the state was 
understood as the “monopoly of the legitimate means of violence over a 
given territory,” as Max Weber famously wrote.1 What was the import of 
the differences?
Arendt became an American citizen in 1950. Her scholarly attention 
had focused fi rst on making sense of what had happened to her—to the 
experience of National Socialism and related contemporary political 
developments. Having published The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951, she 
now centered her attention on the contrasting environment around her. It 
was becoming her environment. She starts a sequence of entries in her 
Denktagebuch for September 1951 by referring to America as “the politi-
cally new”—these are the thoughts that will eventually result in her argu-
ment in the 1963 book On Revolution.2
c h a p t e r  7
America as Exemplar: 
The Denktagebuch of 1951
Tracy B. Strong
The highest laws of the land (America) are not only the constitution 
and constitutional laws, but also contracts.
—HANNAH ARENDT,  D VI.11.131
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Her analysis in that book has often been criticized from a historical 
point of view, especially since she refers to the Constitution as being the 
fi rst to be established “without force, without ruling (archein) and being 
ruled (archesthai).”3 Whatever the validity of these criticisms, they strike 
me as missing an essential point of her concerns. Arendt is trying to work 
out what she a few pages later calls “the central question of the coming 
[künftigen] politics,” a problem she sees as lodged in “the problem of the 
giving of laws” (D VI.18.141). Her aim is to describe a political (i.e., 
humanly appropriate) system that would not rest upon will, and in particu-
lar on the will of the sovereign. “That I must have power [Macht] to be able 
to will, makes the problem of power into the central political fact of all 
politics that are grounded on sovereignty—all, that is, with the exception 
of the American.” I shall return to the question of sovereignty toward the 
end of this essay.
Her concern in these pages (130–143) centers on what a human society 
would be that was truly political. Her understanding of what America 
could or did represent is her entry into this question, for she will argue that 
it is from the particular American revolutionary experience that one can 
construct a picture of a truly human political realm. Writing about what is 
contained in what humans do is not the same thing as writing history—in 
particular since the actors in question may have only partial understand-
ings of what they are doing. While her work draws upon historical activity, 
she is precisely not writing history.
What is striking about her discussion in the intervening (and other) 
pages is that she approaches the question of America explicitly through the 
lens of European philosophy. The point is not to Europeanize America; it is 
to see if America does not in some manner constitute a potential instantia-
tion of what in Europe had been thought by some over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Thus, she is attempting an answer to the question of 
“can we determine the particular excellence of the American polity by view-
ing it through the lenses of European thought?”
The range of European thinkers she now invokes is important. She fi rst 
mentions Marx and then Nietzsche, each of whom she sees as part of, and as 
makers of, the “end of Western philosophy.” Marx is held to have inverted 
Hegel, Nietzsche to have done the same for Plato. The point of her analysis 
of Marx and Nietzsche is to assert that they released thought from its bond 
to the “Absolute.” And in the present world, that is a good thing, too; to 
hold to the idea of an Absolute is to “make possible in the present unjust and 
bestial behavior” (D VI.12.133). As we know, this will be an ever- returning 
theme in her work. In 1953, she can write: “The bankruptcy of Western 
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political philosophy reduced to the simplest formulation: the re- realizing 
[Um- willen] of the political life collapses with Marx (or with secularization)” 
(D XV.17.357). She expects to fi nd in America the elements of a political 
that does not rest on an “absolute.” America thus provides for her—or can 
provide for her—an example of what an understanding of politics that does 
not rest upon any kind of absolute would look like. America provides, as it 
were, a case study for how to think about the political “without a banister.”4
To whom might one look to fi nd this vision of a nonabsolute political? 
For Arendt, Nietzsche provides the opening to an answer. We are to look, 
however, not to his doctrine of the revaluation of values but to his discus-
sion of promising in the second essay of the Genealogy of Morals. She quotes: 
“To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is that not . . . the 
real problem of humans?” For Arendt, the foundation of a new “morality” 
lies in the right to make a promise; the promise makes possible human 
relations based on contract. And the grounding on contract, as she writes 
in the Denktagebuch (D VI.11.131), was for her the particular excellence of 
the American polity.
When she expanded these thoughts in On Revolution, she referred the 
ability (and the right) to covenant to the power that the settlers had as 
human beings. Those on the Mayfl ower and later the Arabella must have 
had some apprehension about the world to which they were coming—it 
was for them the state of nature and clearly outside of what they knew 
civilization to be. While they of course knew that there was a native popu-
lation, their sense was that it was relatively small and not organized into 
substantial settlements. Their feeling was not without some basis in fact; 
the diseases and weapons that Europeans had brought from 1492 on had 
reduced the indigenous population by a factor of almost ten.5 The arriving 
settlers, unaware and/or unmindful of the holocaust of the previous one 
hundred and thirty years, could think they were coming to a more or less 
empty land, as the great cities and trading empires of the pre- and imme-
diately post- Columbian period had vanished.6 In his 1651 Leviathan, 
Hobbes would thus remark that European settlers in the New World “are 
not to exterminate those they fi nd there but constrain them to inhabit 
closer together, and not range a great deal of ground to snatch what they 
fi nd,” thereby showing his sense that there were not too many of “those 
they fi nd there” and that they were not politically organized.7 Thus, Arendt 
writes about the state of mind of the newly arriving Puritans:
This fear is not surprising. . . . The really astounding fact in the 
whole story is that their obvious fear . . . was accompanied by the no 
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less obvious confi dence they had in their own power, granted and 
confi rmed by no one and as yet unsupported by any means of vio-
lence, to combine themselves together into a “civil Body Politick” 
which, held together solely by the strength of mutual promise “in the 
Presence of God and one another,” supposedly was powerful enough 
to “enact, constitute and frame” all necessary laws and instruments of 
government.8
As Locke was later to remark, “That, which begins and actually consti-
tutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of 
freemen . . . to unite and incorporate into such society. And this is that, and 
that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in 
the world.”9
On Revolution is thus not precisely about “revolution” as that term has 
come to be understood. There are, as her book makes clear, two sorts of 
events that are called “revolution” and we would do well to keep them 
separate. The fi rst, and today standard, derives from the French Revolu-
tion: the violent overthrow of an existing sovereign and its replacement by 
another sovereign power. In this, as de Tocqueville would point out, a 
“revolution” retained some of the much earlier sense of revolution as of a 
circular motion.10 The second, and America is her model for this, sees 
revolution as the institution of a novus ordo seclorum—it is a change in how 
human live with each other.11 The America Revolution was not to gain 
freedom from oppression so much as it was to gain freedom for those who 
made it. 12 Because of this, accusations that Arendt’s history is bad (the 
Revolution was violent; it maintained slavery; suffrage was less than uni-
versal, etc.) are beside her point. The question will and must be if the 
country has realized the freedom for which it made itself.13
What are the components of this freedom? Arendt notes that there are 
two elements to this contracting or covenanting. The fi rst is undertaken 
“in the Presence of God”—that is as an individual beholden to him or 
herself alone before God. The second is taken “in the presence of others” 
and is “in principle independent of religious sanction.” In the passage from 
Nietzsche that she cites, the “presence of God” element is replaced by the 
breeding to the “right” to make promises. As Arendt is not in any conven-
tional sense religious, she must call upon Nietzsche to instantiate the two 
elements of promising. The centrality of “others” means that our concerns 
in political philosophy derive, in a phrase to which she will repeatedly 
return, from the “fact that not man but men inhabit the earth and form a 
world between them.”14
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What is the implication of Arendt’s claim that contract (or “covenant” 
or “compact”) is the “highest law” and the particular excellence of America? 
What is involved in this notion of contract? Note that Nietzsche thinks 
that having the right to make promises is not something that all humans 
have, as it were simply by fact of existing—it has to be “bred.” One answer 
is revealed by the end of her extended quotation of Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morals, where he indicates that the person who has the right to 
make promises can “answer for the future as himself.”
I wish fi rst to explore here what Nietzsche means by this phrase and 
then to compare it with the use that Arendt makes of it. The movement of 
his text in the fi rst three sections of the second essay in On the Genealogy of 
Morals is a preliminary key.15 In each of them, Nietzsche describes the 
possibility of a particular way of being- in- the- world (the right to make 
promises, the sovereign individual, the acquisition of conscience) and then 
circles back to give an account of the genealogy of that quality. Thus the 
right to make promises requires fi rst the development of the concept of 
calculability, regularity, and necessity.16 The sovereign individual requires 
the development of a memory—the acquisition of a temporal dimension 
to the self. Each of these qualities is what Nietzsche calls a “late” or “ripest” 
fruit, the coming into being of which, therefore, has required ripening.
Nietzsche is quite clear that the earlier developments are the means to 
making possible a “sovereign individual.” He refers to this as a “preparatory 
task” and includes in it what he calls human “prehistory.” What is key here 
is the understanding of history: The past has made possible the present, 
but has not necessarily monotonically determined it. The resources for a 
variety of different presents are all in the past, if we can deconstruct the 
past we have received and reassemble it. The sovereign individual will thus 
be in some sense a new beginning.
What quality does the sovereign individual—whom I take here to be an 
individual who has earned the right and capacity to say what he or she is—
have? Nietzsche details a number of qualities in On the Genealogy of Morals 
II, §2, all of which sound like or are intended to sound like the megalopsuchos 
of Aristotle.17 Yet there is a difference between Nietzsche’s sovereign indi-
vidual and the great soul in Aristotle, for the sovereign individual is the 
result of an achievement, a process by which a consciousness has become 
instinct.18 What is important here is the insistence that Nietzsche places on 
the “right to make promises.”19
We are thus dealing with the question of performatives— of which 
promising is the standard example. To say “I promise” is actually to prom-
ise, thus to change one’s standing in the world. Likewise, to say “I do” in 
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certain circumstances is to move from being an unmarried person to a 
married one. This new status must then be “pronounced” by an appropri-
ate institutional representative.
Yet what Nietzsche has done is to make the matter much deeper in two 
manners. First is the question of having the “right” to make promises. Stan-
dard accounts of weakness of will hold that a person who does not keep a 
promise is incontinent, ceteris paribus. They assume that there is no question 
of one’s right to make a promise. When Nietzsche asks as to the right to 
make a promise, it is as if the expectation is that I will not be able to enact 
my words, that is, that I will act weakly because I am not fully myself.
In these matters, the important consequence is that for Nietzsche ratio-
nality is of no ultimate avail. His point is not so much to oppose rational-
ity as to point out that rationality is not why we keep promises. While it may 
be rational to keep promises, it is not in the nature of promises to be kept 
because one has a reason to do so—I do not need a reason to keep my 
promise. If you ask, “Why should I keep my promise?” you will fi nd that 
sooner or later reasons come to an end. If you ask why, you do not know 
what a promise is.20 Nietzsche says that promising requires that I have 
“mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all more short- willed 
and unreliable creatures.”21 Those who have the right to promise are like 
“sovereigns,” because they can maintain their promise in the face of acci-
dents, even in the “face of fate.” To have the right to a promise is to have 
taken upon oneself, as oneself, all the circumstances present and future in 
which the promise may occur. It is to maintain that promise—the 
requirement that the present extend into the future—no matter what 
befalls. Thus when Kaufmann translates the key passage, “für sich als 
Zukunft gut sagen zu können,” as “able to stand security for his own future,”22 
one may pass by Nietzsche’s point, which is that one should be able to “to 
be able to vouch for oneself as a future.” One must earn entitlement to 
one’s “own.”
What this means is that a person who has the right to make promises 
does not regard his action as a choice between alternatives but as a mani-
festation of what she or he is, as something she or he must do, where there 
is no gap possible between intention and action.23 A promise is a declara-
tion of what I am, of that for which I hold myself responsible; because it is 
not a choice, there is no possibility of what gets called weakness of will. As 
Stanley Cavell says, “You choose your life. This is the way an action Cat-
egorically Imperative feels. And though there is not The Categorical 
Imperative, there are actions that are for us categorically imperative so far 
as we have a will.”24
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In this, and despite obvious echoes, Nietzsche’s categorical imperative is 
not identical to Kant’s. In the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and 
elsewhere, Kant argues that one cannot break a promise because to do so 
would in effect deny the point of the entire institution of promising. Kant 
took this position with its very strong denial of the relevance of goal, 
because, as he argued, any breaking of a promise or uttering of a lie for 
contingent reasons (say, as with Sartre, you were being asked by the Gestapo 
the location of the partisan they were seeking) would mean that you claimed 
to know precisely what the consequences of your action would be. Since 
such a claim was epistemologically impossible, it followed that one must be 
bound by the only certainty one might have, that of one’s non–temporally 
limited reason.
Kant’s reason for keeping a promise or not telling a lie was consequent to 
the interplay of a fi xed and actually rational self and an incompletely grasp-
able world. The difference in Nietzsche’s analysis of the right to keep prom-
ises comes in his insistence that not only is the external world not fi xed, but 
neither is the self. The self is not given for Nietzsche: it is rather the effect of 
actions undertaken and thus is motile. The self endures for him only as what 
it has the power to be responsible to. Hence, the binding of the self to a 
promise can only be rightfully accomplished by a power “over oneself and 
over fate” and must penetrate below the level of assessment—where it 
remained with Kant—to become part of the assessor himself or herself, of 
what Nietzsche calls “das Unbewusste.” This means that for me to have the 
right to it, a promise must be part of what I am. In this sense, it is part of 
one’s present and not one’s past.25 Nietzsche’s categorical imperative builds 
on the actions of those who can be “sovereign individuals”; Kant’s “autono-
mous individual” is a cousin but is built in terms of the categorical imperative.
Nietzsche is also clear—now contra Kant and post- Kantians from Rawls 
to Habermas—that the self that is so committed is committed also to all the 
pain and all the reversals that will and may occur—pains that can be seen in 
his exploration of what he calls mnemotechnics. In this, the sovereign indi-
vidual in Nietzsche will fi nd (as we shall shortly see does Arendt) an instan-
tiation in Weber’s person who has the vocation for politics and who can 
remain true to his vocation, “in spite of all.”26 (I might note here that the 
insistence on the necessity of the pain and cruelty of existence was already 
central to the argument in the Birth of Tragedy.) Pain and cruelty are endemic 
to the possibility of life—they are part of what make the sovereign indi-
vidual possible.
I have spent time laying out my understanding of this part of Nietzsche’s 
phrase because I think that Arendt shares most all of it, in particular the 
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focus on action as opposed to reason. She adds, however, one other impor-
tant dimension. The people so constituted promise to each other—contract, 
covenant—and in doing so they bring a political space into existence. There 
is little or nothing of the “to each other” in Nietzsche—his sense of the 
polis will be consequent rather to a kind of ecstatic spectatorship of the sort 
that he describes in the eighth section of The Birth of Tragedy.27
In Arendt’s gloss, this means that if in making a contract (which is what a 
promise is) one pledges to an other that one will remain true to oneself as the 
person making the contract, then one has made one’s own being the founda-
tion for a political space. The question is if one is able to make and hold to 
such a pledge. Such a grounding or foundation would not be based either on 
will or on any external absolute. Importantly, this means that for Arendt, 
much as it had been for Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address, the most impor-
tant American political document is not the Constitution but the Declara-
tion of Independence. The truths that are “held” to be “self- evident” are 
grounded on nothing other than that they are held. That they are thus held 
is a matter, as the signers of the Declaration made clear, made actual by the 
act in which the signers “mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our For-
tunes and our sacred Honor” [my italics]. Here—perhaps not a surprise—is 
the opening for an interesting comparison of Arendt’s arguments in On 
Revolution to those of Jacques Derrida in his “Declarations of Independence” 
where he relates this to the act of signing one’s name. There is an immediate 
difference, however: Derrida writes: “The signature invents the signer.”28 
For Derrida writing has precedence over speech. Not so for Arendt.
The second way in which this Nietzschean approach deepens the issue 
of promising and performatives is this. In Arendt’s reading, the American 
Revolution is not precisely just a performative; more accurately it is what I, 
working from Nietzsche, have elsewhere called a “hyper- performative.”29 
It not only brings something into existence (like being married), but it also 
seeks to bring a new institutional structure into existence (like the institu-
tion of marriage). As noted, when performed in a particular institutional 
context, a performative is an act that brings something about—as when 
the appointed person breaks a bottle of champagne at the launch of a ship 
and says (presumably in Dutch): “I christen thee ‘Nieuw Amsterdam.’ ” 
Arendt’s analysis of the American Revolution adds a dimension: The Revo-
lution was (and is) an attempt to bring about a new order that in turn will/ 
should inscribe itself into institutions, as no appropriate institutional con-
text preexisted. It is a founding.30
As Jacques Derrida remarks, such an act, what I am calling, although he 
does not, a “hyper- performative,” brings something new into the world 
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and the new, as we know, was for Arendt the touchstone of human action. 
Such activity takes place on what one might call a horizontal level—it is 
with others like you and not in relation to a preexisting structure of author-
ity. It is a moment of fraternity—and perhaps of sorority.31
And the question will also arise: How and by what means, if any, might 
this endure and become institutionalized? Temporally speaking, this 
means that what one did in the past will be transfi gured as the reality of the 
present will annihilate all that was past to it. This matter is complex: Our 
political present will thereby be tied to the historical, although not, she 
notes, in a “weltgeschichtliche” (world- historical, i.e., transcendental) man-
ner. How might it then be tied? Here Arendt was fond of quoting the 
French poet René Char: “Notre passé n’est précédé d’aucun testament—No 
will and testament give rise to that which is our past.”32 So what is our 
relation to that which we have done? This is not a trivial question: if the 
promise of the American Revolution was that of a new order under the sun, 
what is to be done about slavery? As Stanley Cavell remarks in a sentence 
that glosses Thoreau and echoes Arendt: “It was not a war of independence 
that was won, because we are not free.”33
Arendt was, I think, aware of these questions. To make the implications 
of this problem clearer, she immediately turns to a consideration of Max 
Weber’s distinction between the “ethic of responsibility” (which she holds 
to be the foundation of the pragmatism and genius of American politics) as 
opposed to his “ethic of conviction,” which, she says, allows us to believe 
and hold to anything since we cannot know “until the day of the Last 
Judgment” if our conviction be correct. The implication here is that if we 
base our polity on the conviction of the supposed correctness of our moral 
judgments (as opposed to our ability to be responsible to ourselves) we will 
be able to justify anything, as the validation for our claim can be infi nitely 
postponed. (One has but to look at the claims made about bringing democ-
racy to Iraq.) Indeed, Arendt sees “central question of our time” to be a 
change in our ability to make valid moral judgments, that is to judgments 
the correctness of which is not postponed indefi nitely (D VI. 17.138). She 
writes: “The legitimate distrust of all moralizing [i.e., her distrust] does not 
arise so much for a distrust of the standards of good and evil (Böse), as it 
does from the distrust of the human capacity for moral judgment, for the 
judging of our affairs from the point of view of morality (Moral). Those 
who have an ethic of responsibility and those who are pragmatic do not 
interest themselves in motive, and those who are of the ethic of conviction 
cannot know them” (D VI.17.138).
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This is, she says, a dilemma. How is one to make judgments? She now 
turns to an examination of “three ways out” from this dilemma, paths she 
identifi es with Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche. In Kant, she looks to his elabo-
ration of the categorical imperative as that which is “splendid” in his solu-
tion. As we saw in the contrast of the understanding of a/the Categorical 
Imperative in Nietzsche and Kant, the problem with Kant’s solution comes 
from the fact that with it, “humans are not of any world, but rather dwell 
in a future” world (D VI.17.138). Hegel, she continues, takes over from 
Kant “the discrepancy between willing and accomplishment” but the result 
is that in the end “not even God Himself can judge” (D VI.17.139). She 
continues: “When all being is in truth becoming, that all action is a hap-
pening in truth (alles Handeln [ist] in Wahrheit Geschehen). It was not 
Nietzsche but Hegel who abolished morality.” She reads Nietzsche here as 
“following Hegel and ignoring Kant.” (D VI.17.139) but sees him as 
replacing the Hegelian unfolding of the spirit with the “circulus vitiosus 
deus” that is, eternal recurrence. A great spectacle without a spectator thus 
replaces history. After she has worked her way through these partial rejec-
tions of the manners in which Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Kant of the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason respond to this main question, she briefl y mentions 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment. That thought is not developed at this 
time in the Denktagebuch, but it will concern her for the rest of her life. She 
will later argue that Kant’s main contribution to political (as opposed to 
moral) philosophy comes in the Third Critique, in particular in the notion 
of refl ective judgment.34
If the central problem of politics- to- come is that of the giving of laws 
(Gesetzgebung—legislation), the answer that has been given by the national 
state (i.e., the European answer) is that the sovereign gives laws and the 
sovereign is whoever has the power to will. The will to will—she instanti-
ates Heidegger here (D VI.18.141)—is the will to power. Interestingly, 
this is an argument found in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures, lectures that 
were not published until 1961—she could not have attended them when 
they were given in 1936–38. Did Heidegger already speak of this during 
the time she was around him, or, more likely after they met again after the 
war?35 So already here, she identifi es the central problem of modern poli-
tics as that of the supposed necessity of sovereignty.36 As Arendt says later: 
“If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.”37 
In On Revolution, she notes that “perhaps the greatest American innovation 
in politics as such was the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the 
body politic of the republic, the insight that in the realm of human affairs 
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sovereignty and tyranny are the same.”38 Freedom, she will argue, is an 
accessory not of the will but of doing and acting.39
What is striking in these passages is how her approach from European 
philosophy brings out the importance of what is new in the American 
experiment. These were concerns that she brought with her from Europe; 
they will continue to occupy her for the rest of her life and are given con-
crete form by the American experience. Such was always the promise of 
America. As Hamilton wrote in the fi rst of the Federalist Papers:
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to 
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the 
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not 
of establishing good government from refl ection and choice, or 
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political consti-
tutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the 
crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the 
era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the 
part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the gen-
eral misfortune of mankind.
This passage tends to get passed over. It is, however, of central impor-
tance as revealing what kind of account (at least some) Americans gave to 
themselves as to the nature and import of their founding. Here we have 
Hamilton invoking a particular historical mission for the new United 
States. His claim is much like that Heidegger in his supposedly notorious 
Rektoratsrede (a text of which Arendt would certain have been aware) where 
Heidegger suggests that what happens in his particular country is tied to 
(what Heidegger was to call) the “spiritual strength of the West.”40 Note 
that Hamilton’s “the people of this nation” is precisely what is meant by 
Volk. Such concerns have been those of the American land even “before it 
was ours”—this from a line in a poem by Robert Frost.41 One already 
found much the same sense at the end of “A Modell of Christian Charitie,” 
the sermon that John Winthrop preached on board the Arabella to the 
settlers arriving in New England in 1630. Winthrop ended by saying that 
his company—soon to sign a covenant—was undertaking the following:
We shall fi nd that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall 
be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when He shall make us a 
praise and glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, “may the 
Lord make it like that of New England.” For we must consider that we 
shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that 
if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so 
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cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story 
and a by- word through the world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to 
speak evil of the ways of God, and all professors for God’s sake. We shall 
shame the faces of many of God’s worthy servants, and cause their prayers to 
be turned into curses upon us till we be consumed out of the good land whither 
we are going.
. . . we are commanded this day to love the Lord our God, and to 
love one another, to walk in his ways and to keep his Commandments 
and his ordinance and his laws, and the articles of our Covenant with 
Him, that we may live and be multiplied, and that the Lord our God 
may bless us in the land whither we go to possess it. But if our hearts 
shall turn away, so that we will not obey, but shall be seduced, and worship 
other Gods, our pleasure and profi ts, and serve them; it is propounded unto us 
this day, we shall surely perish out of the good land whither we pass over this 
vast sea to possess it.42
What is striking in both Hamilton and Winthrop is the sense that the 
founding of this new order presents possibilities of extraordinary greatness 
and the possibility of extraordinary failure—and that the costs of failure 
will be the loss of a human political possibility. Some nations, for Hamil-
ton, Winthrop, and Arendt, can come into existence with a destiny (what 
Heidegger called Geschick), and they are aware of their Geschick when they 
acknowledge the fate that is that of their nation- in- becoming (Hamilton’s 
what is “reserved to the people of this country”).43
The particular Geschick of America was for Arendt to have attempted a 
political realm that did not rest on sovereignty. She is struck by the fact 
that for at least some moments during the American, French, and Russian 
revolutions hierarchical structures of authority collapsed and that those 
making the revolution spontaneously organized themselves into which she 
calls “councils.” Such spaces are formed by and can only be formed by 
those have the qualities that she describes above in her discussion of 
Nietzsche and promises. As with the seventeenth- century understanding 
of the basis of a political space that preceded any relation to central author-
ity, these are formed on the basis of a “mutual contract by which people 
bind themselves together in order to form a community . . . based on reci-
procity and equality.”44 The diffi culty, as she points out, is twofold. First, 
such qualities are by their very nature contingent and potentially transi-
tory. Second, while those covenants gave power to those revolting, they 
did not in and of themselves generate the kinds of structures through 
which people might continue actually to exercise power. Instead, they 
tended to be more or less quickly “crushed by the central and centralized 
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government, not because they actually menaced it but because they were 
indeed, by virtue of their existence, competitors for public power.”45
Revolutions are therefore in general quickly followed by the reestab-
lishment of a sovereign authority—an authority made attractive because it 
insures security, is predictable, and has clear limitations. Hobbes was the 
fi rst to understand this: He applauded the move and argued that, in their 
hearts, each person desired the assurances of predictability and security 
and that they would and should thus be willing to tolerate the limited but 
absolute authority of a Sovereign.46 In such a view, the “rights” of an indi-
vidual are conceived of not as integral to his or her political life but as the 
realm into which political authority may not venture. They are, as Ronald 
Dworkin argued, “trumps.” Arendt’s concern with men rather than with 
man means that she has little interest politically in the “rights of man.” For 
her, in a liberal Hobbesian- Dworkinian view the possibility of political 
action on the part of most citizens is severally and seriously restricted and 
to a considerable degree made irrelevant. Modern political science has 
unthinkingly legitimated this development with concepts such as that of 
“retrospective voting” in which it is held that people do not vote so much 
as to support a plan of action but to pass a judgment on what the sovereign 
power has done since the last election.47 About the only theorist to try to 
develop an understanding of popular effective power is the concept of 
plebiscitarian Führerdemokratie by Max Weber, a concept that until recently 
has languished under the associations with the subsequent implications of 
“Führer.”48
Against this, Arendt suggests that the naturally emerging councils can 
or might organize themselves into federal hierarchies based on different 
spaces. “The common object was the foundation of a new body politic, a 
new type of republican government which would rest on ‘elementary 
republics’ in such a way that its own central power did not deprive the 
constituent bodies of their original power to constitute.”49 The councils 
are not political parties: “Councils are organs of action, the revolutionary 
parties were organs of representation.”50 Therefore what councils cannot 
and should not do, however, is to occupy themselves with what she calls 
“the management of things,” with, that is, “social and economic claims.”51 
These considerations in 1963 thus call upon the more theoretical analysis 
she had developed in her 1958 The Human Condition. Failure to keep the 
world of action separate from the world of work dooms the political.
America, as Arendt analyzes it, gives her an historical example of how 
authentically political space might come into being and of how it, for at 
least at some times, has. It is, for her, exemplary. In Schopenhauer as Educa-
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tor, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer as having been an Exemplar for him. 
(One might note here that the standard translation of this word as “speci-
men” gives an entirely different tone to Nietzsche’s point—and a wrong 
one.)52 An exemplar is that which serves to call one to something that is 
one’s own but which one is not as yet. If one is enjoined to “become what 
you are,” in the words that Nietzsche takes from Pindar’s Second Pythian 
ode, then the exemplar is that which calls one out—it is provocation rather 
than instruction, as Emerson put it. America was, in Arendt’s reading, an 
exemplar of what the political could be.
But the country itself did not, and does not, always live up to itself. It is 
important to realize that Arendt was not ever blind to the dangers to politi-
cal freedom in this country. Nor, for the reasons given above, does she 
romanticize the American condition. In 1953, at the height of McCarthy-
ism, she can write to Jaspers as to “how far the disintegration has gone and 
with what breathtaking speed it has occurred. And up to now hardly any 
resistance.” She continues by noting that much of the persecution has come 
from “ex- Communists, who have brought totalitarian methods into the 
thing.”53 She will have similar words again and again, notably in response to 
the Vietnam War and reaction to the release of the Pentagon Papers. And 
in our present day we may still wonder if at some point what Winthrop 
called a “wrong election” have not been repeatedly made. Stanley Cavell 
made the point:
Since America had a birth, it may die. . . . It has gone on for a long 
time, it is maddened now, the love it has had it has squandered too 
often, its young no longer naturally feel it; its past is in its streets, 
ungrateful for the fact that a hundred years ago it tore itself apart in 
order not to be divided. . . . Union is what it wanted. And it has never 
felt that union has been achieved. Hence its terror of dissent, which 
does not threaten its power but its integrity. So it is killing itself and 
killing another country in order not to admit its helplessness in the 
face of suffering, in order not to acknowledge its separateness.54
Cavell wrote these lines during the time of the war in Vietnam. Arendt 
said much the same about the same war and about the release of the Pen-
tagon Papers. It breaks one’s heart to recognize that the same can be said 
today about the American role in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Jean- Jacques Rousseau gives freedom a body when he opens the fi rst chap-
ter of The Social Contract with the famous sentence: “Man was/is born free 
[est né] and everywhere he is in chains.”1 His argument draws its force not 
only from a strong opposition between nature and culture but also from a 
multivalent temporality. Where English forces a decision, birth, in Rous-
seau’s French, assumes either a historical or an ontological cast depending 
on how one reads the verb est. A fi rst reading transposes the biblical story 
of the fall into politics, recounting that man was born free but is now enslaved. 
A second reading sets freedom against slavery in a battle over the present: 
man is, now and always, born free though he fi nds himself in the contradic-
tory situation of being subjugated.2 Read in Rousseau’s double valence, 
birth is both material (in the world and in time) and transcendental (not 
bound to material, above the world in a way that it can determine it, and 
outside of time).
“Natality” has become one of the most central concepts in contempo-
rary work on Arendt and her unique renegotiation of ideas of freedom and 
possibility. Readers of the Denktagebuch might hope for more evidence 
of the concept’s development, but she uses the term only once in the years 
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leading up to her major deployment of it in The Human Condition. The 
puzzling, even obscure, presentation of the term in the Denktagebuch chal-
lenges interpretive protocols that depend on a linear development. None-
theless, the entry deserves attention because it shows Arendt transforming 
a political metaphysics of the body through an alternative conception of 
corporeality. Maintaining Rousseau’s attention to the clash of language 
and ontology, Arendt shows that the body bears a specifi cally earthly form 
of freedom.
The weight of Arendt’s published works and their scholarly reception 
tempt the interpreter to approach the Denktagebuch from the tradition of 
Western philosophy broadly conceived. However, understanding what this 
early entry means for Arendt’s concept of natality requires a focus on its 
specifi cally literary aspects, understood as the particular ways in which she 
constructs it through arrangements of language. Within an awareness of 
both literary form and the conceptual history of philosophy, my question 
arises from and contributes to the more developed discussion of natality in 
The Human Condition. There, Arendt changes the very defi nition of poli-
tics, describing it not merely as the negotiation of interests between differ-
ent groups, but of the creation of groups that act together to start something 
new. Power, in turn, does not preexist but emerges from common endeavor 
and legitimately endures only as long as it has continuing support. This 
alternate conception of the political ultimately depends on Arendt’s con-
ception of natality: If there is to be the possibility of something truly, radi-
cally new, there must be a distinctive way for a person to be politically born. 
This idea allows her to gesture toward a new understanding of authority, 
tradition, and even temporality by engaging and challenging the notion of 
a transcendental guarantee of freedom.
Yet, while Arendt repeatedly emphasizes natality’s importance, her spe-
cifi c formulations fall short of systematic explication. The introduction of 
The Human Condition offers a typically moving and deceptively lucid state-
ment: “action has the closest connection with the human condition of 
natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the 
world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning 
something anew, that is, of acting.”3 On the one hand, Arendt grants natal-
ity singular potency: “only” it grants the power of starting the new. It allows 
a specifi c kind of novelty that we need to break ties with the past. On the 
other hand, “because” marks a unidirectional relation. At one level, Arendt 
highlights birth as a physical event; it announces the emergence of a new 
distinct being. Beyond this, birth contains possibility; it holds a new start 
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“inherent” in it. From here, it is diffi cult to discern whether birth in this 
sense really relates to the body at all, or instead just describes a transcenden-
tal principle, a higher power that always exists and makes action possible.
In a similar manner, Arendt later writes that “the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted” in natality.4 However, she does not use natality as an 
anchor, but as a phenomenon, an event in the material world, that offers a 
spring of hope and forward motion. Backing away from the view that natal-
ity might be a purely transcendental or ontological principle, we are thus 
led to ask if Arendt insists on the body and the fi gural dimension of lan-
guage as she works out a way of describing freedom that requires a specifi c 
sense of embodiment. In other words, what might seem to be a confusion 
of philosophical and literary modes of inquiry actually contributes to the 
hermeneutic richness of her thought. A careful reading of the explicit ref-
erence to natality in the Denktagebuch and nearby references to fi gures of 
birth can help understand how Arendt uses the narrative and poetic dimen-
sions of the idea to expand the philosophical concepts of novelty and 
change. Natality, as a condition in Arendt’s sense, is related to, but different 
than, a concept, an anchor, and an ontological principle. Arendt’s natality 
needs to be shown and, though it will not present itself directly to the 
senses, it can be approached indirectly through narrative (time) and poetic 
layout (spacing).
The Space of Power
Entry 21 in Notebook XIX (October 1953, p. 461) contains the Denktage-
buch’s only reference to “natality.” In order to engage Arendt’s challenge to 
foundational thinking, I propose that we acknowledge that the entry gives 
us not one but two outlines and aligns them in a way that compels us to 
work out their relation.5 The Denktagebuch presents the opportunity to 
take the layout of thinking seriously and to read it as it comes to us, spread 
out on the page. If we look forward to the published works, we know that 
the two columns into which Arendt divides the entry will need to become 
one. Yet, the very way that she writes resists a simple binary, one- to- one 
relationship. Taking up the challenge of this entry allows a renewed appre-
ciation of Arendt’s thought in its stylistic and conceptual creativity. In their 
spatial division, order of terms, and employment of symbols, these two 
columns offer a productive challenge to reading.
The basic features of the entry suggest a provisional intellectual orienta-
tion, and I propose describing them on their own terms before entering into 
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wider questions of Arendt scholarship. In the accompanying table, the left- 
hand column appears to be generally positive, containing the terms equality, 
assertion, thought, and action, while the right is broadly negative, including 
fear, loneliness, and loss of reality. The left proceeds from Singularität (sin-
gularity) to Mortalität (mortality) and the right column begins with Pluralität 
(plurality) and ends with Natalität (natality). Each of these corner terms ends 
with what in English would be the suffi x “–ity,” which grammatically implies 
that Arendt denotes a state of being. It may seem that the outline offers pure 
philosophy, pure concepts and terms. In their very purity however, the lists 
of terms raise the question of motion, relation, and connection.6
Editors Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann describe the entry as 
“keywords” (Sitchwörter) to Arendt’s lectures at Notre Dame in 1954 
(1046). Their description makes sense when one reviews how the third part 
of these lectures develops questions related to the “two- in- one” in a read-
ing of Plato.7 A small addition should be made to this relation between 
notes and lectures by pointing out that the note to the right on “Labor” 
Pluralität  Singularität
Equality—distinction 
in the modus of speech: 
= Assertion of human 
condition 
 Fear if related to plural
Faith  if in and by itself 
   
Thought: Solitude 
= two-in-one = I with 
myself = with Humanity 
Fabrication: isolation 
= I with human artifice 
 Labor: metabolism with
nature = my life 
Loneliness if related to 
plurality: One-ness without
confirmation by others 
= loss of reality or common
sense 
   
Action = together with 
Power 
  
   
Futility of action = need 
for permanence— 
Poetry or body politic 
  
Natalität  Mortalität 
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has clear connections with the Gauss Lectures that Arendt delivered at 
Princeton University one year before.8
If one sees the Denktagebuch solely as a sourcebook for ideas to be devel-
oped later, it would be enough to be satisfi ed to explain it as an outline, a 
spine, or skeleton to be fl eshed out in a fi nal product. Those who know The 
Human Condition might see the opening and closing as parallel terms and 
assume that, beyond the immediate relation to the Notre Dame and Prince-
ton lectures, the entry ultimately moves in a deliberate manner from plural-
ity to natality and singularity to mortality. Arendt extensively develops her 
sense of plurality in The Human Condition, defi ning it clearly and program-
matically as “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world.”9 Simply put, Arendt prioritizes multiplicity over conceptual unity. 
Arendt scholarship has also done a great deal of work on Arendt’s reworking 
of Heidegger’s approach to mortality as “being towards death.”
With the rich conceptual development the scholars and Arendt herself 
provide, it is easy to forget that The Human Condition itself never systemati-
cally explains the function of natality, insisting on the need for a basis for 
action in plurality but leaving open the question of how this relationship 
between action and natality works. It seems to be a kind of foundation, 
except that is more of a spring than a solid base. It refers to the body. Arendt 
uses it not as the appearance of the body in the merely natural sense, but 
instead as a mark of the distinctively human, which she consistently resists 
reducing to the simply biological.
This entry of The Thought Diary keeps keys terms of Arendt’s thought 
at a typographical distance. Indeed, its lack of clear transitions demands 
that we read the space between the terms. While temping us to jump to 
connections and conclusions, it also inserts a mostly blank barrier between 
concepts. The history of philosophy, while rarely commenting on its own 
innovations of layout, does offer some guidance in this regard. Specifi cally, 
Arendt’s intimate familiarity with Kant’s three Critiques, and her particular 
training in the German philosophical tradition, suggest a provisional 
approach through the lens of the layout of early German editions of Kant’s 
antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason. There, in side- by- side columns, 
he begins with premises beyond the scope of reason and shows that each 
necessarily leads to its opposite. For example, in one antinomy, Kant offers 
negative proofs of the proposition that the universe has a fi xed area and 
beginning and the proposition that it does not have a fi xed area and begin-
ning. In Kant, the division of the columns signals a rift in thinking that 
cannot be bridged. The empty middle marks an abyss, a void for human 
thinking. Arendt’s text, by contrast seems to offer an apparently logical 
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development from one key term to another on each side. The equal signs 
even suggest mathematic progression and conclusion. Often they can be 
translated “I defi ne as.” For example: “Action I defi ne as together with.” 
Choosing one such interpretation, though, would be a strong step, since in 
this specifi c case there are so many locutions that could as easily be inserted 
there instead, such as: “relies upon,” “is contingent upon,” “has something 
to do with.” This is particularly true since Arendt also offers a different 
connection between the columns in two small arrows that she inserts in the 
middle pointing from the right to the left.
Despite these differences, contrasting Arendt’s columns with Kant’s raises 
the question of how each side develops, and it prepares us to watch for twists 
in what seems to be straightforward motion. Most important, it reminds us 
to take the distance between the two columns seriously and sets a high stan-
dard for attempts to bridge them. Indeed, the spacing warns us of the danger 
of hoping to fi nd one answer to this equation rather than accepting the 
multiple challenges to thinking that the columns open.
Given such a multiplicity of ways to begin reading this entry, perhaps we 
can start with the most notably distinct feature, the arrows, small marks 
fl ying between terms, that imply that Arendt takes singularity as her start-
ing point (following her teacher Heidegger) and tries to work her way out. 
Since they force us to read from right to left, though, we might have an 
uneasy sense that we are swimming upstream, working against a prejudice 
of tradition. The right hand column offers a series of pitfalls, of ways to go 
wrong, or at least apparent negatives. “Fear,” “loneliness,” and “loss of real-
ity” stand out. In contrast, one might hope to fi nd a smooth, positive devel-
opment in the left- hand column. This is not the case, though. “Fabrication” 
poses a threat to “equality” that “action” does not just conquer. Instead, one 
slides, stumbles, and gets stuck in the “futility of action.”
Natality offers action its energy but cannot be linked to it in a clear way. 
The two terms stand apart. However, the specifi cs of the distance are sig-
nifi cant. The development of the line of thought hangs up on poetry:
Futility of action = need
for permanence—
Poetry or body politic
The positive movement of the column hits “futility.” The interruption 
implies at least two directions. It might just be a blip in her run of thought, a 
speed bump, so to speak, built into the human condition itself. Alternatively 
and perhaps more interestingly, Arendt may be considering an objection, 
acknowledging the fact that the boldly announced “action” above remains 
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threatened by disappointment, and trying to come to terms with that objec-
tion by contending that practical failure leads to a metaphysical need for 
stability, and acknowledging the fact that the boldly announced “action” 
remains threatened by disappointment.
The history of political philosophy has long aligned the “need for per-
manence” with the “body politic,” not only since the early modern rein-
vention of sovereignty, but even much earlier in classical Greek and Roman 
thought. In her published work, Arendt uses the term “body politic” 
without inquiring into its conceptual history, but that history does offer a 
place to start for critical refl ection.10 Traditionally, philosophers use the 
body to describe a principle of stable organization. This was already true 
for Aristotle, who insists on an analogy between mind and body and ruler 
and subject.11 In his view, such a hierarchy was prescribed by nature and 
extended in principle to the control of men over animals and free men 
over slaves.
As Ernst Kantorowicz famously demonstrated, medieval political theol-
ogy argues for the continuity of the ruler with the idea of the two bodies of 
the king: a physical body that passes away in his death, and a spiritual body 
that does not change.12 The phrase often cited in connection with this 
idea, “The king is dead, long live the king,” employs a paradox that appar-
ently resolves when one realizes the “king” is being uses in two different 
senses. However, the imperative hides the implicit group of people that 
project the still living concept of the king in speech. The French phrase “le 
roi est mort, vive le roi!” employs the subjunctive case, and a more literal 
translation would be “the king is dead, may the king live.” The need to add 
the marker of duration in English (“long”) testifi es to an anxiety about the 
stability of this concept as the idea intersects with the body.
Most important for modern thought, Hobbes describes individuals in 
the state of nature who cede their individual power to the ruler, resulting in 
a single body that the famous front piece of Leviathan pictures as a giant 
composite of smaller people. Jonathan Hess highlights the move from Aris-
totle, who sees man as having an intrinsically political nature, to Hobbes’s 
insistence on the artifi cial body of the state.13 Hobbes needs to convert man 
from an antisocial animal into a political being. Hess argues, in effect, that 
when Hobbes combines the social contract with the body politic, the unity 
of the body wins, since the contract only operates at the moment of forming 
the leviathan as head of state, who then has the power to make all future 
decisions.14 In the terse phrase “poetry or body politic,” Arendt shifts our 
attention away from this rational moment of the contract and toward a 
different kind of moment altogether, a creative poetic moment.
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Born Like Animals, Guided Like Men
Linguistically, “body politic” has a unique currency in Anglo- American 
thought that deserves comparative examination in light of Arendt’s multi-
lingual background. In German discourse, the mechanistic Staatsapparat 
(state apparatus) predominates over Staatskörper (state body). Arendt’s choice 
to focus on the body rather than the machine marks a difference between 
her project and that of the structuralist thinkers of the post–World War II 
period. Most famously, Louis Althusser drew on Marx and structuralism in 
his elaboration of “ideology and ideological state apparatuses.”15 Rousseau, 
in line with his preference for fi gures of nature and the organic, employs 
“corps politique” in The Social Contract, but it never took a central place in 
French debate. In comparison with these thinkers, Arendt’s use of the 
English “body politic” in connection with “natality” assumes the organic 
fi gure of the body, but does not associate it with the teleology that it would 
assume in Rousseau. Likewise, the arrow markers in the two columns of 
the entry from the Thought Diary suggest a logical, perhaps even machine-
like functioning. She does not explicitly clarify the meaning of those opera-
tors, though, which prevents the system from assuming a sense of closed 
circulation.
Arendt’s revision of the body politic operates through a plasticity of the 
concept innately related to its fi gural aspect. Expanding on one of Arendt’s 
notes on Hans Blumenberg, Sigrid Weigel writes, “The same words can be 
understood as concepts or metaphors, yet their designation as metaphor 
refl ects the moment of transmission that is always inscribed in them—at 
least when it is a question of the designation of the invisible.”16 Weigel 
connects the moment of categorizing a word as a metaphor with a release of 
sense and movement of meaning. She is not saying that new meaning arises 
from nowhere that fi nally illuminates a previously unseen idea. Instead, an 
old word, the same word, marks out a new terrain. Beyond Weigel’s insight 
though, Arendt compels us to think of the words “body politic” not just as 
a concept or metaphor, but concept and metaphor. In doing so, concepts 
also become vehicles of transmission that do not just offer new categoriza-
tion but also bring forth unseen knowledge.
From the medieval period to the twentieth century, theories of the body 
politic shared a common emphasis on unity and an organic principle of 
stability that points to a metaphysical “need for permanence.” In the “or” 
of Arendt’s “poetry or body politic,” she compels us to consider an alterna-
tive to the necessity of assuming that structure. Considering nearby entries 
of the Denktagebuch within the general horizon of the Human Condition 
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shows that she does not merely reject the body or its order, but, by demand-
ing continual participation, instead employs the body to talk about politi-
cal connections in a way that opens political form rather than closing it.
Perhaps surprisingly, given Arendt’s emphasis on natality as the basis of 
radical newness, other fi gures of birth in the Denktagebuch relate not to 
change, sudden or otherwise, but to consistency and integration. However, 
the way Arendt describes this maintenance of the world provides a basis 
that cannot be circumvented for the radical energy that she ultimately 
grants action. Reading a few key entries around the same time in the Denk-
tagebuch shows that the world (i.e., the common realm of living together) 
needs to be sustained; it does not just exist by itself. In this regard, the 
phrase “poetry or body politic” indicates that the political body needs to be 
continually renewed, either through the poetic, or in poetry itself. This 
renewal has both a conservative aspect and a potential for radical change in 
action. Each new body does not just fi t the higher state- body, but continu-
ally maintains the social structure. Without presupposing that higher 
principle of stability, the common world can then change its entire politi-
cal structure because it brings with it the possibility of starting something 
wholly new.
Jürgen Habermas’s critique of Arendt’s conception of power helps 
sharpen her challenge to permanence in the political realm in the other 
entries I wish to examine. Habermas reads her as usefully placing emphasis 
on the origin of power as opposed to its means of employment. In contrast 
to Max Weber, who understands power in terms of particular individuals 
seeking to realize a fi xed goal, Arendt separates power from the necessity 
of a telos (end). Habermas names plurality as the condition for communica-
tion and then quickly moves from distinctness to connection. The world 
has a “spatial dimension” in which “multiple perspectives of perception 
and action of those present” are unifi ed.17 Insightfully—and provoca-
tively—he complements this description of the spatial dimension of the 
world with a temporal one: “The temporal dimension of the life- world is 
determined by the ‘fact of human natality’: the birth of every individual 
means the possibility of a new beginning; to act means to be able to seize 
the initiative and to do the unanticipated.”18 In this description, Habermas 
references the past in the singular (“the birth of every individual”) but 
allows for action between people. So, in natality, as he describes it, we go 
from the past to the future and the individual to the group.
The very emphasis on the origin of power, however, raises the question 
of how it can endure over time. The phrase “temporal dimension of the 
life- world” points to this problem: How could it be said to “use” power in 
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the future when, as Arendt writes in the Human Condition, “power cannot 
be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies”?19 For Arendt, the spec-
ter of the Weberian conception of power cannot quite be so neatly side-
stepped as Habermas desires. Power should not be seen as capital that can 
be deployed at the time that a ruler or executive wishes. Arendt suggests 
instead that it cannot be virtualized, that it in its purest state it exists only 
in a one- to- one relation with its supporters.
Habermas ultimately accuses Arendt of a sleight of hand in taking ref-
uge in the idea of the contract to solve the problem of her radical concep-
tion of action. His quick assertion that Arendt falls back on the “contract 
theory of natural law” rings false, though.20 He leaves us little else to 
support his accusation, and it seems to be a sort of stopgap approach to 
closing the important questions raised by his description of Arendt’s con-
ception of power. He clearly describes both the spatial and temporal 
aspect of Arendt’s concept of power, but saying that she relies on the 
contract suggests that, as in Hobbes, political agreement exists in order to 
closes off political form. Even before Habermas’s challenge, Arendt had 
already provided a language to understand the stakes of this problem: her 
distinction between a promise and a contract. The Denktagebuch offers 
other options, though, particularly around the fi gures of birth that she 
explores in philosophical notes as well as those that experiment with the 
narrative genre. An entry from 1955 draws our attention to the difference 
between animal and human birth: “Heidegger is wrong: man is not 
‘thrown in the world’; if we are thrown, then—no differently from ani-
mals— onto the earth. Man is precisely guided, not thrown, precisely for 
that reason his continuity arises and the way he belongs appears. Poor us, 
if we are thrown into the world!”21
Despite the stark tone of her objection, Arendt’s critique of metaphysics 
begins with Heidegger, who already writes about existential spatiality instead 
of the independent existence of subjects who are cut off from the world. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger’s idea of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) offers a 
conceptual hinge between a limitation and expansion of freedom. On the 
one hand, the thrown Dasein (Heidegger’s displacement of the subject 
through spatial “being- there”) cannot choose to come into the world, 
much less into a particular world.22 Indeed, Heidegger describes Dasein’s 
usual state of thrownness as “fallen,” which of course suggests a range of 
negative connotations starting with the fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis. 
Heidegger claims that he does not intend a negative value judgment of this 
starting state, though, which he associates not with a hierarchical shift, but 
rather a horizontal dislocation. As thrown, Dasein fi rst exists in a confused 
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disorientation among the mix of everyday opinions of other people. Yet, 
this type of thrownness does not only describe a past or current condition, 
but it also enables an openness to the future in that Dasein remains “in the 
throw” (in Wurf bleibt). Dasein’s thrownness causes original disorientation, 
but this state at the same time keeps it in play for future development.
On the other hand, once situated in a fi eld of relations, possibilities 
open that allow Dasein to fashion a sense of the future and self- knowledge. 
In contrast to Arendt, Heidegger emphasizes individual development at 
this point. He repeatedly speaks of authentically “being able to be oneself” 
in a manner that contrasts with the publicity of the inferior social episte-
mology of idle talk.
Arendt asks how exactly we are to recognize the original condition of 
being thrown in such a way that new possibilities open up. Her objection to 
Heidegger takes a subtle linguistic path that shows how her method of read-
ing infl ects her philosophical ideas. She actually combines philosophy and 
linguistics in a subtle terminological challenge rather than hold exclusively 
to the conceptual development of “thrownness.” She says that man is only 
thrown into the natural “earth,” not the humanly made “world.” Arendt 
broadly holds to this division in The Human Condition, though she also uses 
the terms interchangeably at times. In making the distinction in the Denk-
tagebuch, she draws on Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 
which he wrote in 1937 and published in 1950. There he distinguishes the 
world as a system of relations that creates meaning from the earth as the 
given, material aspect of nature. This latter dimension has a certain solidity, 
but it also resists understanding in its pure state.
By inserting this distinction between the earth and the world, Arendt 
reads geworfen not abstractly as “thrown,” but concretely. In doing so, she 
implies that she has in mind the second meaning of the German verb werfen, 
which one uses to speak of animals other than humans giving birth. Such a 
shift takes Heidegger down a notch and uses his own term in a nearly oppo-
site sense. After all, Heidegger’s sense of “thrownness” relates to position, 
chance, and dislocation, along the lines of a throw of the dice. If he does not 
intent God to be his model, he at least suggests man as one who engages 
chance. When Arendt gestures instead to animal birth, she points to neces-
sity rather than contingency.
From this point of view, it looks like Arendt wants to simply leave the 
merely animal behind after recognizing it. The German verb leiten, which I 
have translated here as “guided,” could also mean to “direct,” “to conduct,” 
“to lead,” “to govern.” Thinking ahead to Arendt’s writing on education, 
one can hear a connection to begleiten, which means “to accompany.”23 The 
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guiding that one receives gives a sense of continuing and belonging to a 
greater world. Heidegger insists that Dasein does not choose to be thrown 
into a specifi c world, but is born without choice or input. For Arendt, this 
is our earthliness, and she emphasizes the difference between the human 
world and the given earth. With respect to the world, she highlights the 
connection to others from the start. Since others exist before the entrance of 
the newcomer, we also assume responsibility for their entry to the world. 
One must be educated into the world, which is not simply the earth, but the 
humanly constructed edifi ce that includes history and memory and the polis.
In “The Crisis of Education” (1954), Arendt writes, “Basically we are 
always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is 
the basic human situation, in which the world is created by mortal hands to 
serve mortals for a limited time as home.” She draws powerfully on Shake-
speare in her description of the world’s disjunction. Facing the command 
of the ghost, Hamlet laments his task of revealing that his uncle murdered 
his father to rule Denmark: “The time is out of joint. O cursed spite, that 
ever I was born to set it right.” As the heir to the throne, Hamlet’s personal 
situation is inherently political, and Shakespeare’s tragedy stages the pre-
mature death of the father as genealogical break that raises the question 
of succession. Arendt generalizes Hamlet’s words in a manner that might 
appear paradoxical at fi rst: How can the world always be becoming out of 
joint? The Thought Diary suggests that the continual animal- like birth of 
people challenges the structures that are to assure their entrance into 
humanity in its fullest, politically empowered, sense. The body comes fi rst 
because we cannot assume a moment of rest or cohesion from which the 
disjunction starts.
Arendt’s conception of fi nitude is key here: humans make a world (com-
prising structures and practices of living together) that lasts for only a set 
period. In this sense, “home” for Arendt does not offer the permanent ref-
uge that philosophers and poets often long for. The crisis in education that 
she writes of in the late 1950s is in part one of a particular time and place. 
She does critique specifi c pedagogical trends such as an emphasis on play-
like activities in the classroom over “the gradually acquired habit of work.” 
In a broader sense, however, the crisis of education actually responds to the 
crisis in authority that she sees occurring over a long historical arc. While 
she recognizes the declining power of the parent, teacher, and expert, 
Arendt does not merely advocate a harsh return to old models. Instead she 
advocates a “minimum of conservation” that allows the most basic opera-
tion of reinterpreting the past based on new conditions. The word “educa-
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tion” derives from the Latin root educere, meaning “to lead forth,” but for 
Arendt such a journey could have little confi dence in its destination.
Peg Birmingham and Stephan Kampowski suggest that Arendt replaces 
Heidegger’s geworfen with geboren (born).24 The earlier passage from the 
Denktagebuch shows the complexity of this substitution and that it works 
only by changing the context to the world rather than earth. However, 
while the quote shows that Arendt relegates Heidegger’s thrownness to the 
realm of the earth and body, her own idea of “natality” brings the body 
back to her thinking of freedom.25 Being born will have not one but two 
important senses for Arendt from the Denktagebuch to The Human Condi-
tion. If werfen can refer to animals giving birth, Arendt works out a specifi c 
way in which humans are born, but her intervention in the conceptual his-
tory of the body politic emphasizes a fi rst connection that already liberates 
humans from the earth, and then a mode of being born that changes the 
world rather than just adding to it. If Rousseau’s opening of The Social 
Contract says that man is both in time and transcends it, Arendt sees man as 
both in the body, as an animal, and guided, albeit in the disjunctive rather 
than organic manner, into the world.
Birth and . . .
Before moving on, or back, to natality, though, another entry must be 
reckoned with in which Arendt offers a smooth and touching narrative of 
welcome into the world that not only tells but also shows what she means 
by being guided into the world. She offers another form of writing, switch-
ing into the narrative mode in a way that performs the guidance articulated 
conceptually in the passage above. Almost a page long, this entry gets 
started with a drumbeat of the conjunction “and”: “We are born into this 
world of plurality where father and mother stand ready for us, ready to 
receive us and welcome us and guide us and prove that we are not strang-
ers” (D XIX.39.469– 470). Arendt homes in on the connection between 
newborn and world to establish a relation that at fi rst appears surprisingly 
untroubled to readers of her later work. She describes the mother and 
father as being there for the child in four ways. In being “ready,” they have 
prepared for him in advance. They will “receive” him, bringing him to the 
place that they made. In “welcoming,” we might think of additional signs 
of acceptance that indicate a broader, social incorporation. Further, the 
parents do not just take in the child at that moment but also offer to “guide” 
him, accompanying him for a time in the world.
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The parents do all of this to show that the child belongs, but Arendt’s 
repetitions reveal an awareness of the diffi cult kind and amount of work this 
requires. Moreover, in the “we,” the reader sees not just another reference 
to the child but to the parents as well. The repeated welcome affi rms the 
place of the parents and child. Beyond the content, however, the passage 
compels a switch from a critical philosophical mode of analysis to an 
embrace of narrative. Arendt moves along with the story. Invited, welcomed 
by this switch in style, readers performatively enter the “we,” joining the 
story in the mode of the “and” that is also its central point of content.
If there is an irresistible beauty to the passage, of the smooth fl ow that 
immerses us into a new world, then that fl ow makes all the more striking 
the moment when, later in the same entry, Arendt subtly disrupts the per-
fect, smooth plane of her story when “we” are no longer newcomers but 
must ourselves welcome “newcomers to whom we prove what we no longer 
quite believe, that they are not strangers” (D XIX.39.470). A split opens up 
in relation to the simple welcome of the start of the passage. A new per-
spective appears, so that over the course of the narrative the reader sees the 
same event is seen from two vantage points. This does not need to be read 
as a dissolution of the opening lines. On the contrary, Arendt needs both. 
We must feel welcome and retain a sense of the strangeness of the new-
comer. The strangeness will be productive: It does not merely mean that 
the newcomer does not fi t, but it is what allows that they can change the 
whole world while also having the sense that they have a place in it.26
The section ends: “We die in absolute singularity, strangers after all, 
who say farewell to a foreign place after a short stay. What goes on is the 
world of plurality” (D XIX.39.470). As the “we” dies, Arendt withdraws 
the narrative welcome she so elegantly extended. We, the readers, are 
returned to the key term “plurality.” The fi nal passage to consider before 
returning to an explicit consideration of Entry 21 in Notebook XIX 
(October 1953) helps clarify the end of this story. The repetition of the 
“and” at the end of the passage offers a clear connection to the narrative 
just considered:
It is as if men since Plato have not been able to take the fact of having- 
been- born seriously, but rather only that of dying. In having- been- 
born the human establishes itself as an earthly kingdom, toward which 
one connects, in that it searches for and fi nds its place, without any 
thought that he will one day go away again.27
Arendt speaks of a way of thinking foreign to Plato in which the “eter-
nity of the human species” was seen primordial, rather than the “mortality 
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of humanity.” She argues that we need to take the fact of being born seri-
ously even though the period of history in which this was taken for granted 
is over. If, in that time one could count on linking “search and fi nd” (sucht 
und fi ndet) in a quick conjunction, Arendt looks deeper into the moment of 
the “and” in the modern period. She describes a strangely unrefl ective 
“kingdom” where one never thinks of death. In this respect she launches a 
pure attack on the higher world of metaphysical afterlife. At another level 
though, her own thought demands that we think the imminence of the 
political and its nonidentity, its ability to change from within.
Poetry and Body Politic
In the Human Condition, Arendt productively reformulates the double per-
spective that appears in the narrative death of the “we” in terms of a “sec-
ond birth” that leads an individual beyond the welcome of the world. One 
takes one’s stance in relation to the world by refl ecting on the distinction 
between actual birth and an idea of freedom that emerges from thinking 
about birth. In Chapter 5, she writes: “With word and deed we insert 
ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in 
which we confi rm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our physical 
appearance.”28 In the second birth, one realizes that the plurality of the 
world does not simply preexist but that our own arrival necessarily cosigns 
it (“confi rms”), and thus implicitly contains the power of refi guring it.
Since the opening of the inquiry, it has become clear that although the 
logic of Entry 21 appears to hang up on the phrase “poetry or body poli-
tic,” Arendt does not actually reject the body as way of envisioning the 
world. Instead, she highlights an aspect of birth that displaces a higher 
conceptual body like the leviathan in the direction of a horizontal, narra-
tive accretion of support. In addition to this new “body politic” that 
demands constant maintenance, however, the phrase gestures to what I 
would call a “poetry politic” that shows how action can radically change 
the common world. So, while Arendt does fi ght the abstractions of Hei-
degger’s thrownness and Hobbes’s leviathan, a mere shift to the horizontal 
is not suffi cient to understand her thinking. The “or” can break in at any 
moment when a new generation whose bodies get ahead of the institutions 
demand new beginnings.
More than simply naming poetry, the lines “Futility of action = need / for 
permanence— / Poetry or body politic” read like poetry, and this suggests 
another approach to the entry’s layout. If Kant’s antinomies provided a 
model for approaching the entry from the German philosophical tradition, 
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thinking of the entry in the tradition of avant- garde poetry around 1900 
offers another way to take its spacing seriously.29 Stéphane Mallarmé’s 1897 
poem “A Throw of the Dice” provides the blueprint for twentieth- century 
spatial poetics and helps us read two columns of text in their exposure of 
language across facing pages.30 Critics have been fascinated by the multiple 
connections suggested by the poem’s font sizes, use of italics and capitaliza-
tion, and the way it opens semantic links across facing pages. Mallarmé’s 
spacing operates on at least two levels: between the words on a page and 
across the spine, the hinge of a manuscript that physically holds it together. 
Reading the body politic poetically shows that plurality never really gives 
way to the unity of the body in the sense of a totality, because each person 
remains distinct, just as each word in the poem remains distinct.31 Further, 
the space between the two pages, like the space between the two columns, 
reveals a basic distance between the singular and plural that constitutes the 
world for Arendt, even if, for the purposes of her political thought plurality 
holds the foreground. At the same time, Mallarmé’s dice throw conserves 
the materiality of language in its specifi c fonts and careful layout, just as 
Arendt’s thrownness keeps the animal body. For Arendt, the body both 
keeps one “in the throw” (Heidegger) and enables the capacity of the new 
throw in action.
If Rousseau grants the body a temporal force for liberation, Arendt not 
only brings time into the body politic but also keeps it open to the space of 
poetry. The “or” should not be seen as an alternative, as proposing two 
equally good choices. Instead, the phrase “poetry or body politic” splits up 
and becomes both “body politic” and “poetry politic.”32 Or, to put it another 
way, in the Thought Diary, Arendt offers a poetry of the body politic.
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The twenty- seventh notebook is the last substantive section of Arendt’s 
Denktagebuch, before the twenty- eighth trails off into a bare succession of 
dates and places.1 It concludes abruptly with a brief note that her husband, 
Heinrich Blücher, has died—“so suddenly, so quickly” (D XXVII.86.797)—
followed by a fragment of Berthold Brecht’s “Ballade vom Mazeppa”:
One man road out with the things that were most his own:
with earth and horse, with endurance and silence,
then he was joined by vultures and sky.2
The notebook that follows begins with an equally brief and poignant 
entry: “1971 Without Heinrich. Free—like a leaf in the wind” (D 
XXVIII.1.801).
Even before its poignant conclusion, though, Notebook XXVII is pre-
occupied with thinking about ends, and Arendt weaves the multiple senses 
of the word in both English and German together into a series of medita-
tions on the relationships between thinking, death, and purpose. These 
meditations, which interlace philosophy and poetry, show us a period when 
what would become the volume Thinking—which makes its fi rst appearance 
c h a p t e r  9
Facing the End: The Work of Thinking 
in the Late Denktagebuch
Ian Storey
Everything that is appears; everything that appears disappears; 
everything that is alive has an urge to appear; this urge is called 
vanity; since there is no urge to disappear and disappearance is the 
law of appearance, the urge, called vanity, is in vain. “Vanitas 
vanitatum vanitas”—all is vanity, all is in vain.
— (D XXVII.84.796)
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in the form of an initial outline (D XXVII.64.784–85)—is crystallizing into 
an argument about the nature of appearance (and disappearance) and the 
“thinking- I.” They also show us, in a way perhaps more intimate than nearly 
any other section of the thought- diary, how consummately absorbed in the 
world in which she lived Arendt’s thoughts were, and the depth with which 
she thought and felt through her own embodied place in it.
The centrality of ends in these entries highlights one of the unique vir-
tues of the Denktagebuch as a lens through which to look at Arendt’s thought 
more broadly: its ability to bring to the fore dimensions of Arendt’s pub-
lished work otherwise easily lost and help trace threads of those dimensions 
across different periods and writings. Instrumentality and the orientation 
toward particular ends were a perennial concern for Arendt’s work in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, and the critiques she puts forward in that period 
have been a central part of the rise in popularity of her thought in political 
theory and philosophy. In a series of works, particularly The Human Condi-
tion and the several iterations of “Culture and Politics,” Arendt highlighted 
the dangers of reducing the vita activa—particularly the sphere of action 
and politics—to the calculation and pursuit of predictable ends. “This 
instrumentalization,” Arendt warned, could result only in the “limitless 
devaluation of everything existing,” degrading “nature and the world into 
mere means, robbing both of their independent dignity.”3
One might be tempted, then, to read the turn in Notebook XXVII (and 
subsequently in Thinking) toward a concern for the place of ends in human 
life as a shift in Arendt’s thought, perhaps even a reversal on her previous 
decrial of those who would reduce the vibrancy of the public world to the 
service of means and ends. But reading Notebook XXVII in the context of 
Arendt’s early work also brings out the ways in which the place Arendt 
accords to ends in the vita contemplativa already had signifi cant echoes in 
her account of the vita activa that have gone underappreciated in the obvi-
ous salience of her discussions of ends- orientation for political thought. 
Perhaps ends were never such incorrigible villains for Arendt after all, but 
always had a role to play for what might be called her curious species of 
Platonism, in which each dimension in her account of the human condition 
was necessary but dangerous outside of its proper place. This is part of 
what makes the Denktagebuch compelling as an intellectual archive: It not 
only helps us better understand the nuances and interconnections of 
Arendt’s thought, but can sometimes allow us to reread our own readings 
of her, and reconsider what we thought we understood of her texts.
In Notebook XXVII, philosophy stands astride the senses of end, and 
brings them together as an examination of the “fi nal ends of human life,” 
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as she says quoting Kant, or with Leibniz’s “fi rst question,” “why there 
should be something, rather than nothing” (D XXVII.68.786). For Arendt 
here, the end of life returns us to the question of the ends of life, and think-
ing is a necessary “anticipation of dying,” a retreat from the world in which 
all things appear to each other, in order to give that world the meaning 
which its raw appearance alone cannot provide. In Thinking, thought’s 
mode of engaging the appearing world through removal fi nds its closest 
companion in art, “which transforms sense- objects into thought- things, 
tears them fi rst of all out of their context in order to de- realize and thus 
prepare them for their new and different function.”4 This intimacy between 
thinking, which makes meanings “for its own sake” (T 64), and art, the only 
ends/objects we make that are “strictly without any utility whatsoever” (HC 
167), is not only a repeated theme in Arendt but also a theme that connects 
those works most known for their apparent hostility toward ends- orientation 
(The Human Condition and the culture writings) and this work that is preoc-
cupied with ends, both purposes and deaths. The curious continuity makes 
it worth revisiting that well- documented anti- instrumentality of Arendt’s to 
see if, at the very least, there might not be just a bit more to the story.
Arendt’s Case against Ends
If nothing more than simply by dint of the object involved, it is not sur-
prising that a large part of the attention in political thought has focused on 
Arendt’s account of action as the defi ning activity of political and public 
life. This attention, both positive and negative, has in turn heavily struc-
tured the contemporary reception of The Human Condition. Arendt’s analy-
sis of action and speech as the “primordially and specifi cally human” (HC 
178) capacity through which we “insert” ourselves “into the human world” 
(HC 184) contains much of what is most novel and arresting in Arendt’s 
work, and it has become such a prolifi c wellspring of political thought in 
part because Arendt is able to contrast her understanding of action sharply 
with what she diagnoses as the primary misunderstandings of the political 
in our age. Chief among these, a misapprehension Arendt argues struc-
tured the turn in the social sciences toward econometrics and in turn the 
bureaucratic world of Washington toward the social sciences, is the attempt 
to understand and judge politics according to the standards of work, to 
reduce the meaning of political action to its means and ends, the usefulness 
of its outcomes.
For Arendt, one of the greatest dangers to action’s fragile power of 
allowing humans to “reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   164 11/2/16   11:12 AM
Facing the End 165
thus make their appearance” (HC 179) is, as Dana Villa succinctly puts it, 
the “instrumentalization of action and its degradation of the world of 
appearances.”5 Homo faber, one who works, in as much as what she is doing 
is working, approaches the world according to the value system germane to 
work and the creation of products: “everything is judged in terms of suit-
ability and usefulness for the desired end” (HC 153). According to Arendt, 
famously and contentiously, this way of understanding and evaluating the 
world is antithetical to the possibility of political action. For action to suc-
ceed at providing a sphere of expression and freedom, it needs an audience 
able to view it as such: “every act, seen from the perspective not of the agent 
but of the process in whose framework it occurs and whose automatism it 
interrupts, is a ‘miracle’—that is, something which could not be expected.”6 
“The issue,” as she puts it in The Human Condition, “is, of course, not instru-
mentality, the use of means to achieve an end, as such, but rather the gener-
alization of the fabrication experience in which usefulness and utility are 
established as the ultimate standards for life and the world of men” (HC 
157). In other words, the danger is not from instrumentality as such—with-
out instrumentality and the world- building work of Homo faber, there can 
be no shared world in which actors can appear to each other through 
action—but from evaluating all life, particularly political life and the 
other nonfabricating dimensions of the vita activa, through the lens of 
means and ends.
Perhaps the most vivid account of what happens when politics is reduced 
to utility comes when that possibility intersects the human capacity for self- 
deception, as it did, in Arendt’s analysis, during the decision- making pro-
cesses of the Vietnam confl ict. For Arendt, the problem of the Vietnam 
War’s organizers was neither their nearly endless capacity to lie—for “the 
fact that the Pentagon Papers revealed hardly any spectacular news testifi es 
to the liars’ failure to create a convinced audience”7—nor even their equally 
endless capacity to deceive themselves. The only way to fi nd an answer to 
the “How Could They?” of decision making concerning Vietnam was to 
realize how deadly had been the marriage of the capacity to deceive with an 
understanding of decision making itself that saw choices to act as reducible 
to quantifi ed data out of which instrumental outcomes could be calculated. 
It was the conjunction of the power to lie to oneself and others and an 
overridingly instrumental view of the conduct of war that brought disaster:
The problem- solvers who knew all the facts regularly presented to 
them in the reports of the intelligence community had only to rely on 
their shared techniques, that is, on the various ways of translating 
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qualities and contents into quantities and numbers with which to calcu-
late outcomes—which then unaccountably, never came true—in order 
to eliminate, day in and day out, what they knew to be real. (“LP” 36)
As Arendt frames it in The Human Condition, the terminal trouble with 
the universalization of Homo faber’s framework of instrumentality is that it 
unravels work’s own capacity to do what it must, to build a world for 
enduring habitation. The criteria of work not only threaten the possibility 
of beginning something unexpected in the world, they also, when applied 
to that work’s own output, ensure that the end- products of work them-
selves can never be valued as anything more than means to other, as yet 
undetermined ends. There is, for Arendt, a fairly literal sense in which the 
instrumentality of work makes value itself impossible, leaving our relation-
ship to our world “in the unending chain of means and ends without ever 
arriving at some principle which could justify the category of means and 
end, that is, of utility itself” (HC 154). Outside the world of politics, this is 
at its most dangerous for Arendt when applied to those products of work 
which, in their “outstanding permanence,” most “defy the equalization 
through a common denominator such as money” (HC 167), works of art.
The work of art occupies a unique place in Arendt’s account of politics 
and action, a kind of unstable bridge from the instrumental world of the 
worker to a public space that depends on it for survival. The artwork can 
perform its task of building “a home for mortal men, whose stability will 
endure and outlast the ever- changing movement of their lives and actions, 
only insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of things 
produced for consumption and the sheer utility of things produced for 
use” (HC 173). Works of art, for Arendt, are what allow action to survive 
the moment of its passing, the literal substance of which the stories of who 
we have been are made. As such, the most immediate danger to these 
“most intensely worldly of all tangible things” issues from the very men-
tality necessary to create them, the impulse to understand materiel as 
means to an end.
At the birth of modern mass society, this threat took (and takes) on a 
specifi c fi gure to which Arendt attaches the much older name of “philis-
tine,” one who “seized upon [cultural objects] as a currency by which bought 
a higher position in society . . . in this process, cultural values were treated 
like any other values, they were what values always have been, exchange 
values.”8 The rise of a form of society that “evaluated and devaluated cul-
tural things into social commodities, used and abused them” in turn paved 
the way for a translation of the social value of cultural objects into consum-
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ables, little more than another product to “serve the life process of society, 
even though they may not be as necessary for life as bread and meat” (“CC” 
205). This descent from the lonely status of invaluable preservers of the 
world- space of “mortal men” to merely another piece of “the biologically 
conditioned cycle of labor,” to “a metabolism feeding on things by devour-
ing them,” presents the last real possibility that works of art might cease to 
be able to hold open the space of appearance. “Many great authors of the 
past,” Arendt warns, “have survived centuries of oblivion and neglect, but it 
is still an open question whether they will be able to survive an entertaining 
version of what they have to say” (“CC” 208).
It would seem, then, that thinking and experiencing our world in terms 
of its ends, both past and projected, represented for Arendt a potentially 
mortal danger to the public and its space of appearance, and to action and 
its always unpredictable capacity to begin something new and reveal who 
we are to each other. Certainly, Wout Cornelissen makes a persuasive case 
in his essay here that in the early Denktagebuch this was still very much a 
driving concern for Arendt, and that she extends that set of concerns to 
thinking as well, when she writes that in reducing our experience of the 
world to making we have “everything has been split into contemplative 
thought, in which the ‘Ideas,’ the ends, etc. are given, and into violent 
action, which realizes these contemplated ends by violent means.”
One response to this problem is to search for a way to understand think-
ing—in fact a way to think—which removes thinking from the realm of 
making, Herstellen, and transforms it into something else, something less 
violent, an approach Wout Cornelissen in this volume points out Arendt 
attributed to Jaspers, and to some extent undertook herself, with mixed 
results. Another approach, however, one that Arendt seems to take in the 
late Denktagebuch, is to ask whether the troubled family relation between 
thinking and means- and- ends might not be so wholly destructive as one 
strand of her thought might suggest. Notebook XXVII shows, in part, that 
the seeds of this reconciliation were already present in her narrative about 
making and action, thinking and art. But the Denktagebuch also provides 
the intervening fi gure between the critique of instrumentality in The 
Human Condition and the end- fi lled character of thought in Thinking, the 
analytic knot that ties the two together: Arendt’s relationship to death, 
both the end of one part of the story of a who and, paradoxically, the 
beginning or origin of thought. While Elisabeth Young- Bruehl is right to 
say that the substance of Arendt’s move from Heidegger lies in the fact that 
she adds an equal “concern with birth” to way that the latter’s “work is 
weighted toward the future experience of death,”9 Notebook XXVII seems 
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in many ways to return to the emphatic interconnection of ends that Hei-
degger was only beginning to articulate when Arendt studied with him. 
The notebook begins to fi ll out Arendt’s suggestion that thinking needs 
ends to do what it does, and that the ends of thought might be as integral 
part of what it means to take one’s place in the world of appearances as the 
action which reveals our “who” to others. Perhaps this is a change of heart, 
a softening toward ends as the world seemed more full of them, but per-
haps Arendt was also simply returning to the scene of ends’ crime, so to 
speak, to do something like right by their place in her own story.
Thinking, Philosophy, and the End
It is a curious enough moment, given her historical hostility toward being 
called a philosopher, to fi nd Arendt, as she mulls thinking and the ends of 
thought, invoking Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as “thinking, inso-
far as it refers only to itself,” that “special case of thought” which takes as 
its “end” “its own self- recognition” (D XXVII.67.785–6). After all, this 
thinking about the ends of thinking is precisely what Arendt has taken on, 
in what would be her last completed work, which brought her work closest 
to Philosophy, the magnum opus of her great friend and mentor Karl Jas-
pers.10 To be sure, Arendt’s late thoughts on this peculiar species of think-
ing are not an unambivalent endorsement of that of which she was once so 
vocally suspicious. She wryly observes, “All metaphysical fallacies are the 
fallacies of professional thinkers” (D XXVII.68.786), and it is often diffi -
cult to tell, without looking in Thinking for an endpoint that is not yet 
there in the Denktagebuch, whether her notes on Kant and Hegel are imply-
ing an agreement or setting the stage for a critique. But in taking on think-
ing about thought, Arendt brings philosophy into the dialogue begun by 
thought and art as evidence for the permanent interconnection of thought 
and our ends, both of means and of life.
Through philosophy’s entry into Arendt’s thoughts, the peculiar illumi-
nating role that death plays in revealing the character of thought and phi-
losophy appears here in a particularly beautiful form that survives only 
much diminished in Thinking. In Notebook XXVII, the primary charac-
teristic of thought is that it is by its very nature deathly. The proximity of 
the two is not just an organizing metaphor for her understanding of the 
function of thought in the human life- world, but in the lives of men and 
women forms a fabric of what they are able to think, and when. Arendt 
fi nds in this tie between life- horizon and thought an explanation for the 
central paradox of what she calls the Greek (Platonic) view on philosophy, 
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that it can be practiced only by “the youth” and “the elderly.”11 The para-
dox is only a paradox, according to Arendt, if one does not place thought 
in the context of the birth and death of a singular Who.
Remembering that thought can only occur in one who has been born 
and who will die, and never without those two conditions, reminds us not 
only of one limit to thought, but also begins to answer the question, “What 
makes us think?” (D XXVII.58.782). “When we are born,” Arendt writes, 
“we are confronted with what appears only once, with the sensuously per-
ceptible. Since we are born as a stranger in it . . . we are overwhelmed with 
astonishment, and our questions are aimed at becoming recognized in it” 
(D XXVII.55.780). Thus the condition of natality, of being and being 
capable of the radically new, meant for the Greeks that philosophy was 
“reserved for the new,” “the youth” (D XXVII.55.781). This centrality of 
natality appears very early in Arendt’s work, and Jeff Champlin’s essay here 
examines its appearances earlier in the Denktagebuch. This last notebook 
provides the other end of that story, for although “our astonishment 
decreases proportionately as we become acquainted with the world,” as we 
approach the end of life the confrontation with death “again calls every-
thing into question.” At the end, the question is no longer that posed by 
the irreducible particularity of the sensuous world “with which we had 
become familiar,” but “the ‘whole point,’ ” “and that is why philosophy is, 
then again, a matter for the elderly, or those who can imagine/have been 
introduced to the end” (D XXVII.55.781).
If Arendt’s self- description in Thinking of her own philosophical project 
is one of reversing the historical prioritization of the internal world of the 
soul and mind in order to center the shared world, the world of appear-
ances, then from the perspective of that shared world thinking itself is both 
a prelude and analog of death, of the end that will remove each who, but 
not their story, from the space of appearance. “What in thinking only 
occasionally and quasi- metaphorically happens, to retreat from the world 
of appearances, takes place in aging and dying as an appearance . . . in this 
sense thinking is an anticipation of dying (ceasing, ‘to cease to be among 
men’) just as action in the sense of ‘to make a beginning’ is a repetition of 
birth” (D XXVII.76.792). Disappearance is simply the law of the appearing 
world, the “the price we the living pay for having lived,” and “to not want 
to pay this price,” Arendt muses, “is miserable” (D XXVII.66.785).
Thinking doubly mimics this impending disappearance: We retreat 
from the shared world into our selves, and in making that shared world 
into the object of thought, we remove from it the sensuous quality that it 
had in order to prepare it for thinking. As Arendt later puts it in Thinking, 
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thinking requires a kind of repetition of the world, and “by repeating in 
[our] imagination, we de- sense whatever had been given to our senses” (T 
87); or in the Denktagebuch, “in thinking everything is un- realized. I can 
think everything, but as something thought it is no longer actual” (D 
XXVII.67.786). Thinking, “when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself” (D XXVII.53.780),12 involves the end of both our selves as appear-
ances, and the world we remake in thought.
This deathly character of thought raises the question of the ends of life, 
but it also raises the question of the ends of thought itself. Why, Arendt asks 
with Kant, think at all, if it can be practiced only as the metaphorical death 
of our selves and our world? “No one will doubt that in thinking I withdraw 
from the world,” she writes, “even if my thought concerns world- objects. 
The fi rst question is: What do I lose, what do I gain through this with-
drawal?” (D XXVII.52.779). It is in exploring this question, via the opera-
tion of thinking itself, that Arendt introduces a term that might look 
paradoxical, looked at from the viewpoint of Arendt’s own description of 
thought as without end: the thought- object.
Perish the Thought
The intimate connection between the end of life and ends of thought leaves 
thinking in an apparent paradox, one that will turn out to refl ect on more 
than the thinking activity, alone. For all that Arendt is at pains to remind us 
that thought is itself endless in general and seemingly has no purpose but its 
own continuation, she notes that it nevertheless requires ends to go about 
its work, and though it has no purpose but its own, that is not the same 
thing as saying that it is endless. Thought is then endless only from the 
perspective of human being as the thinking- I, the secondary spectator of 
sorts to its own thought, an I that understands its existence as bounded by 
its own end; viewed from the perspective of its process, thinking is itself a 
kind of making of ends. Just as thought requires withdrawal from the world, 
so too must all things which are thought be withdrawn from appearance to 
join the thinking- I. It is through the deathly process of desensation that the 
world of appearances is made into something that can be thought, trans-
lated from the raw data of the sensory into a mental image. This power, for 
Arendt via Augustine, is called imagination, in a cleverly literal interpreta-
tion of the term: to generate the image by removing things from the world 
of appearances and, in their withdrawal, prepare them for the possibility of 
being thought.
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Imagination is only the fi rst step in the “process of preparation” by 
which world- objects become this new thing called “thought- objects,” 
however. To think a thing also requires remembering it, its recollection 
“from the storehouse of memory” to return as the “deliberately remem-
bered object” (T 77).13 “Thought- objects come into being only when the 
mind actively . . . remembers, recollects, and selects.” Only once we have 
these thought- objects can we begin the activity of thought around them, 
and for Arendt this is precisely the operative term: thought occurs around 
thought- objects, even when that thought- object is understood to be the 
thinking- I itself, which we must remember to contemplate. I can only 
think about myself insofar as I remember having been made present to 
myself in the past, by thinking, and my thought circles whatever object I 
hold in front of it even if that becomes the permanently refl exive process 
of holding my thought before itself. With that thought of ourselves before 
us, we can “go further” and begin to understand “things that are always 
absent, that cannot be remembered because they were never present to 
sense experience.”
This crucial last function of the imagination’s pairing with memory—
to bring thought- objects before our own mental gaze that were never liter-
ally a part of our material world—is, as Arendt began to shadow in her 
lectures on Kant at the New School and University of Chicago,14 pro-
foundly necessary to our capacity to be political. The ability to “remem-
ber” through imagination what we have never directly experienced is what 
allows us to make judgments in a world the political scope of which vastly 
exceeds our immediate perceptive capacity. Without the ability to imagine 
the worlds and subject- positions of others, to “train our mind to go visit-
ing” (LKPP 43) corners of the human world we share yet nevertheless do 
not know, we would be unable to make judgments that refl ect more than 
our particular preoccupations and self- interests. This specifi cally political 
infl ection of thought and imagination’s general capacity to create the 
thought- objects around which our minds can whirl already shadows, 
though, that there is a double analogy to the sphere of art— of the artist- 
worker, artwork, and spectator— only one side of which can be glimpsed 
in the earlier Kant Lectures without the Denktagebuch, and as such has 
largely escaped notice in the literature on Arendtian judgment.
In these late iterations in the Denktagebuch and Thinking, “thinking as 
such . . . every refl ection that does not serve knowledge and is not guided 
by practical needs and aims” (T 64) enables our political capacities to be like 
those of a discerning spectator of art, working the perspectives of others 
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into our own in advance without prioritizing our own material interests. 
Simultaneously, however, the imagining- remembering of thought- objects 
also brings our process of thought closest to the creative making of an artist. 
It is here that Arendt’s late redemption of at least certain kinds of ends- 
making fi nds its resonance with certain kinds of work in “The Crisis in 
Culture” and The Human Condition. Scandal though it may be to the strand of 
philosophy from Plato to the German Romantics which sees the vita contem-
plativa as possible only in quietude and freedom from earthly cares (a strand 
which it seems Arendt might be happy to bring into scandal), imaginative 
refl ection and meaning- making may for Arendt have more in common with 
the toils of the worker—at least, one particular kind of worker—than any 
other side of the vita activa.15
The central characteristic of the artwork which distinguishes it from the 
other products of work in The Human Condition is that despite being ends 
in one sense—some thing, an object produced through fabrication that on 
completion brings its fabricating process to a close—they nevertheless 
“are strictly without any utility whatsoever and . . . therefore defy equaliza-
tion through a common denominator such as money” (HC 167), and as 
objects “almost untouched by the corroding effect of natural processes” 
“can attain permanence.” In other words, artworks are endful only from 
one perspective, that of production, and are endless from both the per-
spective of the human being as a spectator (paradigmatically here the 
exchange market) and as a mortal bound by natality and death. The echo of 
Thinking’s construction of thought should already be apparent. While one 
could quibble with either characterization, Arendt’s point is that the appar-
ent paradox of an endless end appears a paradox only because in every 
other product of the sphere of work the three senses of end appear inextri-
cable from each other. Artworks are the form of work- object which pry 
apart the three senses of end, and in so doing form a kind of object with a 
different status altogether from other products of work.16 They can do so 
because, unlike “use things” whose “source” is “man’s ‘propensity to truck 
and barter,’ ” the “immediate source” of artworks “is the human capacity 
for thought” itself.
In Thinking, Arendt extends her story about this unique form of endful-
ness created by the proximity of art and thought to the direct products of 
thinking itself—metaphors and meanings—and in so doing partially dis-
solves the one major distinction between the mental products of thought 
and artworks as “thought things”: the process of reifi cation that “fabricates 
things of thought” (HC 169). This new frame of metaphors as “thought 
objects,” itself a metaphor, hinges on the idea of “actualizing” a set of 
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products that like artworks are ends only in the fi rst sense of term, from 
the perspective of their production. The most telling version Arendt pro-
vides for extending the essential analogy between the imagining of 
thought- objects and the making of artworks comes when she describes 
thinking as “the mental activity that actualizes those products of the mind 
that are inherent in speech and for which language, prior to any special 
effort, has already found an appropriate though provisional home in the 
audible world” (T 109). These thought- objects, “analogies, metaphors, 
and emblems are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world” and 
in their endlessness ensure the continuity of that world even when “[the 
mind] has lost direct contact with it.” In so doing, “the mind’s language by 
means of metaphor returns to illuminate and elaborate further what cannot 
be seen but can be said” (T 109). Unlike knowledge as a productive pro-
cess, “which uses thinking as a means to an end” (T 64), the objects of 
thinking are the products of a continuous process of “appropriating and, as 
it were, disalienating the world” in order “to come to terms with whatever 
may be given . . . whatever there may be or may have occurred” (T 100) 
through metaphorical connections which are in principle infi nite.
In the Denktagebuch, this same idea is reiterated in a brief confrontation 
Kant, who Arendt claims saw that the imagination’s function was fi rst and 
foremost to “compose” (and it is telling that Arendt focuses on Kant’s use of 
dichten) “under the strict supervision of reason” (D XXVII.49.776). How-
ever, Kant failed to understand that the importance of this compositional 
process lies in the fact that its products are not limited to an explanatory or 
expositive power (erklären) for grounding knowledge, but themselves make 
meanings, a thought- object which unlike an object of knowledge is “done 
for its sake” and begets a potentially endless train of further meanings, the 
“relentless and repetitive” (HC 110) activity of thought. The point echoes 
one made in her earlier “Truth and Politics” in which she distinguishes 
facts, which can be known, and meanings, which must be continuously 
created by humans in their web of social (and political) relations with each 
other.17 In “Truth and Politics,” the Denktagebuch, and Thinking, she 
repeatedly calls this process of world- making through the making of meta-
phors “the quest for meaning.” The “faculty of thought,” she writes, exists 
to “search” for meaning: as distinct from knowledge, thought “does not 
ask what something is or whether it exists at all—its existence is always 
taken for granted—but what it means for it to be” (T 57).
In a way, one might read the discussion of the relationship between art 
and thought in The Human Condition and Thinking as an analytic hourglass, 
the bottleneck of which lies in Notebook XVII’s consideration of the ends 
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of life. In The Human Condition, where the central concern of the relation-
ship between thinking and the work of art is the latter’s reifi cation of 
“words and deeds,” Arendt momentarily notes that “thought transforms 
[feeling’s] mute and inarticulate despondency . . . until [it is] fi t to enter the 
world and to be transformed into things, to become reifi ed” (HC 108).18 At 
this earlier point, though, because she is concerned with how the process 
of work can provide some kind of permanence to fragile a public world that 
is constantly perishing, Arendt emphasizes the distinctive importance of 
the “materializing reifi cation” with which work, in the work of art, must 
interrupt the endless play of thought. Art appears to create the lone sense 
in which it is an end, despite its uselessness and permanence, only by sac-
rifi cing the endlessness of thought. Thinking, however, transforms HC’s 
brief suggestion on thought into the idea that art and refl ective thinking 
both do the work of “transforming sense- objects into thought- things, 
[tearing] them fi rst of all out of their context in order to de- realize and thus 
prepare them for their new and different function” (T 49) in the quest for 
meaning. Though briefl y recognizing HC’s distinction between the two (T 
57), Thinking is more concerned with the essential continuity in the 
activities of the work of art and the work of thought—that they are ends 
in one sense and not ends in two others—than with the particular media 
by which the two promise a fl eeting world some degree of perpetuity. 
Between the two lies Notebook XVII, which pries apart the three senses of 
ends and their relation to each other in the thinking- I, as death, process, 
and purpose all push their way into Arendt’s thoughts and life.
Yet None so Terrible as Man
The Human Condition and Thinking each, in their separate ways, articulate 
decisively the proximate stakes of unraveling the meanings of “end” for 
their liminal objects, the artwork and thought- thing.19 In Arendt’s narra-
tive about the world- preservative power of art, our collective who’s (we) 
need an end of a work process whose purpose is to lend its immortality 
(endlessness) through materiality to action, which would otherwise die in 
the moment of its birth. In her last thoughts on thinking, “things of 
thought”—metaphors and meanings—are made in order to give us mental 
objects that, as concretizations in memory of the fl ux of our inner and 
outer worlds which is otherwise constantly passing away, allow us to con-
nect each piece of that life to another as we strive to fi nd (really, create) a 
purpose to the fi nite process of our lives together.20 The last thing that the 
intervening Notebook XXVII gives us is a glimpse of what joins the nature 
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of these two strange types of objects to another kind of bearer of ends 
altogether, perhaps the ultimate stake in their disentanglement of ends: the 
human being herself. The specter of our end, as what drives those facing 
“the development of our disappearance” (philosophers and the dying) back 
to the old metaphysical questions, is what brings answers to the question of 
“why exist” under the sphere of Kritik der Urteilskraft, judgment. It is, pre-
dictably, the beginning of philosophy (D XXVII.64.784; 74.791). It is 
also—and Arendt calls missing this “the essential error of Kant’s moral 
philosophy” (D XXVII.80.794)—the beginning of conscience.
Entry 80 is one of those moments in the Denktagebuch that, if left in the 
isolation that they appear in the reproduced notebooks themselves, are just 
rich and tantalizing enough to be utterly maddening in their truncation. It 
presents, in just two paragraphs, a brief, fragmentary, but potentially revo-
lutionary alternative account of the nature of morality as grounded not in 
Kantian practical reason, but in the relationship of judgment to conscience. 
In itself, it gestures only at the fact that there must be some connection 
between the fact that we “hide” “the bad from the world,” the exercise of 
taste, and the “instinct” (which is “probably nothing more than judgments 
of taste”) by which anything we do is “exposed to conscience.” Set against 
the backdrop against the ground Arendt has provided for disentangling the 
ends of human life, however, there is enough here to at least call this vision 
of conscience a promise, if not yet a theory.
Arendt closed her critique of instrumentalization in HC by noting that 
Kant’s moral philosophy presented a fi rst systematic attempt to free mod-
ern humanity from the grip of “the anthropocentric utilitarianism of homo 
faber” by relegating “the means- end category to its proper place and pre-
vent its use in the fi eld of political action” through his formula that “no 
man must ever become a means to an end.” Kant’s moralist solution to the 
political problem of “the blindness of homo faber to the problem of mean-
ing”—rendering each person as an end- in- herself—though, could succeed 
only in inventing utilitarianism’s “greatest expression.” As long as “the 
standards which governed its coming into being are permitted to rule it 
after its establishment,” every individual thing in Homo faber’s “world 
becomes as worthless as the employed material” (HC 155–156).
Articulated within the narrow frame of work’s instrumentality, under 
which the highest ends of the human world work builds are ultimately 
reduced to means, the circuit of means- ends itself remains closed and uni-
tary. Means remain the only terms through which to describe worth, because 
it is only in forms of usefulness that ends become valuable to Homo faber, and 
the categorical imperative, in accepting the terms of means- ends in exchange 
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for putting humanity as the ultimate ends, remains mute to defend the worth 
of human life beyond means. In other words, Homo faber’s world is worthless 
for Arendt in a literal sense, as long as the only framework for articulating 
worth is as further means. Work can guarantee a lasting world, but only 
activities that break apart the closed circuit of means- ends can bring the 
appearing world into that space of permanence still bearing other values.
Up to this point, Arendt’s point from the HC remains a familiar critique 
of Kant, not far from Nietzsche’s or Marx’s, albeit using her singular idiom. 
The combination of Arendt’s distinctive account of political action and 
heightened focus on appearances in Thinking, though, means that her cri-
tique of value enters into a quite different conceptual terrain and vision of 
politics when it intersects her late approach to ends. If, for Arendt, the 
political can only be set in the world of appearances, the dictates of con-
science—that is, a faculty of deciding how to act—too must be germane 
to that faculty structure not to convert those appearances to knowledge, 
but to make meanings of it. To know how to “do good or bad,” to act in a 
world, begins with the acknowledgment that our fellow humans must 
appear to us just as our actions must appear to them. When they appear, 
they do so not as strict ends in themselves but as makers of ends: as this line 
of thought from HC through Notebook XXVII to Thinking describes, 
beings capable of unraveling the tight means- ends braid by making mean-
ings through the partial ends of thought and art. In such a world, our rev-
erence for others cannot be saved by rendering them as an end to which no 
value can be given even if they are never a means. Conscience can only 
belong to the faculty capable of making their appearance to us mean some-
thing, this is, bear noninstrumental value through made meanings. And so 
Entry 80’s declaration of Kant “essential error”: he missed the defi ning 
reorientation that his own late architecture of reason should have given 
him, that this faculty through which “I can fi gure out the good” was not 
practical reason, the capacity to navigate means and ends, but “a kind of 
thinking,” refl ective thinking, or “the capacity to judge.”
Would this attempt to radically refi gure the place of the good in a world 
of appearances have worked to construct a new vision of political con-
science? Absent the terrible interruption of Heinrich’s death and her own 
decline, could Arendt’s working out in Notebook XXVII of the polyphony 
of certain kinds of ends—art, thought- objects, and ultimately human 
beings—have become a fully fl edged ethics, in the book Judging that was 
never to be? Or would this line of reason simply have become mired in all 
the basic moral dilemmas that “aesthetic” accounts of politics have been 
accused of creating since Walter Benjamin’s “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter 
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seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit” and Isaiah Berlin’s studies on the 
German and Russian Romantics, and which Seyla Benhabib had would 
soon accuse Arendt of having confused from the outset?21
Kant was famously plagued by the problems created by his separation of 
practical reason and judgment for political action. He seems to have 
resorted to a strict separation of perspectives—the perspective of the 
actor, who could only determine the right through moral reason; and the 
perspective of history, that of the spectator and judge—as the only appar-
ent way out, and this lead him into such strange alleys as a view of revolu-
tion as simultaneously admirable and absolutely forbidden.22 Arendt 
herself, in the last entry before Heinrich’s death, notes this separation of 
the stance of the spectator and, in a fl uid description that forms an almost 
surreal, dissonant echo with the entry it faces, calls this position a kind of 
“impartial” and “inhuman” wonder (D XXVII.85.796). Many since (for 
which we might assign a bit of blame to both the neo- Kantians and Hegel) 
have simply jettisoned the place of the spectator and treated Kant’s account 
of practical reason as his guide to action, full stop, consigning his views on 
the good and the right to an unsurprisingly politically unsatisfying deonto-
logical moralism. Arendt’s suggestion seems to be the opposite: that Kant 
should have pushed his account of how we should act in the public all the 
way in to the sphere of judgment, and embraced the last critical faculty as 
the place of politics. It is an intriguing proposition, from an enticing frag-
ment, in an absorbing volume, of an arresting thinker’s intellectual life—
perhaps one worth taking to the end.
notes
1. Though the Denktagebuch does not mention its source, the Latin 
quote from Ecclesiastes used in the epigraph to this essay appeared much 
earlier in Arendt’s writing as well, in the form of a warning in the chapter 
“Action” of what becomes “unavoidable wherever and whenever trust in the 
world as a place fi t for human appearance . . . is gone.” Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 204 (here-
after HC). Now, here, it appears not as a situation to be avoided by the pres-
ervation of a vibrant sphere of appearance, but rather an inescapable 
condition of the existence of a space in which we can appear.
2. This is Arendt’s own translation of these lines, which she also 
invokes, with the caveat that they are untranslatable, in her elegy to Brecht, 
“What Is Permitted to Jove . . .” Otherwise in this essay, where the original 
entry is in German, translations are my own.
3. HC, 156–157. Hereafter “HC.”
18834-Berkowitz_Artifacts.indd   177 11/2/16   11:12 AM
178 Ian Storey
4. The Life of the Mind (San Diego: Harcourt, 1971) (hereafter T).
5. Dana Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” Political Theory 20, no. 2 
(May 1992): 276. Villa has been one of the most consistent and thorough 
English- language interpreters of the anti- instrumental dimension of 
Arendt’s thought; of earlier importance was James Knauer’s defense of 
Arendt’s anti- instrumentality in “Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt’s 
Concept of Political Action,” American Political Science Review 74, no. 3 
(September 1980): 721–733.
6. “What Is Freedom,” Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1978), 459.
7. “Lying in Politics,” Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1969), 35 (hereafter “LP”).
8. “The Crisis in Culture,” Between Past and Future (New York: Pen-
guin Books, 1968), 204 (hereafter “CC”). It is this form of philistinism, which 
arose from a society in which the instrumental mentality produced members 
who “even when they had acquired release from life’s necessities, could not 
free themselves from . . . their status and position in society and the refl ec-
tion of this on their individual selves” (210–211), which in turn gave rise to 
the social problems of mass society, Arendt’s deeper concern in the fi rst half 
of the essay.
9. Elisabeth Young- Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1982), 76.
10. Karl Jaspers, Philosophie (Berlin: J. Springer, 1932).
11. For reasons of space and competence, I am bracketing the question 
of the source and accuracy of this characterization of the “Greek” view and 
hope that it will suffi ce suggest that Arendt is neither obviously right nor 
alone in this characterization, in that it can be found in several places in the 
post- Kantian trajectory of Schiller, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. In Thinking, 
she splits this description as between the Roman (the old) and Greek (the 
young) interpretations.
12. Quoting David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, I:6.
13. This emphasis on the deliberateness of reconstruction in memory is 
odd (insofar as it seems that perhaps the most powerful of memories are pre-
cisely those that return unbidden, or will not return whatever we will), but it 
also seems unnecessary for Arendt’s larger description of the operation of 
memory and thought to hold together.
14. Compiled and edited by Robert Beiner as Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) (hereafter LKPP).
15. This is already indicated by the argument of HC, in the midst of the 
section on the work of art, that “like fabrication itself, [cognition] is a process 
with a beginning and an end, whose usefulness can be tested, and which, if it 
produces no results, has failed” (171). There, however, the concern is a con-
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trast this character of cognition with thinking as “relentless and repetitive”; if 
there is a dimension of the argument of Thinking that represents a distinct shift 
in Arendt’s thought, it is on this specifi c sense of endfulness, and whether or 
not thinking shares with cognition this characteristic, and to what extent.
16. One important stake of this move in The Human Condition, which 
reappears in Notebook XXVII of the Denktagebuch, is that humans, too, as 
the workers of art and the thinkers of thoughts, represent for Arendt this 
same kind of end.
17. “Truth in Politics” was originally published in the “Refl ections” sec-
tion of The New Yorker, February 26, 1967.
18. Interestingly, Notebook XVII.79.793 appears to radicalize this claim 
to the point where it undercuts the connection between thinking and feeling 
itself. Arendt argues that “thinking and Feeling are in fact opposed to one 
another” because “to think, I need separation, distance; feeling takes on the 
felt in such an intensive proximity, that it is virtually one with its object. The 
distance even of knowing, not to mention recognizing, is completely 
destroyed in feeling.”
19. With respect to the subhead: In a move that would inspire 
responses from Kafka in the opening of Metamorphosis and Heidegger in a 
lecture reprinted in An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1959), Hölderlin translates the opening of the choral “Ode to 
Man” in Antigone as:
Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts
Ungeheuer als der Mensch.
20. A neat summary of this point can also be found at XXVII.52.779, 
where Arendt fi nds in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason the point that only the 
process of translating our sensations of the world makes it even possible to 
become conscious of our selves in the world: “To say: Ich existiere denkend, I 
need something (Beharrliches) permanent which is not given in inner intuition” 
without which “I could not even measure this fl ux against permanence.” In 
other words, in order to insert ourselves into the world, on Arendt’s reading of 
Kant, we must also remove ourselves from it.
21. Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in 
Arendt’s Thought,” Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988): 29–51.
22. This problem has a long and rich history in Kantian interpretation; 
in judicious review, see Christine Korsgaard, “Taking the Law into Our Own 
Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution,” reprinted in The Constitution of 
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 233–262. Arendt examines 
the actor/spectator distinction extensively in LKPP; see, e.g., 44, 55.
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